


THE KINGDOM PAPERS. No. 21

*With the compliments
of
John S. Ewart*

Imperial Projects
and
The Republic of Canada

By
John S. Ewart. K.C., L.L.D.

McCLELLAND, GOODCHILD & STEWART
PUBLISHERS, :::: TORONTO



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by
Author

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John S. Ewart. K.C., L.L.D.

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IMPERIAL PROJECTS
AND
THE REPUBLIC OF CANADA

(In order to draw attention to the purpose for which quotations are employed, italics not in the original are sometimes employed)

PAPERS STOPPED.—With the outbreak of the war, publication of the Kingdom Papers ceased. More impressed than most Canadians, I think, with the tremendous difficulties of the situation into which we had been suddenly plunged, I was more impressed also with the necessity not only for united action, but for cordiality in that action, and consequently for the suppression of debate, as far as possible, upon all separating subjects. Among those subjects was the one to which the Kingdom Papers were exclusively devoted, namely, Canada's constitutional relations; and, deeply as I was interested in my endeavor to rouse my fellow-countrymen to a sense of political dignity—to elevate them from the degrading slough of colonialism, and to give to them a position of honorable equality with the other nations of the earth, I felt that I must for the time abandon my advocacy.

IMPERIALISTIC ACTIVITY.—Imperialists have thought right to pursue a different course. Their scheme of federation, born in 1884, abandoned in 1893, lamented by Lord Rosebery (one of the past presidents of the Imperial Federation League) as “an impossible dream,” but revived by Mr. Lionel Curtis, is now being pressed in the United Kingdom with the utmost vigor, is finding some support in Canada, and, in the absence of opposition, is making some converts there. Other schemes, too, have been initiated—one of them of exceedingly dangerous character.

This activity does not accord with my own views as above stated, but I recognize that the imperialists see their chance: they imagine that war-enthusiasm may give to them that control of Canada which unclouded intellect always denied; they believe that war-fever may succeed where argument failed; and they cannot persuade themselves, even for the sake of necessary unity, to forego their opportunity.

THE PAPERS RECOMMENCE.—Not without some feeling of resentment have I witnessed the increasing strength of the propaganda, and at times (for example, upon the appearance of the publications of Sir John Willison and Mr. Lash) I have felt impelled to make reply. But I have refrained, and would have still remained silent had not Sir Robert Borden told us that he, as Prime Minister of Canada, had been taking part in proceedings which he described as "revolutionary changes in the government of the Empire" (a), and that he was sitting as a member of an "Imperial War Cabinet"; and had I not observed that he was pursuing a line of policy which could have for its purpose only the entanglement of Canada in the meshes of imperialistic projects. The Kingdom Papers must recommence.

"IMPERIAL WAR CABINET."—As long ago as 23 August, 1810, a Canadian official (H. W. Ryland) attended a meeting of the British cabinet held for the purpose of discussing Canadian affairs; and, before and since that date, many other similar incidents have occurred. What has never happened, and cannot happen, is the attendance at a cabinet meeting, as a member of the cabinet, of a person who is not a member. You may, by using language incorrectly, convey an erroneous impression upon the point, but the solid fact will remain unshaken. For example, Sir Robert Borden, referring to the authority of the British Prime Minister, is reported to have said:

"The recent exercise of that great authority has brought about an advance which may contain the germ and define the method of *constitutional development in the immediate future.*"

He alluded to the deliberations of what he called the "Imperial War Cabinet," and added:

"It is not for me to prophesy as to the future significance of these pregnant events; but those who have given thought and energy to every

(a) Toronto Mail and Empire, 3 May 1917.

effort for full constitutional development of the oversea nations may be pardoned for believing that *they discern therein the birth of a new and greater Imperial Commonwealth*" (a).

On another occasion, Sir Robert said:

"The profound influence of the war upon our Empire is already apparent. The very force of circumstances has brought about *an important advance in constitutional relations*. We sit in the *Imperial War Cabinet* to consider matters of common concern, while a British War Cabinet, meeting at other times, consider those appertaining more especially to the United Kingdom" (b).

PERNICIOUS NONSENSE.—That, of course, is nonsense. There are not two war cabinets. There is not even a "British War Cabinet." There is a British parliamentary cabinet, and only one. It devotes itself principally to the conduct of the war, and if you wish to mislead yourself, you may call it a "British War Cabinet"; but it is not. When Sir Robert and the other colonial representatives meet with the British cabinet, you may speak of the aggregation as an "Imperial War Cabinet"; but it is not. And when representatives of all the Allies meet in Paris, you may (as one of them did) apostrophise the conference as an "ally parliament"; but it is not. The British Cabinet is

"a committee of the party that has a majority in the House of Commons" (c).

It is

"a parliamentary executive, for it is in truth chosen by a very indirect process, and may be dismissed by the House of Commons, and its members are invariably selected *from among the members of one or other House of Parliament*" (d).

There will never be an "Imperial Cabinet" until there is an Imperial parliament. Sir Robert is no more a member of the British cabinet because he attended some of its sittings than is Mr. Balfour a member of the Canadian cabinet because he was present at some of its deliberations. In his speech in the House of Commons on May 18, 1917, Sir Robert slipped into the unexaggerated fact when he said:

"It was a remarkable body that was gathered together. First there were the members of the Cabinet of the United Kingdom, the five men

(a) The Times (London), 3 April 1917.

(b) The Times (London), 12 April 1914.

(c) Lowell: *The Government of England*, Vol. 1, p. 54.

(d) Dicey: *Law of the Constitution*, p. 483.

who constitute that Cabinet, but who call into counsel with them other members of the British Government whenever necessary" (a).

When "other members of the British Government" meet for counsel with the cabinet, they do not thereby become members of the cabinet. Nor do members of the Canadian government when they attend meetings of the cabinet.

Invention of the phrase "Imperial War Cabinet," as descriptive of the London consultations, is a dishonest exploitation of war enthusiasm for imperialistic purposes, and cannot be too strongly censured. It will mislead many people. It was originated for that purpose, and Sir Robert ought to have refused to participate in its propagation. That he is well aware of the deception is indisputable, not merely because he is an excellent constitutional lawyer, but because, when telling how innocuous (from the point of view of Canadian self government) the future meetings of the cabinet would be, he said:

"The ministers from overseas go there as the heads of their governments. They are responsible to their own parliaments; as the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom goes there responsible to his parliament. They go there as the representatives of independent governments, each responsible to independent Parliaments" (b).

In other words, instead of meeting as one cabinet, the delegates meet as representatives of several cabinets. One cabinet would mean collective responsibility. There is none.

WORSFOLD.—One of the most studious of the imperialists, Mr. Worsfold (a), states the simple truth when he says:

"The War Conference does not represent any new departure from a constitutional point of view. . . . Constitutionally the War Conference does not represent an advance towards the administrative unity of the Empire. We are consulting the Dominions in precisely the same way as we have consulted foreign (and Allied) nations at the Paris Economic Conference and the recent Rome Conference. To consult the Dominions by the method of the Conference and negotiation between governments is all that can be done, until a common Imperial authority has been constituted" (d).

(a) *Hansard*, p. 1599.

(b) *Ibid*, p. 1600.

(c) The author of *The Empire on the Anvil*.

(d) *The Empire: The Nineteenth Century*, March, 1917.

OBJECT OF THE FEDERATIONISTS.

CONTROL OF CANADA.—The single object of the imperialists is to provide for the eventuality of Canada not being willing to participate in some future British war. They wish to arrange, in advance, that, for all time and under all circumstances—wherever the war is, and for whatever cause, Canadians, however unwilling, shall be obliged to arm and fight. That is the imperialistic purpose, and not infrequently it has been frankly avowed.

IMPERIALISTIC STAGES.—Observe the three stages in imperialism as applied to Canada: (1) Until the introduction of free trade (in the 1840's), Canada was a British possession of considerable commercial value, and, for that reason, imperialists insisted, with statutes and soldiery, upon keeping control over her. The colonies were (to appropriate Lord Milner's rather mixed metaphor) regarded as

"so many satellites circling round the United Kingdom as a centre, and being compelled to dance to a tune of some Piper of Westminster"—

the Piper being the Colonial Secretary. (2) Free Trade having dissolved British monopoly, Canada's value disappeared, and "these wretched colonies" (referring principally to Canada) were spoken of as "a millstone round our [the British] neck." Canadians were told that they ought to "break the bonds and go," and they were allowed to govern themselves as they pleased (a). (3) Canada having become populous and rich, her value as a source of military supply was discovered; and imperialism set itself to regain the lost control. Disraeli, in an often-quoted speech, regretted that it had ever been surrendered, and Mr. W. E. Forster founded (1884) the Imperial Federation League.

TUPPER.—Sir Charles Tupper was a member of the League, and was one of the committee which framed its valedictory. He understood its purpose, and has left us the following:

"Knowing as I do, that the most active members of the committee were mainly intent on *levying a large contribution on the revenues of the colonies for the support of the army and navy of Great Britain*, I am delighted to have been able, almost single-handed, to obtain such a report from such a committee."

(a) New evidence that the Canadian federation in 1867 was hailed by British people as a step towards their release from association with us has recently been supplied by publication of the letters of Joseph Howe to W. S. Stairs in the Records of the Royal Society of Canada (1917).

FREEMAN.—The object of the League is well expressed in the language of the historian Freeman:

"The greatest and freest of colonies may at any moment find itself plunged into a war which may suit the interests or the fancies of the people of Great Britain, but which may, in no way, suit the interests or the fancies of the people of the colony. *It is to meet this difficulty that schemes have been of late largely proposed* for bringing about a nearer union between the mother-country and the colonies, and that in some shape other than that of dependence" (a).

CHAMBERLAIN.—Shortly after his return from the battle-fields of South Africa, Mr. Chamberlain commenced his memorable imperialistic campaign. Impressed with the value of the military assistance supplied by Canada, and the necessity for controlling it, he urged upon his electors (15 May, 1903) the need for the creation of "a new government for the British Empire"; and overlooking the effect in Canada, he pointed to the advantage of

"association with the growing colonies, without whose strong right hands and loyal hearts *you cannot keep your Empire*. . . . Think what it means to your power and influence as a country" (b).

Canada was to be regimented so that the power and influence of the British people might be sufficient for the maintenance of their Empire.

PHILLIPS.—That later-day imperialists are actuated by the same purpose as the earlier can be proved partly by easily demonstrated argument, and, perhaps more satisfactorily, by the actual language of some of its less discreet apostles. At the Royal Colonial Institute (20 June, 1916) for example, Sir Lionel Phillips, speaking of the present war, said that it

"has demonstrated that in a moment of great emergency, and in a case where the justice of the cause appealed with irresistible force to every part of the Empire, a Commonwealth parliament, having legislative rights over the whole, could hardly have produced more effective cohesion and co-operation."

That being true, one would think that Sir Lionel would have been satisfied to leave matters as they were. He proceeded:

"But although this enthusiasm and spontaneity have been awakened on the present occasion, *it does not follow that the same result might ensue upon other occasions* in the future when the British Empire may be drawn into war. The time, therefore, seems ripe for the creation of

(a) *Greece and Britain*, p. 46. Quoted by Ewart: *Kingdom Papers*, Vol. I, p. 48.

(b) Quoted, Ewart: *Kingdom Papers*, Vol. I, p. 47.

Imperial machinery for assuring hereafter better organization and greater certainty of combined action" (a).

DUVEEN.—Compelling machinery is what the imperialists want. Mr. Duveen, for example, has given us the following:

"May I, in passing, note that within a few years Canada, supposing her present progress continues, would be in a position to withhold her support from any war we might be engaged in, on the ground that her interests are not involved in the struggle. *I want to make such a contingency impossible*" (b).

That was not intended for Canadian eyes, but here it is.

WORSFOLD.—Mr. Worsfold, an old-time imperialist, in his recent work, *The Empire on the Anvil* remarks that the disinclination of the colonies to join in an imperial parliament is "the gravest defect in the existing system of Imperial administration. The resources of the Empire as a whole in men, money, and materials remain unorganized, and are, therefore, *only in part available for the Imperial Government*" (c).

LASH.—Mr. Lash, too, is perfectly frank. Replying to an attack upon his recent monograph, he said that his critic wanted Canada to be

"free from obligations to the mother country or the Empire, free at all times to assume or decline any such obligations, free to take part or to decline to take part in imperial defence, free to remain neutral when the Empire is at war" (d).

SUPPRESSION.—Disliking freedom of that sort, imperialists set themselves to evolve schemes for its suppression. And, however diverse the output, all embody the single purpose—namely, that no statesman (as Mr. Curtis tells us)

"will consider a system which will not enable them to frame a budget, submit it to parliament, and *obtain the cash, if necessary by a process of execution* against the taxpayers legally liable for supplying it" (e).

These gentlemen are to be commended for their courage and their frankness. When Canada is willing to participate in a war, she will send her men and money, not only without compulsion, but without request. But when she is unwilling (as in some Crimean or in some Chinese-opium war), imperialists insist that she must be compelled to participate, and that the "cash" may be obtained by "a process of execution against the taxpayers." Can anything be more fascinating?

(a) United Empire, August, 1916, p. 519.

(b) Lecture and Pamphlet, May 1910.

(c) P. 13.

(d) The Globe (Toronto), 22 January 1917.

(e) *The Problem of the Commonwealth*, p. 160.

CONSENT OR CONTROL.

GREATER STILL.—The honor roll of the imperialists is headed "Empire-builders." As their name implies, (a) they are always seeking for additions to their territory and striving for something more to govern. It may be Egypt, or the Transvaal, or Morocco, or Tripoli, or Persia, or the Balkans, domination of which has to be acquired by force. Or it may be Siam or China—Port Arthur, Wei-hai-wei, Kiao-Chou, or an area opposite Hong Kong; and, against pacifist peoples, the possession of force is sufficient. Or it may be Canada and Australia and New Zealand and South Africa; with consent of the inhabitants as the unique and unpleasing necessity.

PRUSSIAN PRECEDENT.—The British are supreme over nearly four hundred millions of people. No one of them ever voted for his subjection. Under pressure of war conditions, imperialists appear to imagine that Canada will willingly perform her *hara-kiri*. They are impressed, as is all the world, with the unexpected exhibition of colonial fighting power, and they acknowledge the ungrudging spontaneity of colonial contributions, but the very vastness of colonial fighting-value has whetted their imperialistic instinct to bring it under control. If, they say, the United Kingdom can be put into a position to issue orders to these places for men, money, and supplies as we need them, what a splendid thing for the United Kingdom! Germany has her Danes, Poles, Alsatians, Lorrainers, etc.; Austria-Hungary has her Czechs, Slovenes, Serbo-Croats, Galicians, Roumanians, etc. Why should not the United Kingdom have her Canadians, and Australians, and South Africans and New Zealanders?

PRUSSIANISM FAILED.—One good reason might occur even to imperialists (greedy for government and confident of its efficiency), namely, that control in Europe has failed, while consent in the British Colonies has produced unprecedented and almost incredible success. Why? Because men are men, and the good ones hate subordination. Is there an imperialist anywhere who imagines that orders from London would have

(a) In his Rectorial Address at Glasgow University, 1900, Lord Rosebery accurately defined imperialism as "the predominance of race": Quoted in Silburn, *The Governance of Empire*, p. 82.

enlisted 300,000 to 500,000 men in Canada? Of course not (a). But nevertheless all the imperialists wish to obtain power to issue orders in the future. They would nag Canada into ill-temper with enforced war-preparation; provoke disobedience to displeasing orders; and send the sheriff with his writs of execution.

AMERICAN EXPERIENCE.—That is precisely what the imperialists did in the case of the American colonies in the 1770's. Those places had not escaped from the control of the imperial parliament; the taxing power was intact; and, in its exercise, parliament required the colonies to contribute toward their defence; imposed taxes for that purpose; met with refusals; sent the collectors; sent regiments; and in 1778—two years too late—renounced the right to tax.

NOOSE FOR CANADA.—Canada inherited the benefit of the renunciation. The imperial parliament has not now the right to levy taxes upon her. And imperialists blandly propose that she should surrender her sovereignty; vest it in a parliament or council in which she would have a trifling representation; and comply with whatever requisitions that body might send to her. Being free, we are asked to put our heads into a noose, and confide the strings to the British electorate. How fascinating!

MR. CURTIS'S SCHEME.

MR. CURTIS.—Mr. Lionel Curtis is now the principal apostle of imperial federation. If energy, ability, and abundant financial resources can make it palatable, Mr. Curtis will succeed. His organization is remarkable, as well in extent as in character. A *Round Table* magazine, very ably conducted, and widely circulated; Round Table study groups, everywhere; books on *The Project of a Commonwealth* and *The Problem of the Commonwealth*; speeches and other propagandist activities, have undoubtedly made deep impression upon a great many people.

(a) In the course of his recent speech in the House of Commons (18 May 1917), Sir Robert Borden said: "I venture to think that the Dominions have done more for the common cause that we all have at heart in this war than could have been accomplished by any Imperial Parliament possessing the powers to which I have alluded" (*Hansard*, p. 1603).

MR. CHAMBERLAIN.—With courageous confidence, Mr. Curtis undertakes an enterprise to which Mr. Chamberlain referred as follows:

“To create a new government for the British Empire—a new government with large powers of taxation and legislation over countries separated by thousands of miles of sea, in conditions as various as those which prevail in our several dependencies and colonies—that, indeed, would be a duty *from which the boldest statesman might shrink appalled*” (a).

FEDERATION.—Mr. Curtis proposes the usual form of federation—a federal parliament, with legislative jurisdiction over everybody—British, Canadian, Australasian, Malayan, Hindu, etc.; and a local state (b) parliament for each member of the federation—namely, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Of such a proposal, Sir Frederick Pollock, a very enthusiastic imperialist, has said:

“I am not aware of any reason for thinking that the Parliament of the United Kingdom would easily be persuaded to reduce itself by a solemn act to a *mere state legislature*, or that the colonial governments would be willing to surrender any substantial part of their autonomy to some federal state or council.”

FEDERAL JURISDICTION.—Recognizing that the present parliaments would be loathe to surrender their powers, Mr. Curtis proceeds to indicate the minimum amount of jurisdiction that must be given up to the federal parliament, namely: (1) foreign affairs, (2) the army, (3) the navy, (4) India, (5) the dependencies, and (6) finance sufficient for those purposes. The federal parliament is to consist of a single chamber; to have authority to regulate its expenditure as it pleases; to distribute liability among the states as it thinks right (upon the basis of tax-bearing capacity); and to enforce payment in case of recalcitrance. There is to be a parliament; an opposition, as its usual accompaniment; and the customary elections for membership.

THE TARIFF.—While Mr. Curtis proposes a federation, he omits from the powers given to the federal parliament that which has always been thought to be essential to the proper functioning of a federation, namely, control of the tariff. That he leaves to the individual states, each of which may legislate

(a) Address to Canadian Club, London (Eng.) 25 March 1896.

(b) Mr. Curtis prefers the term *Dominion*, but the word is not only inaccurate but confusing.

as it pleases—give preferences, make concessions, treat equally, or make tariff-war. Canada may enact continental free trade, and recoup herself by heavier taxes on British manufactures. Australia may enter into separate arrangements with Germany, and send all her wool to Hamburg. Does anybody imagine that the United States would have lived for twenty years with state-control of the tariff? (a). Do you know what keeps Austria and Hungary together?

A WAR UNION.—Looked at more closely, Mr. Curtis's scheme is not so much a federation as a war-union—a war-union of unique type. Heretofore arrangements for war-cooperation have taken the form of treaties, or at most of confederations—mere unions of states (not of peoples) without any central or federal parliament. Mr. Curtis proposes a union for the purpose of war only, but a union in which there is to be a war-parliament. That is something for which there is no precedent. Let us examine it.

A WAR-PARLIAMENT.—Parliament of the British type performs two functions. It legislates, and it makes and unmakes executives, called cabinets. What would Mr. Curtis's war-parliament do? He assigns to it six subjects of jurisdiction.

1. FOREIGN POLICY.—Constructive foreign policy, the British parliament never debates. In bygone days, the opposition were wont to heckle and worry ministers in connection with pending negotiations. But experience conclusively proved that while that procedure might be beneficial to the opposition, it was certainly injurious to the nation. And the practice was dropped. Foreign policy is now left completely in the hands of the cabinet, and Mr. Curtis probably would not suggest that his imperial parliament should adopt the abandoned system.

2 and 3. THE ARMY AND NAVY.—Usually very little time is spent upon questions concerning the army and navy. Big or little navy sometimes comes under discussion, but, that settled, all details are left to the executive.

4 and 5. INDIA AND DEPENDENCIES.—Once a year the Secretaries for India and the Colonies make their annual statements. Some unusual action (such as Lord Morley's civil reforms) may raise debate, but generally two or three speeches are all that are heard.

(a) Cf. Curtis, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

6. FINANCE.—Mr. Curtis proposes that settlement of ratios of state-contributions should be fixed by a Board of Assessors. If that be done, and the action of the Board is to be final, debate on the budget can involve one principal subject only—namely, big or little army and navy. If the action of the Board is not to be final, debate may last indefinitely; and the longer it lasts, the madder will wax the members.

NOTHING TO DO.—Parliament then is to be summoned from the four quarters of the globe to debate one subject—the size of the army and navy; possibly a second—the ratios of contributions; and to listen to reports upon India and the Dependencies. There being only one or two subjects of dispute, it will be upon it or them that the cabinet will frame a policy, and upon it or them that the opposition will take issue—the cabinet (we may say) proposing (1) “reasonable” or “adequate” preparation, and their opponents insisting upon something much more “reasonable” or “adequate”; and (2) a certain schedule of ratios, to which nearly everybody will make objection. The elections, too, will turn upon this one or these two subjects—big or little preparation and the ratio schedule. Could anything be more ridiculously absurd?

PARLIAMENT INAPPROPRIATE.—Very plainly, the most obvious objection to Mr. Curtis’s scheme is the inappropriateness of the machinery to the work that is to be done. A parliament is to be got together at enormous expenditure of time, money, and effort. It is to contain (perhaps) the best men in the constituencies. And it is to do almost nothing. Turn over the pages of the British statute book, and you will not find, on the average, one enactment in a year upon the subjects which Mr. Curtis proposes to hand over to his imperial parliament. The work of his parliament is almost entirely the work of an executive.

BRITISH CONTROL.—Mr. Curtis would protest that, although there is little for the parliament to do, yet that that little is of the very greatest importance and cannot be done in any other way—namely, that *the resources of the whole Empire have been made available by a paramount parliament*. That is true, but it ought to be amended to read: THE RESOURCES OF THE WHOLE EMPIRE HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

BY THE SIMPLE METHOD OF CASTING THE MAJORITY VOTE. For, as Mr. Curtis explains,

"It is true that for some time the United Kingdom would retain a preponderance of votes in the Imperial Parliament" (a).

In other words, the United Kingdom is to have the dominating position which gives to Prussia her authority in Germany. Whatever the United Kingdom requires, the colonies must do. Is not that a situation (Mr. Curtis may think) which amply justifies the elections, and the travel, and the time, and the money—THE RESOURCES OF THE WHOLE EMPIRE AVAILABLE TO THE BRITISH PEOPLE?

UNICAMERAL.—Although, as competent authority tells us,

"No one attempt at introducing the unicameral system in large countries has succeeded" (b),

Mr. Curtis proposes that very system for the parliament of much the greatest aggregation that ever existed. And the suggestion, as Mr. A. Berriedale Keith points out,

"has at least the merit of not being flatly absurd as would be the suggestion that there should be an upper house with equal representation of the Dominions and the United Kingdom in order to preserve the true federal principle, a view which would never be accepted by the people of the United Kingdom as long as the discrepancy between the population of that Kingdom and of the Dominions is so marked" (c).

Mr. Curtis's reasons for proposing a single-chambered parliament are very obvious:

1. If he were to suggest that admission to a second chamber should be limited to titled gentlemen, what would the democracies say?

2. If he were to open the doors to everybody, what would the British aristocracy say? And what would become of the aristocrats? Could then retain, in their state parliament, privileges which were unrecognized in the federal?

3. Would he apply to his federation "the true federal principle" of equality in state representation—the same number of members for each state; and thus abandon British control?

4. Would not the farce of two chambers, summoned from the ends of the earth, with little to do but look at one another, be much too broad to propose in a cloth-covered book?

(a) *Op. cit.*, p. 217.

(b) Creasy, in *The English Constitution*, p. 179.

(c) *The Ideal of an Imperial Constitution*: Canadian Law Times, 1916, p. 842.

NO MIDDLE WAY.—With the authority supplied by ability, prolonged study, elaborated consultations, familiarity with the teaching of history, and the friendly assistance of eminent statesmen, Mr. Curtis tells us that, in order to obtain a share in the control of our foreign affairs, we must comply with certain conditions. One of them—that we must participate in the control of India and the Dependencies—will be dealt with on a later page. As a second condition, Mr. Curtis declares that the Dominions must surrender “the exclusive right of taxation”—

“ . . . they must either forego this exclusive right, or else forego their status as citizens of the greatest Commonwealth that the world has seen. *There is no middle way, and it is idle as well as dangerous to mask the alternatives before us*” (a).

NO OTHER POSSIBILITIES.—Mr. Curtis is undoubtedly right. The principal difficulty with which the writer of the Kingdom Papers has had to cope was the absence of some such clear and authoritative statement as that just quoted (b). The usual reply to similar assertions in the Papers was that which Professor Falconer applies to the Curtis and Lash schemes, namely, that “these do not exhaust the possibilities” (c). Mr. Curtis’s book has now given to that sort of reply an appearance of mere desperation, and it has placed heavily upon those who assert the existence of other possibilities the onus of producing one of them.

The Founder of the Imperial Federation League (1884), Mr. W. E. Forster, foresaw the mischief which would happen should any of his apostles formulate a scheme of federation. He said that:

“he thought that those were the foes of union, or at any rate sceptics and unbelievers in it, who would ask them to define, then, what shape federation should assume.”

Messrs. Curtis and Lash have disregarded the warning. They have published their proposals, and they have enabled everybody with little effort to arrive at confident decision between colonialism, imperialism, and nationalism. Without their books, there would always have remained a suspicion of the possibility of other possibilities. That feeling cannot long survive the failure to suggest some other proposal.

(a) Op. cit., p. 215.

(b) Kingdom Papers, Vol. I, pp. 166, 8.

(c) Toronto Globe, 2 May 1917.

MR. LASH'S SCHEME.

A NOVEL CONTRIVANCE.—Mr. Lash agrees with Mr. Curtis in desiring the creation of a “central authority” with both legislative and executive power, but while Mr. Curtis adopts and misapplies the well-known federal principle, Mr. Lash constructs something of which the only merit is its originality. He objects to reduction of the present British parliament to the position of a state parliament, and he objects, therefore, to a new imperial parliament. What he wants is an “Imperial Council” with “plenary executive and legislative powers and authority” over subjects which may be summarized under the heads, foreign policy, army, navy, finance, censorship, pensions, eminent domain, courts

“for the better administration of the laws in relation to any matter coming within any of the classes of subjects enumerated in this clause, and the appointment and payment of the Judges of such Courts” (a).

Control of India and the colonies is left with the British parliament.

The Council is to consist of

“the Crown and a small number of elected representatives from the United Kingdom and the Dominions, and representatives from India (not necessarily elected)” (b). “The members should ordinarily reside in England and be prepared to devote their whole time to the business and requirements of the Council” (c).

That is necessary because:

“Foreign affairs, as a rule, by their very nature do not admit of public discussion while they are being conducted; they do require continuous discussion and attention by the ablest men of the nation. They sometimes require quick action, both executive and legislative” (d).

A CAMARILLA.—Of Mr. Curtis's scheme, Mr. Lash truly says that it

“would appear revolutionary and would certainly be fraught with danger.”

Mr. Lash being an old friend of mine, I refrain from telling him what Mr. Curtis must think of his plan. For if Mr. Curtis proposes inappropriate machinery for the conduct of foreign affairs, it is at all events machinery that we are familiar with,

(a) *Defence and Foreign Affairs* (1917), pp. 79, 80.

(b) *Ibid*, p. 44.

(c) *Ibid*, p. 46.

(d) *Ibid*, p. 43.

and (when properly constituted) can be trusted; whereas Mr. Lash proposes a mere camarilla—something which nobody would trust or even try to respect.

He may say that foreign affairs are now conducted by the Foreign Office, which I may, if I wish, call a camarilla; but the difference is that the Foreign Office is responsible to a parliament; that the Foreign Secretary may at any time be asked to tell parliament what he is doing; and that parliament may at any time put an end to him. Mr. Lash's Council is to be the Foreign Office. Its meetings and discussions will, for the most part, be secret (*a*). Nobody can question it. Nobody is to have control of it. It tells what it pleases, and does as it likes, until the next election.

Do not tell me, that just as there is now a Foreign Secretary responsible to parliament, so there will be a Foreign Secretary responsible to the Council. That is not the scheme. The Council is to be the executive, and, for that purpose, is to sit continuously. Its Foreign Secretary will take his daily orders from the Council and through his staff will put them into operation. The Council—the executive—will be responsible to nobody, except at the elections, to people who can be told, in part only, what has been done.

ISSUING ORDERS.—Incredible as it may appear, Mr. Lash actually proposes that this little junta ("The membership should be kept down as low as possible" (*b*)), sitting cozily in London, with comfortable salary ("They should be well paid" (*c*)) is to issue its unappealable war-orders to all the six state parliaments. But that proposal, extraordinary as it may seem, is only imperialism raised to a war-crazed degree. For it is merely the most effective method ever yet suggested of placing Canadian resources unreservedly under imperial control. Mr. Curtis would let us have something of the appearance of a popular parliament, with open discussions, and declared policies, and appeals to electors as between opposing views. But Mr. Lash sees danger in all that. Why ought not a few men control all the parliaments, and tell them what they ought to do?

(*a*) Foreign affairs, Mr. Lash says, "do not admit of public discussion while they are being conducted"; treaties should be published, and sometimes the substance of negotiations; estimates of expenditure, and the reports and accounts "should be presented and explained in public" (Pp. 43, 44).

(*b*) *Op. cit.*, p. 45.

(*c*) *Ibid.*, p. 46.

If Imperialism is right, why not have it *in excelsis*?

To which, perhaps a sufficient answer is, that, some hundreds of years ago, the British people escaped from camarilla control of their foreign affairs; that they have not quite forgotten what it meant; and that, rightly or wrongly, they are somewhat firmly convinced that they will never return to it.

PROFESSOR MILNER.—There are probably very few people in Canada who will not agree with Professor Milner, another imperialist (I should think), when he says that

“Mr. Lash was perhaps too absorbed in the intellectual interest of its solution”,

and that adoption of his scheme would mean

“so violent a break with the past as to dismay our cautious, practical people.”

PRESIDENT FALCONER.—Probably President Falconer would agree both with what Mr. Lash says about Mr. Curtis and with what Professor Milner says about Mr. Lash, for, in a letter to *The Globe* (a), he said:

“You seem to complain that the Round Table has not committed itself to the schemes set forth by Mr. Curtis or by Mr. Lash. The reason is that many of the members of the Round Table have not been satisfied with either proposal; but these do not exhaust the possibilities.”

The President would wish that we should become “full partners in a commonwealth of nations,” but what that may mean, he does not say.

FRYING PAN AND FIRE.

PRESENT POSITION INTOLERABLE.—For their schemes, imperialists offer the clever and insidious, but hollow and sophistical plea that the present relationship is unfair to the colonies; that colonies have been plunged into the present war without having had a voice in the diplomacies which preceded it; and that, for the future, their rightful demand for consultation ought to be conceded. Long prior to the war, and to the discussion in connection with naval preparations for war, the present writer pointed to the rank unfairness of the situation, and urged that Canada, like other nations, should go to war, not as an adjunct of another nation and merely because she

was an adjunct, but when, in the exercise of her own judgment, she so decided.

SOMETHING WORSE.—Navy debates, and now war itself, have made it clear to everybody that the relationship is, as Sir Robert Borden has expressed it, intolerable; and admitting that some change must be made, imperialists propose that, out of the frying pan, Canada should voluntarily flop over into the fire; that we should give up the measure of freedom which we now have; and that we should bind ourselves by an irrevocable constitution to obey orders from London.

PRESENT LIBERTY.—At present, if the United Kingdom were to engage in a war which we did not approve, and did not desire to join in, we could take one of two courses:

1. We could declare our neutrality, and as Mr. Curtis says, "the enemy in the present war would most gladly have recognized it" (a). The same remark would apply to war with every country except the United States.

2. Or we could announce that we intended to confine our operations to the defence of our own territory, and by that announcement practically secure (save in the case of war with the United States) that no attack would be made upon us.

LIBERTIES TO BE OBLITERATED.—It is for the express purpose of obliterating these liberties that the imperialists propose to entangle us in some sort of war-union. Pretending to admit that the position of an adjunct is unsatisfactory, they expand the status of a doubtfully attached appurtenance into that of a constitutionally established bond-slave, and tell us that we ought to be delighted with their concurrence in our views. Observing that when the United Kingdom is at war, the colonies also are at war, but (except at the will of the colonies) in theory only, imperialists propose to change our position, not only by striking out the volition, but by giving to the United Kingdom conscriptive authority over men, money, and resources. That is, Mr. Curtis asserts, the only way in which

"a British subject in the Dominions can acquire self-government in the same degree as one domiciled in the British Isles" (b).

PRESENT INFLUENCE.—Left with her present liberties, Canada may rest assured that, in the future, some care will be

(a) P. 3.

(b) Curtis, *op. cit.*, p. vi.

taken by British Foreign Secretaries that their policies and proceedings are not quite out of harmony with Canadian feeling, and that some regard will be paid to Canadian opinion. Establishment of a central authority, on the other hand, would effectually relieve the Secretaries from all unpleasant embarrassment of that kind. The representatives of Canada would be patronized into concurrence in imperialistic views. Her titled and title-hunting hostages would outrun request and anxiously anticipate all demands. And should the impossible occur,—should social pressure fail, should tawdry ribands and gentlemen's garters lose their persuading power—the dominating vote would suppress all ill-mannered dissent. At present Canada has some little influence upon the foreign policy which binds her. She would have none under either of the proposed schemes and Professor Keith (x) is safe in suggesting that—

"It may therefore be regarded as in the highest degree doubtful whether these Dominions would be willing to consent to the establishment of a central power to deal with foreign policy, since the degree of control which their representatives would *de jure* exercise would be negligible, and, by reason of that creation of a central power, the amount of control *de facto* now exercised over the foreign policy of the United Kingdom would at once disappear" (a).

PRUSSIAN PRECEDENT.—If anybody were to say that a German living in Stuttgart has influence in war affairs "in the same degree as one domiciled" in Berlin, Mr. Curtis would not fail to point to the fact that, owing to her prepondering population, Prussia is practically omnipotent, and that one share in omnipotence is much more substantial than a hundred shares in impotence. The case of the colonies, in the proposed imperial Parliament or Imperial Council, would be still worse. For if Prussia is *practically* dominant in Germany, the United Kingdom, in the London central authority, would be *absolutely and unqualifiedly* omnipotent. Prussia cannot outvote all the other states, but it is precisely that power that the United Kingdom is to possess.

BRITISH CONTROL.—War-unions will never appeal to anybody in the British Isles, except upon the one condition, that complete control shall remain in the hands of the British people. If, by conceding the appearance of a share in that control, imperialists can bring the giant colonies to British assistance,

(x) University of Edinburgh.

(a) Can. Law Times, 1916, p. 839.

the appearance may be conceded—provided that it is an appearance only, and not in the least like a reality. If anyone should be inclined to dispute this, let him picture to himself what luck the imperialists would have were they to say to the British people:

“Our proposal is, that the complete control of all matters relating to foreign policy and war, including the British navy and army, shall be handed over to a central authority in which representatives from the British Isles and four or five other countries shall determine what is to be done.”

That, of course, would not do, and the imperialists must add:

“The constitution of the central authority will be such that British control will practically remain the same as before.”

And so Mr. Curtis assures his British readers, that

“for sometime the United Kingdom would retain a preponderance of votes”,

and adds, for his Canadian readers:

“though the lapse of a few generations is likely to transfer that position to Canada” (a).

What fantasy! The British Isles taking their foreign policy from a parliament dominated by Canadians, and depending for their defence upon the views of the Canadian electorate! Australia and South Africa get no comforting words of any kind. A change of domination, from the United Kingdom to Canada (no doubt a great improvement) is the best they can expect.

INDIA.

MR. CURTIS'S SCHEME.—Contending that India is not sufficiently advanced for self-government (a), Mr. Curtis declines to admit her as a member of his federation, and he transfers control over her from the British to his federation parliament. Any other disposition, he contends, would be impracticable.

“In plain words, Britain could govern neither India nor Egypt unless it maintained in both these countries a British army strong enough to enforce its authority. The body which creates and controls these forces” (the federal parliament) “is the body which must also be responsible for the policy of the government whose authority it may be called upon to uphold.”

“As this war has shown, the native armies of India, of Egypt, and of the Protectorates, as well as the armies of occupation, are integral factors in the whole scheme of Imperial defence. They must be con-

trolled by the Imperial Government. But, that one authority should control the Indian and Egyptian armies, while another and wholly separate authority controls their civil administration, is unthinkable."

"A British citizen in the Dominions cannot be made responsible for the foreign affairs of the Commonwealth, without also becoming responsible for the government of its subject peoples and sharing in the long and difficult task of training those peoples to govern themselves. The two things are by nature inseparable."

"No proposal to entrust the conduct of foreign affairs to a parliament responsible to all the self-governing Dominions, while leaving the Dependencies to the Dominion parliament of the British Isles, is feasible in practice. . . . The immediate point therefore to keep in view is this: the people of the Dominions cannot share in the control of their foreign affairs with those of the British Isles unless they are ready to share also in the task of governing the great Dependencies. Let those who decline to face this prospect accept the alternative. Let them recognize at once that the people of the Dominions must each conduct their own foreign affairs for themselves through their own Dominion governments: let them realize that in order to do so the Dominions must assume their independence; that their people must renounce for ever their status as British citizens; that this project of a Commonwealth must be abandoned, and that all the consequences for abandoning it must be faced. *In the last analysis there is no middle way*" (a).

MR. LASH'S SCHEME.—Mr. Lash, on the contrary, would divide the control of Indian affairs between his Council and the present British parliament; foreign affairs would go to the Council; while for domestic affairs with a foreign aspect very special provisions are suggested. Mr. Lash argues strongly against the alleged necessity for vesting in a central authority lordship over all Indian affairs, but he fails to appreciate the full strength of Mr. Curtis's position. He knows, however, that acceptance by Canada of Mr. Curtis's proposal would be impossible, and to Mr. Curtis's assertion that Canada must accept it or face the alternative, namely, independence, he responds by saying:

"The alternative quoted is presented as from the United Kingdom to the Dominions. It is earnestly hoped that the alternative may never have to be presented by the Dominions to the United Kingdom" (b).

INDIA'S VIEW (c).—While these gentlemen are making arrangements on the assumption that India must be treated as unfit

(a) Op cit., pp. 204, 205, 208, 209, 210.

(b) Op. cit., p. 37.

(c) During a visit to India by Mr. Curtis last autumn, he wrote a letter to the London Secretary of the Round Table. If anyone wants to understand the detestation with which Indian opinion has repudiated Mr. Curtis's scheme, he must read the newspaper comments on that letter. See *Canada and India*, April 1917, p. 16.

to occupy in any new scheme a position of equality with Canada, Indian representatives have succeeded in making clear to everybody the impossibility of assigning to their country an inferior position. She has been accorded an equal place with Canada in the London conferences; has practically secured her admission as an equal to the Imperial Conferences; and has been specially welcomed to her advancement by the King. To place among her over-lords, as Mr. Curtis proposes, men from countries which have shut their doors against the Hindu, would rightly result in revolt.

THE ALTERNATIVES.—The alternatives, then, appear to be as follows:

1. Admit India as a state, or states, in the federation—with its capital in Delhi, and with Canada open to floods of polygamous Hindus.
2. Place India under control of the federal parliament—and vigorously stamp down Indian revolt.
3. Leave India under control of the British state parliament—and, as Mr. Curtis tells us, make the federation unworkable.

TEETER-TAUTER.—Mr. Lash, in consideration of India's recent "loyalty and patriotism," and "sacrifices" (*a*), and "evidence of capacity," while leaving her domestic and internal affairs under British direction and control, would give her a place in his Imperial Council. Canadians have been reared in the belief that domestic affairs are much less complex than foreign, and that capacity to manage them can be much more easily acquired. India, it appears, is to be told the contrary.

And with this astonishing result that while, as to one set of affairs, the United Kingdom is to continue to dominate India; with respect to the other set—the much more important set—India is to form part of a Council which is to dominate the United Kingdom. The British parliament is to regulate India's domestic affairs, and India is to assist in the regulation of the United Kingdom's foreign affairs.

Worse than that, for inasmuch as these two sets of affairs intermingle and overlap, the Council is to be given (1) some control over the doubtfuls, and (2) power to put anything it

(*a*) That India, by her conduct during the war, has earned a title to gratitude, is, for diplomatic reasons, being officially acclaimed. It has not a vestige of foundation in fact. It is one of several pernicious notions that pendency of the war makes current, and that it will be difficult afterwards to dissipate.

pleases in the foreign class. So while the British parliament may think that it dominates India in such matters as trade, treaties, shipping, etc. (a), India may vote that such domination is to cease.

The British parliament is to maintain troops in India, in order to support its authority there; and in the event of war, India is to have a voice in the method of employment of those and all other troops. There is no end to the absurdities attendant upon the teeter-tauter which Mr. Lash proposes.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

DEFINITION NEEDED.—Both the schemes under review contemplate the relegation of foreign affairs to a central authority. But what are foreign affairs? And how can you disentangle them from domestic affairs? That has never yet been done, and there need be little hesitation in affirming that it cannot be done.

IMMIGRATION.—Is immigration from foreign countries, for example, a foreign or a domestic affair? If Canada is to retain control of it, are the difficulties with, say, Japan to be discussed in London? Is Canada to have power to exclude Hindus as “undesirables,” and, at the same time, to form part of the central authority which must flatter their national capacity and ambition?

TARIFF.—Is the tariff a foreign or domestic affair? Canada, in control of her own custom-houses, had a tariff-war with Germany leading to reprisals, and fought it to a satisfactory finish. If our tariff arrangements are to be tied to imperial policy (as is proposed), is the central authority to tell us what we are to do?

SHIPPING.—Canada is to retain control of her merchant ships, and may regulate their actions as she pleases. But the quarrels which will ensue are to be dealt with in London. Australia and New Zealand have good reason to anticipate sharp divergencies of opinion in that respect.

(a) See pp. 31,2.

EXPERIENCE.—London indifference to quarrels thousands of miles away is natural and enevitable, and, therefore, although in its effect upon Canada unsatisfactory and unpleasant, need neither be wondered at nor complained about. But, with the experience which we have had, we should be absurdly foolish to agree to an aggravation of the present situation. Some little circumstance, such as a Russian fleet firing by mistake upon Dogger Bank fishermen, may appear in London as an insult to British honor, and may precipitate war; but the inexcusable seizure, by the United States, of Canadian sealing ships, year after year, in the Pacific, would appear (as it in fact did) to be a series of merely unfortunate incidents for which we ought to enter law-suits for damages against the United States in United States Courts (*a*).

MR. LASH'S PROPOSAL.—Mr. Lash understands perfectly that there are many

"affairs which, though regarded as domestic, yet sometimes partake of a foreign nature" (*b*).

And in this category of doubtfuls, Mr. Lash places

"the subjects of Naturalization and Aliens, Immigration, Navigation and Shipping, Trade with the other Dominions and with Foreign countries, Imports and Exports, Customs and other duties, Questions relating to boundaries and International streams and waters, Conventions and arrangements with Foreign Governments upon Domestic Matters, as distinguished from Foreign Affairs proper" (*c*).

Very clearly, if a subject of jurisdiction have two aspects, and if, from one point of view, it be within the jurisdiction of Mr. Lash's Council, and, from another point of view, it be within state jurisdiction, some arrangements of very spécial character will be necessary.

TWO SUGGESTIONS.—Mr. Lash makes two suggestions:

1. "It might be thought advisable, or even necessary, to entrust, to the Central Authority, some control, within specified limits, over some of the subjects in this class" (*d*).

2. The term "foreign affairs" shall be so interpreted that it "shall include such other matters as the Central Authority may, from time to time, declare to be Foreign Affairs, and such declaration may be unlimited or limited as to time or purpose, and may be, from time to time, repealed or altered by extension, limitation, addition, or omission" (*e*).

(*a*) See Kingdom Papers, vol. 2, pp. 59-112.

(*b*) *Op. cit.*, p. 29.

(*c*) *Ibid.*

(*d*) *Ibid.*

(*e*) *Ibid.*, pp. 31, 32.

Probably these two suggestions are the best that can be offered, and their obvious effect is fatal to Canadian control of all those matters which Mr. Lash places in the doubtful category. There is hardly any subject which, in some way or other, may not take on a foreign aspect.

JUNTA JURISDICTION.—And thus we see that the London Council, in the name of foreign policy, is to have power:

1. To over-ride our naturalization laws—to arrange by treaty, and enforce by statute, the naturalization of anybody in Canada.

2. To declare the rights, and duties, and powers of aliens in Canada. To open Canadian doors to yellows, browns, and blacks.

3. To regulate Canadian shipping—its character, its methods, its rules, and its routes.

4. To enforce its will upon questions affecting our trade, our imports and exports, our customs and excise duties.

5. To take out of our hands (in which only recently we got it placed) the settlement of all questions relating to boundaries and to international streams and waters.

6. And, even with respect to purely domestic affairs, to make conventions for us with foreign governments.

Could anything be more fascinating?

WILL CANADA CONSENT.—No one will dispute, that for the effective conduct of foreign affairs, the power which Mr. Lash desires is essential. The experience of the United States has sufficiently taught that to everybody. But the question is, whether Canada will make the necessary surrender. Will Canada, for the sake of a war-union (in which she would have less interest than any other state) descend to a level of political subordination lower, in some respects, than that now occupied by her Provinces? In order that there may be a central authority in London with power to compel us to spend in preparation for war, and to engage in war as it pleases, are we willing to abandon self-government in respect of the matters described as doubtfuls?

FINANCE.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.—The imperialists who caused the American revolution urged, as complete justification for imposition of taxes upon the colonies, that the then recent French war had proved the inadequacy, for defence, of the requisition system. Franklin begged them to continue it, promising all kinds of reasonable compliances. The imperialists refused, and insisted upon exercising their power to enforce payment of contributions. They failed, and the lesson ought to have taught them the utter impracticability of subjecting peoples like Americans and Canadians to distasteful taxation.

PREDACITY UNIMPAIRED.—But the predacity of imperialists is unimpaired. If one excuse for wider power fail, another—perhaps the opposite of the old one—is offered. Or, without any excuse, they sing:

“Wider still and wider, may thy power be set.

God, who made thee mighty, make thee mightier yet.”

In the 1760's the voluntary system failed, therefore (they said) the imperial government must assume control, apportion expenditure, and enforce payment. In the present war, the voluntary system has been a splendid success, and, therefore (they say) in order to make repetition of co-operation certain, voluntarism must be replaced by imperialism.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE.—For the coercion of the American colonies, there may at least be said that it did not violate that fundamental rule of governmental finance which prescribes that the authority which disburses the money must take the responsibility of providing the method by which it is to be obtained. To assign to a government the prerogative of spending as it pleases, unhampered by the unpleasing necessity of finding the money, would be disastrous in two ways—(1) it would produce in the spending authority a habit of reckless and irresponsible extravagance, and (2) it would induce objection, and resentment, and opposition on the part of the contributors.

PRINCIPLE FLOUTED.—But that is precisely the system which Messrs. Curtis and Lash propose. They are well aware of the

weakness, in this respect, of their schemes (a), but their curious contrivances for a mere war-union leave them no alternative. They agree that the central authority cannot be permitted to dictate the methods by which tax-payers shall be required to subscribe. They say:

"An Imperial Government, however representative, which settled tariffs throughout the Commonwealth, would be going beyond the sphere of foreign affairs and trenching upon that of national and domestic governments" (b).

"The people of Great Britain and the Dominions would object strongly to giving to any authority but their own Parliament the power to tax them directly" (c).

And so, despite all fundamentalities, the central authority is to spend the money, and fix the rate of expenditure, and apportion the burden; while the state governments are to face the tax-payers with no better explanation than that the central authority has issued its mandate, and (quite frequently, or even usually) with the self-exonerating plea that the strongest protests have unfortunately proved to be unavailing. Could anything be more fascinating?

A WAR-UNION.

WHY A WAR-UNION.—As has already been said, both of the imperialistic schemes under review are war-unions, and war-unions, heretofore, have been provided for either by treaties or by confederations. Why do Messrs. Curtis and Lash discard precedent and endeavor to construct something entirely new—an amalgam of constitutional union and war-union?

The answer is simple enough. Under treaties and in confederations, the states are equal; they have co-extensive rights; no state dominates the other states; and such conditions are precisely those which British imperialists insist upon avoiding. Were they dealing with any countries other than those over which the United Kingdom has some coercive authority, they would not think of presenting the terms which they propose to us. We may feel certain that when Lord Lansdowne was negotiating a war-alliance with Japan in 1902, he did not suggest that the foreign policy and the fighting power of both countries should be placed, during both peace and war, in the hands of some central authority in which British representa-

(a) Mr. Lash says that finance is "the crux of the whole problem" (p. 59).

(b) Curtis, *op. cit.*, p. 162. And see pp. 47-57.

(c) Lash, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

tion would predominate. That would have been not only a silly but an insulting proposal. Has it any other character when made to Canada?

PRESENT SITUATION —While our political status remains as it is, there are two courses open to us:

1. We shall either hand ourselves—men, money, resources, and credit—over to the British electorate; or

2. We shall retain the liberty which we have, namely, (1), a right to declare neutrality, and (2), a right to confine our participation in war to defence of our own territory.

Liberty of that kind, however, is but a clogged and hampered freedom, and one very difficult of exercise. For a declaration of neutrality would be tantamount to a declaration of independence, and Canada would properly feel that the outbreak of war was not a fitting time at which to make separation. Restriction of our operations to defence of our own territory, too, would have in it such an appearance of selfishness as would make adoption of that course extremely difficult. And therefore, although we have these liberties, and although we should never abandon them, their existence cannot be regarded as sufficient for us.

LONDON ATMOSPHERE.

SOCIAL FEVER.—In both the proposed central authorities, Canada would have but a trifling numerical representation, and that representation would be subject to London influence. What that means is well understood. Environment affects everybody—usually by reduction to conformity, and occasionally by exciting to resentment. London is tory in politics, and, socially, of aristocratic temper. Liberalism and dissent are indications of inferiority, while duke-worship and state-church attendance are passports to desiderated drawing-rooms. Against the pressure of social influence, the average man (the average man is married) may struggle, but he struggles in vain.

LIBERAL STATESMEN.—Liberals take seats in the House of Lords, and simultaneously commence acquisition of the aristocratic spirit. The principles and feelings of thirty or forty years of the House of Commons, with its elections and popular

appeals, yield easily when exposed to the perfume of the strawberry patch (a).

CHATHAM.—Pitt in parliament was the people's Pitt and the great Commoner, but in the presence of the King he cringed and grovelled.

"When Pitt went to the King to give up the seals of his office, George spoke graciously to him. Always intoxicated by a peep into the royal closet, Pitt burst into tears and replied in words of absurd self-abasement" (b).

CHAMBERLAIN.—Joseph Chamberlain, the indomitable radical, let slip, as he left the Liberal party, his contempt for those "who toil not, neither do they spin"; and, mixing with the nobility, learned to say, with exaggerated adulation (3 June 1905):

"I have the highest respect for dukes and for all the aristocracy."

CANADIAN LIBERALS.—Canadian Liberal ministers (supposed to hold their principles somewhat more stiffly than other people) went to the Imperial Conference from time to time, and from time to time succumbed. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, whose poise and self-control are remarkable, left Canada, on one occasion, a tweed-trousered "democrat of the democrats"; returned, a silk-breeched, star-spangled Knight of the Grand Cross of St. Michael and St. George; and told us that we ought not even to mention the transformation. That was a bit of feeble foolishness for which Canada has not yet paid the full penalty.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN.—During his recent London excursion, Sir Robert completely lost track of himself and talked imperial nonsense (c). Return to Canada has partially restored to him his power of orientation, but, down to the moment of writing, he still imagines that he has been, or is (that is not quite clear), a member of an Imperial Cabinet—a cabinet (like the dream-built Spanish Castle) in the air, for no imperial parliament (its necessary foundation) has as yet been constructed.

(a) Unlike the maple leaf in Canada, the strawberry leaf in England is the monopoly of the higher orders in the nobility.

(b) The Political History of England, 1760-1801, p. 32. Thackeray in *The Four Georges* said "In the days when there were fine gentlemen, Mr. Secretary Pitt's under-secretaries did not dare to sit down before him; but Mr. Pitt, in his turn, went down on his gouty knees to George II.; and when George III. spoke a few kind words to him, Lord Chatham burst into tears of reverential joy and gratitude; so awful was the idea of the monarch, and so great the distinctions of rank."

(c) Ante, pp. 268, 9.

THE BAGGING BUSINESS.—Lord Grey, while in Canada, turned the heads of scores of men, not by argument but by little doles of patronizing courtesies. Upon the despicable servility and snobbishness of men, the Governor well knew how to practice. What a contempt he must have had for the flabby fools whom he twisted with nothing but a smile and an invitation to luncheon!

London is not England, and it is not in the least like Scotland. It is full of Lord Greys, and if you are worth bagging, they will bag you. Even if you do not want to be bagged, you will find it is not good form to refuse. Dissent will only disclose the presence of unfortunate defects in your birth and education, while enthusiasm for the bag will prove that you are a refined and well-bred gentleman.

LONDON PRESSURE.—When warring nations desire to negotiate a peace, they insist that conferences shall be held in some place where the very atmosphere is neutral; for the negotiators are men, and amenable to atmospheric pressures. And Canadian delegations to the Central Authority would find resistance to the London pressure impossible. Every man they spoke to, every newspaper they read, every magazine and book would act as water dropping on stone; every high-society compliment would cut as a chisel. Inevitably Canadianism would wear down, and imperialism would take its place.

ESCAPE IMPROBABLE.—Mr. Curtis's parliamentarians are to be in London only a few weeks in the year. But they will have little to do other than accept social invitations and deliver pleasing speeches. Some few of them may possibly escape the bag. But for Mr. Lash's Councillors, and for those of the parliamentarians who are appointed to the cabinet there can be no hope. They are to reside in England. The ordinary parliamentarian would return (or would he?) to Canada between sessions, and might recuperate a little. But the Councillors and the Ministers would not have a possibility of living their own lives. For not only are they never to get a breath of fresh air, but they are to be but few in number, and therefore quite certain to go speedily to the bag in a bunch.

DEMOCRATIC CANADA.—Canada has been, and is upon the whole, a democratic country. But the imperialists are strong;

they all have an aristocratic bent; human nature is gullible and weak; and union with a country whose social system is one of grades and castes would add tremendously to the forces which are even now dragging us into the meanest of all competitions—the petty rivalries for social promotion. As between toleration in Canada of the Hindus, and the cultivation of the aristocratic taint, the former is infinitely preferable. For honest toil is noble and praiseworthy, in man as in horse or dog, while all that is distinctively aristocratic is deleterious and debasing—injurious to the aristocrats, and productive amongst the others of envy, servility and resentment. If Canada is to cease to be a white democracy, let her people be yellow, brown, or black, rather than aristocratic.

IMPERIAL FEDERATION CONDEMNED.

SIR ROBERT BORDEN.—It was Sir Charles Tupper who (as has been noted (a)) chiefly contributed to the termination of the federation scheme of 1884-93, and probably the later effort of Mr. Curtis will not long survive the recent language of Sir Robert Borden and Sir Edward Carson.

"There have been proposals put forward for an Imperial Parliament which should have taxing powers for certain purposes over all the Dominions as well as over the United Kingdom. As far as I am concerned, and I think the other members of the Conference thoroughly concurred in this view, I regard that proposal *neither feasible nor wise*" (b).

"People talk wildly of an Imperial Federation. *It was a kind of dream*. Many people talk of it as a splendid thing, not knowing in the least what it means, and I venture to give this one word of warning, that there cannot be, and there will not be, an Imperial Federation if you mean by that that any Act of Parliament is going to bind together the various units that make up the British Empire" (c).

MR. HAZEN.—If imperial federation is to survive these declarations, it can only be by its advocates reverting to the unmeaning language which Mr. Curtis's clear-cut definition and exposition temporarily terminated. Indeed, the day upon which Sir Robert spoke did not close before the first recurring step had been taken by Mr. Hazen, who said:

"Something has been said to-night about Imperial federation. I never knew exactly what was meant by Imperial federation, except this. There

(a) Ante, p. 271.

(b) Sir R. Borden, 18 May 1917: Hans. p. 1603.

(c) Sir E. Carson: *The Times* (Eng.) 25 May 1917.

never was any hard or fast scheme to which any great body of people in this country committed themselves, and my understanding of the phrase Imperial federation did not necessarily imply an Imperial Parliament; it did not necessarily imply sacrifice of a single iota of our autonomy or independence or liberty. If it did no man in this country would support such an idea for a single moment. What I have always understood by Imperial federation was that there should be *a closer drawing together in the bonds of union, friendship, sympathy and common support, and the maintenance of a common Empire* of Great Britain and its Overseas Dominions and India and all the countries generally that make up the British Empire" (a).

Clothed in obscure, confused, and unintelligible language, imperial federation may for a time continue to perplex people. Substitution for political reality of idealizing metaphor, adroitly associated with such meaningless phrases as "bonds of union" and "the maintenance of a common Empire," may continue to mislead the unwary.

SUMMARY.

The arguments against the acceptance of any proposals of a constitutional character are overwhelming. Those which have been referred to in the foregoing pages may be summarized as follows:

1. Mr. Curtis proposes a war-union in the form of a federation. He provides a parliament, and gives it almost nothing to do. He dowers it with authority to spend as it pleases, unembarrassed by the responsibility of finding the money. He contemplates party divisions and party elections upon the single issue of big or little army and navy, or, at the most, upon the ratio of state-contributions. He proposes that a single-chambered parliament shall, upon the most important questions of national life, dominate the two-chambered parliaments of all the states.

2. Mr. Lash condemns Mr. Curtis's scheme as revolutionary and dangerous. He proposes that a few representatives from each state shall act as an Imperial Council; that it shall control foreign policy, the army, the navy, etc.; that it shall have power also over domestic matters with foreign aspects, and power to bring within its functions any subject which it may choose to declare to be a foreign affair; that it shall have authority to borrow on the credit of all the states, and spend

(a) Ibid, p. 1633.

money as it pleases without troubling itself with ways and means. Of that scheme Professor Milner rightly says that it would mean

"so violent a break with the past as to dismay our cautious, practical people" (a).

And of both the schemes, Professor Falconer says that

"many of the members of the Round Table groups have not been satisfied with either proposal" (b).

3. Mr. Curtis refuses to give India a place in his federation; relegates its government to the federal parliament; and declares that dissolution of the Empire and colonial independence is the only alternative. From this assertion, Mr. Lash dissents, but, as between the alternatives, appears to prefer independence. India, meanwhile, has made clear that her rebellion would be the result of Mr. Curtis's federation scheme.

4. The avowed reason for all such schemes is that, at present, "the resources of the Empire as a whole in men, money and materials . . . are only in part available for the imperial government" (c).

Canada was born into subjection, and was held there as long as she was of commercial value. When she became commercially free, she was told to "break the bonds and go." Now that she has developed into military strength, her independence is regretted, and termination of it is attempted.

5. Although theoretically at war when the United Kingdom is at war, Canada has, under present arrangements, a certain measure of freedom: (1) she may declare her neutrality; or (2) she may limit her participation to defence of her own territory.

6. Entrance into a constitutional war-union would deprive Canada of even that measure of freedom.

7. It would place her men, money and resources at the unqualified disposal of the United Kingdom, to be used for such purposes, on such occasions, and at such places as the United Kingdom pleased.

8. At present, Canada makes such war-preparations as she chooses. Imperialistic proposals would compel her to maintain such a peace establishment as the United Kingdom thought proper.

9. Canadian representation in the central authority would be too small to be of any value.

(a) Ante, p. 283.

(b) Ante, p. 283.

(c) Ante, p. 273.

10. London influence upon the representatives would dissipate their individuality.

11. Constitutional association with a country of aristocratic caste would be detrimental and eventually disastrous.

THE MILNER METHOD.

PRESENT DANGER.—While we need have little apprehension of the adoption of either the Curtis or the Lash scheme, danger from the operation of the Milner method (*a*) is not only imminent but present; and it is a method so subtly crafty and insidious that it gives to the proposals of Messrs. Curtis and Lash the appearance of the crude and clumsy work of youthful neophytes.

THE MILNER METHOD.—Persuaded by Mr. Chamberlain's failures (at the Imperial Conferences of 1897 and 1902) to induce the Dominions to agree to the establishment of either a parliament or the seedling of a parliament (*b*), Lord Milner deprecated (or appeared to deprecate) any attempt in that direction, saying (15 October, 1908):

"Men are waiting for a sign, for some great scheme of an Imperial constitution, which, as it occurs to me, can only result from, and not precede, *the practice of co-operation* in the numerous matters in which it might be practiced now *without new institutions*" (*c*).

(*a*) There is no better embodiment anywhere (Prussia included) of autocratic imperialism than Lord Milner. To him, African Boers and the British proletariat are alike people who must be governed and controlled—the Boers by the British people, the British people by the British aristocrats, and the British aristocrats by those among them who agree with Lord Milner. With the aid, principally, of Joseph Chamberlain and Cecil Rhodes, he brought the Boers into subjection; and there (or, more probably, in a resumption of their fight for freedom) they would be to-day had the subsequent counsels of Lord Milner prevailed. Against British democratic endeavor for release from the deadening of the aristocracy, Lord Milner wages constant and vigorous war. When the House of Lords was warned of the consequences of the assumption of a right to modify the budget of 1909, it was he who urged the House to its downfall with the expression, 'Damn the consequences.' And now, with Lord Milner in the British government, we are getting what those who know him expected, namely, a highly accelerated pace in imperialism—imperial stagings, imperial phraseologies, imperial speeches, imperial sugar (proposed by Premier Hughes), imperial conferences, imperial co-operative practices; impressionable people, very much impressed—as Lord Milner expected.

(*b*) In reply to the Colonial Secretary's (Mr. Lyttleton's) suggestion (1905) that the Imperial Conference should be called the Imperial Council, Canada replied with the specific declaration that she would not assent to that which "might eventually come to be regarded as an encroachment upon the full measure of autonomous legislative and administrative power now enjoyed by the self-governing colonies."

(*c*) *The Nation and the Empire* (1913), p. 319.

This is (for want of better term) what I choose to call the Milner method. It is cleverly conceived: Get the colonists to act as though they had been constitutionally subjugated. Slowly and very gently accustom them to restrictions and restraints. Courteously and very tenderly (for they are a sensitive people) train them into an increasing docility and a fitting amenability to superior direction. Above all, refrain from frightening them with constitutional schemes. Ask them to sign nothing. They would refuse. Softly and affectionately filch from them the freedom which, foolishly, they have been permitted to acquire. Ever and ever tighter—a little tighter, “draw the bonds of Empire.” Eventually the colonists will know that bonds are things intended to bind; but meanwhile coo to them gently of honor, and justice, and the peace of the world, and the glories of the British Empire. That is the Milner method.

WHAT IS HAPPENING.—“But surely, Mr. Ewart, you do not mean to say that anything of that kind is happening?” I most emphatically do. We have been cooed into a good deal of military regulation, and the same process that was successful there is being applied to our trade, our immigration, even to our territorial resources. We are on the road that brought Egypt under British control.

THREE PROCESSES.—The Milner method, as applied to attacks upon Canada’s autonomy, exhibits diplomatic artifices and dexterities of three kinds. They may be referred to as processes, for they function slowly and produce their results progressively. They are:

1. Phraseological inexactitudes.
2. Advice and its price.
3. London influence.

We must familiarize ourselves with the first two of these processes before referring to the current events in which they will be found to be very actively operating. The third—London influence—has already been discussed. Its recent effect upon Sir Robert Borden is an excellent illustration of what has been said. It will be further noted as we proceed.

1. PHRASEOLOGICAL INEXACTITUDES.

"EMPIRE."—An empire being

"an aggregation of subject territories ruled over by a sovereign state,"

Canada is a part of the British Empire only because, and as far as, she is ruled over by the United Kingdom (a). That situation being (as one might think) a constant source of irritation to Canadians, Lord Milner regarded the word *empire* with dislike, and said:

"The word 'Empire' has in some respects an unfortunate effect. It no doubt fairly describes the position as between the United Kingdom and subject countries such as India or our Central Africa possessions. But for the relations existing between the United Kingdom and the self-governing colonies *it is a misnomer, and with the idea of ascendancy, of domination inevitably associated with it, a very unfortunate misnomer*" (b).

In similar strain, Sir Edward Carson, a few days ago, warned his audience that they should "not talk too much of imperialism," for it idealized domination, and meant exploitation of some men by others.

CANADIAN IMPERIALISTS.—Milner and Carson need have had no timidities so far as Canada is concerned. Disraeli played upon the uneducated millions in India by calling the place an empire; and although the word proclaims for Canada a subjection which had almost disappeared, plenty of her people grasped as greedily at the high-sounding designation as they would have clutched at some "decoration" for the left breast of their coats. Now the word is used grandiloquently by many Canadians who, priding themselves upon being part of the British Empire, forget that it is the subordinate part to which they belong. Were I British, I might use some of their language, for I should be a member of the dominating part. Being Canadian, I avoid, as much as possible, language which implies a political subordination that I heartily hate, and that I am extremely anxious to terminate.

(a) Mr. Chamberlain used the word correctly when he said: "*If we had no empire*" (Proceedings of the Col. Conference, 1897, p. 7). The phrase "our colonial empire" is frequently and correctly used.

(b) Ewart: Kingdom Papers, Vol. I, pp. 12, 13.

SOME NEW APPLICATIONS.—If the use of the word "Empire" in common speech is to be attributed to the pleasure of self-laudation, its employment in such phrases as "Empire as a whole"; "the unity of the Empire"; "Empire resources"; is tinged with dishonesty. When imperialists ask the Dominions to make concessions for the benefit of "the Empire as a whole," they really mean "for the benefit of the United Kingdom," but would not care to say so. When they speak of "Empire unity," they mean (if they mean anything) the subordination of the Dominions. And when they contemplate the undeveloped wealth of "Empire resources" (meaning Dominion resources), all that is specially characteristic of imperialists glows with acquisitive envy.

"THE EMPIRE AS A WHOLE."—The Empire is not a whole—geographical, political, commercial, financial, or any other sort of whole. You may think of the world as a whole; but to refer to six widely-separated parts of it, with separate governments, separate excluding tariffs, separate laws, and separate trade affiliations, as a whole, is to talk nonsense. When Canada made a commercial agreement with France, nobody was foolish enough to speak of the benefit of the two countries "as a whole." If Canada should make a tariff arrangement with the United Kingdom, we should say that it was a benefit for both—not for the two "as a whole." And if the United Kingdom and the five principal colonies should agree upon preferential tariffs, we still ought to say (if we want to talk intelligibly) that the arrangement was for the benefit of each of the six—not for the six "as a whole." To declare that it was beneficial for "the Empire as a whole" would be still more ridiculous, for the six do not constitute the Empire.

Why then is the phrase used? Very frequently, no doubt, for the same reason that much other inaccurate phraseology is employed, namely, loose and inaccurate thought; but sometimes, I believe, because of a desire to lend an appearance of validity to an invalid proposition or conclusion. For example, some of the imperialistic proposals that are being made to us are recommended on the ground that they would be beneficial to "the Empire as a whole," whereas what ought to be said is that, although they would be prejudicial to Canada, they would be beneficial to the United Kingdom. On my putting that view, on one occasion, to a disputant, his answer was, "Well,

what is good for a part is good for the whole." To which I ventured, with similar sophistry, to reply, "What is bad for a part is bad for the whole."

"UNITY OF THE EMPIRE."—The fact that, apart from the existence of one sovereign (who is constitutionally impotent), there is no "unity of the Empire," ought to be sufficient to prevent sensible people from making use of the phrase. On the plea of ignorance, some users might be excused; but defence against a charge of dishonesty is difficult for men whose intelligence has qualified them for seats upon imperial commissions. For example, Lord Balfour of Burleigh's committee, in recommending the adoption of the principle of trade preferences, said:

"We think it may be necessary, for the sake of the unity of the Empire, a serious attempt should now be made", etc.

And in the final report of the Dominions Royal Commission may be seen the statement that

"The instinct not only of nationhood but of Imperial unity has gradually asserted itself" (a).

In speaking of "Imperial unity," the Commissioners may have had in mind some such conception as that which they express concerning India and the Crown colonies, namely, that they are "vitally linked with the self-governing Dominions; the destinies of all are interwoven" (b).

But even that is arrant nonsense; and the word "Imperial" is in such connection inappropriate. As against "Imperial unity," I place Sir Robert Borden's sentence:

"The British Empire, in some respects, is a mere disorganization" (c).

"EMPIRE RESOURCES."—If the meaning of the phrase "Empire resources" could always be confined to "resources within the geographical limits of the Empire," it would seldom necessitate challenge. But when it is employed (as often happens) to express the Empire's possessions, Canada must (or rather, ought to, for she does not) make very emphatic protest. The Empire has no possessions. Each Dominion and Colony has resources, but there is no such thing as "resources of the Empire as a whole." Although one might be inclined to

(a) Final Report, para. 714.

(b) Final Report, para. 714.

(c) *Hansard*, 1910, p. 1747.

think that that statement was indisputable, we shall have occasion, as we proceed, to observe the tendency on the part of imperialists to treat Dominion resources as "Empire resources"; to exploit them as such; and even to apply the proceeds of them to the liquidation of the British war-debt. When people become impecunious, they are apt to lose respect for the distinction between mine and thine. At present, Canada's resources belong to Canada. For the future, I do not know.

II. ADVICE AND ITS PRICE.

PAYMENT.—Turning to the second of the imperializing processes to which we are being subjected, let us observe that advice is an opinion recommended or offered as worthy to be followed (*a*); that Canada is being deluged with British advice; that that advice is being accepted; and that it is tending to become authoritative. If you take advice from a lawyer or a doctor, you pay his fee. If you take it from a book, you pay for the book. If you take it from a friend, you pay by acknowledgment of superiority and obligation. (That is why you don't like it.) The more frequently you depend upon him, the more you debase yourself. And to install him as permanent adviser is an acknowledgment of relative imbecility (*b*).

DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES.—All that is just as true of relations between nations as between individuals; and bestowment of advice is, in diplomacy, a well-recognized instrument for the extension of the power of the adviser and the subjugation of the people advised. The progressive stages are somewhat as follows:

1. Very deferential proffer of kindly suggestion.
2. Repetition of it, with diminishing deference.
3. Very respectful regret that advice was, on some occasion, not asked.
4. Provision of more simple method of tendering advice—a resident adviser.
5. Development of a right to give advice.
6. Development of a co-relative duty to accept advice and to act upon it.

(*a*) Century Dictionary.

(*b*) The word *advice* includes "the accessory idea of superiority either of age, station, knowledge, or talent": Crabb's English Synonyms, tit., *Advice*.

Advice, naturally and inevitably (unless killed) develops into recommendation, persuasion, admonition, joint enquiry, co-operation, guidance, expostulation, threat, and control.

EGYPT.—Observe the process by which Egypt, from being Turkish in 1875, became British in 1914. In the former year, Mr. Rivers Wilson went to Cairo as “financial *adviser*” to the Khedive. In 1878, a joint “High Committee of *Inquiry*” was appointed—six Europeans and one Egyptian (a).

“Yet England had no intention at first of dictating in public affairs, preferring rather the part of a friendly *adviser*” (b).

In 1882, the United Kingdom suppressed the nationalist movement under Arabi Pasha, but solely (so she said) to “restore the power of the Khedive.” Afterwards, in 1883 (3 January), Lord Granville, in a circular to the Powers, said—

“Although for the present a British force remains in Egypt for the preservation of public tranquility, Her Majesty’s Government are desirous of withdrawing it as soon as the state of the country and the organization of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive’s authority will admit of it. In the meanwhile, the position in which Her Majesty’s Government are placed towards His Highness imposes upon them the duty of *giving advice* with the object of securing that the order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character, and possess the elements of stability and progress” (c).

And so Lord Dufferin, afterwards,

“provided European *advisers* in every branch of the administration, but left all the public positions to be filled by Egyptians” (d).

The duty of these advisers was to furnish “*sympathetic advice* and assistance.”

Cromer became British Resident in 1883, and thus refers to his arrival at Cairo:

“He came not as a conqueror, but in the familiar garb of a *saviour of society*. The mere assumption of this part, whether by a nation or by an individual, is calculated to arouse some degree of suspicion. The world is apt to think that the saviour is not improbably *looking more to his own interests than to the salvation of society, and experience has proved that the suspicion is not unfrequently well founded*” (e).

What was to happen if the advice was not acted upon? Cromer said—

(a) On the Dominions Royal Commission, which took stock of Canadian resources, there were six British and one Canadian.

(b) Norman Dwight Harris: *Intervention and Colonization in Africa*, p. 313.

(c) Cromer: *Modern Egypt*, Vol. 1, p. 340.

(d) Harris, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

(e) Cromer, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 123.

"No special system exists to enforce the acceptance of their advice. All that can be said is that, in the event of their advice being systematically rejected, *the British Government will be displeased, and that they will probably find some adequate means for making their displeasure felt*" (a).

By this time, advice had passed through all the gradations down to expostulation and such an unveiled threat as: "Will your Highness be good enough to reconsider your refusal, for I should be extremely sorry if tomorrow it should be my duty to *advise* your Royal Highness to go on board a British man-of-war at Alexandria?" (b). And so, after some further progress had been made a writer on international law could say (1911)—

"The international position of Egypt is curious. Nominally under the suzerainty of the Porte, it has in fact become a part of the British Empire; and the permanence of the British occupation has now been placed beyond doubt" (c).

The suzerainty terminated in 1914. All which seems well to illustrate the remark that "the title deeds of all political authority are elastic" (d)—quite capable, indeed, of being stretched from advice to command.

Let Canada take warning. She has plenty of reasons for apprehension for she is being provided with plenty of advice—as we shall see.

ADVICE AND MR. JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN.—That clever, but far from shrewd, imperialist, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, was the first to make use of the advice-method of attack on Canadian autonomy. At the Imperial Conference of 1897, he asked, whether it might not be

"feasible to create a great Council of the Empire to which the colonies would send representative plenipotentiaries . . . persons who . . . would be able to give really effective and valuable *advice*" (e).

But at the same time he frightened the colonial Premiers, and insured their disapproval, by adding:

"If such a Council were to be created . . . it is perfectly evident that it might develop into something still greater" (f).

Undiscouraged, Mr. Chamberlain repeated his proposal at the Conference of 1902, saying that

(a) Ibid, p. 284.

(b) A paraphrased incident.

(c) F. E. Smith's *International Law* (4th ed., revised and enlarged by J. Wylie), p. 29.

(d) In Oliver's *Alexander Hamilton*, I think.

(e) Ewart: *Kingdom of Canada*, etc., p. 217.

(f) Ibid.

"the Council might in the first instance be *merely an advising Council*. . . . But although that would be the preliminary step, it is clear that the object would not be completely secured until there had been conferred upon such a Council executive functions, and perhaps also legislative powers" (a).

Having on a previous occasion (b) indicated that the desiderated powers would be those of "taxation and legislation" (c), the Premiers once more declined to commence their *débâcle* by acceptance of the proffered advice.

ADVICE AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK.—Then a committee of fifty, with Sir Frederick Pollock at their head, acknowledging the difficulties of an imperial parliament, and

"that we must distinctly renounce the invention of any new kind of executive or compulsory power",

arrived at the conclusion that

"We must therefore be content with a *Council of Advice* (an 'Imperial Council or Committee') which will have only—what is called '*persuasive authority*' (d)—

in other words, and according to the usual course of development, advice, raised, through the recommendation stage, into persuasion. Sir Frederick toured Canada trying to induce us to submit to "persuasive authority," and, in making his exit, declared (somewhat ambiguously)—

"that the strongest reasons exist for immediately instituting an Imperial Intelligence Department" (e).

ADVICE AND SIR WILFRID LAURIER.—We need not go to Egypt for an excellent example of the operation of the advice-process (f). We have, unfortunately, a very notable case of it in Canada. At Imperial Conferences, Sir Wilfrid maintained himself splendidly, and Canada has not yet sufficiently recognized the great merit of his defence against Chamberlain imperialism. But he slipped a little—or rather, he permitted his Minister of Militia to slip; *et c'est le premier pas qui coute*.

(a) Ibid, p. 218.

(b) Canadian Club, London, England, 25 March, 1896.

(c) Ewart: *Kingdom of Canada*, p. 148.

(d) Ibid, pp. 219, 220.

(e) Can. Sess. Pap., 1906, No. 67.

(f) The effectiveness of the advice-and-its-price process is well known to Japan, and is being applied by her to the subjugation of China. Among the demands upon China of two years ago, was the following: "The Central Government of China shall employ influential Japanese subjects as *advisers* for conducting administrative, financial, and military affairs."—New York Times, 19 February 1915.

Mr. Chamberlain (at Newport) expressed as his purpose the complete annexation of Canada to the United Kingdom—

“Aye, as Yorkshire and Lancashire are bound to Middlesex and Surrey, so let Australia and Canada be bound to South Africa, to the United Kingdom” (a);

and, from frontal assaults, Sir Wilfrid never receded an inch. Against Milner-method attacks, however, he was not sufficiently rigid; and to three proposals of restrictive tendency he unfortunately assented, namely, (1) the formation of the Imperial Defence Committee; (2) the formation of the Imperial General Staff; and (3) the acceptance of confidences respecting foreign affairs.

TENDERLY.—The tender deference to our feelings with which those proposals were accompanied furnish a specially valuable example of the working of the advice process of the Milner-method and of its dangers. We know, now, what the Imperial General Staff is, and can judge what its functions will probably be; but in 1907, it was recommended to us as a most innocent device for the simple purpose of furnishing us with any information and advice which we might choose to ask for.

IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF—STEP No. 1.—Let us glance at the history of the thing. Mr. Haldane at the Conference, said:

“I will define what I mean. It is not that we wish in the slightest degree *even to suggest that you should bow your heads to any dictation* from home in military matters, but the General Staff officer would have as his function this: Trained in a great common school, recruited, it may be, from the most varying parts of the Empire, but educated in military science according to common principles, he *would be at the disposition of the local government* or of the local Commander-in-chief whether he were Canadian, British, or Australian, or New Zealander, or South African, *for giving advice and furnishing information* based upon the highest military study of the times” (b). *It is a purely advisory organization of which command is not a function*” (c).

Sir Frederick Borden was properly suspicious, and said:

“Canada has already established a General Staff in embryo and we hope to develop it. We recognize the absolute necessity for such a body, but it really seems to me we should have our own General Staff responsible to the Canadian Government—and in the same way all the other Dominions—which might, as you suggested, I think, exchange officers with

(a) Ewart: *The Kingdom of Canada*, etc., p. 147.

(b) Proceedings, Col. Conference, 1907, p. 96.

(c) Ibid, p. 97.

your staff; but *I scarcely think it would do to have officers in the different Dominions who were responsible in the first place to the Secretary of State for War here.*

MR. HALDANE.—“The Imperial General Staff for this purpose is a purely advisory board.”

SIR FREDERICK BORDEN.—“So long as that is understood, I would concur in that view” (a).

Sir Frederick fell, and the Conference agreed to the following resolution:

“That this Conference welcomes and cordially approves the exposition of general principles embodied in the statement of the Secretary of State for War, and, without wishing to commit any of the Governments represented, recognizes and affirms the need of the developing, *for the service of the Empire, a General Staff, selected from the forces of the Empire as a whole*, which shall study military science in all its branches, shall collect and disseminate to the various governments military information and intelligence; shall *undertake the preparation of schemes of defence on a common principle*, and, without in the least interfering in questions connected with command and administration, shall, *at the request of the respective governments*, advise as to the training, education, and war organization of the military forces of the Crown in every part of the Empire” (b).

STEP NO. 2.—The next proposal was the establishment in the Dominions of local sections of the Imperial General Staff. That also was agreed to (10 February, 1909), with further verbal reservation of autonomy:

“After general acceptance of principles as laid down in the War Office letter and memorandum enclosed of 15th January, satisfaction is expressed that *principle of local control by responsible ministers concerned over officers of local section has been fully safeguarded*” (c).

Since then we have had a set of British officers in Canada, and have found the safeguarding to be a matter of ever increasing difficulty.

STEP NO. 3.—The next step was the acceptance (with still further verbal reservation) of a proposal for co-operation in military preparation (Conference of 1909). The Milner-method was never practised more carefully, nor elaborated with greater skill, than on that occasion. Asquith and Haldane vied with each other in repudiation of any semblance of interference with the completeness of local control. In making the proposal, Mr. Haldane said that he was

(a) Ibid, p. 100.

(b) Ibid, pp. v, vi.

(c) Cd. 4475, p. 16.

"well aware that the representatives of the overseas Dominions cannot at the Conference pledge their Governments, or undertake in any way to bind the officers and men composing oversea Dominion forces to engagements beyond the shore and boundaries of their own countries."

"It is not suggested that any one of the Dominions should be asked to undertake a definite obligation. Whatever is done must be done spontaneously and with due regard to the circumstances in which each of them is situated" (a).

With these assurances, the Conference agreed

"that each part of the Empire is willing to make its preparation on such lines as will enable it, *should it so desire*, to take its share in the general defence of the Empire" (b).

Afterwards in the House of Commons (26 August, 1909), Mr. Asquith said:

"The result is a plan for so organizing the forces of the Crown wherever they are, that *while preserving the complete autonomy of each Dominion, should the Dominions desire to assist* in the defence of the Empire in a real emergency, their forces could be rapidly combined into one homogeneous imperial army" (c).

STEP No. 4.—A clause in the Canadian constitution is as follows:

"The Commander-in-Chief of the Land and Naval Militia, and of all Naval and Military Forces, of and in Canada, is hereby declared to continue and be vested in the Queen."

Although the meaning is indisputable, namely, that although the authority is vested in the Sovereign, its exercise must always be based upon the advice of Canadian ministers, some of our Governors have made assertion of independent authority, and have, from time to time, stood in need of correction in that respect. Now, however, we have entered into an agreement by which needed advice is to be supplied by the Imperial General Staff, and have provided for the residence of a local section of the staff in Canada. So a new situation has been created—an imperial official, endowed with the authority, has been supplied with imperial military officers for the express purpose of furnishing the advice; and perhaps, therefore, we must not be over-surprised that the late Governor General should have assumed to communicate directly with the advisers; that he should have given orders without the sanction of the Minister of Militia; and that, by protesting, the Minister should have become obnoxious to the Governor.

(a) Ibid, p. 35. And see p. 38.

(b) Ibid, p. 29.

(c) Ibid, p. 32.

STEP NO. 5.—If, as is proposed, the Imperial War Cabinet continues its operations, our military autonomy will consist in making parliamentary and departmental registration of policies and regulations annually agreed to in London. *C'est le premier pas qui coute.*

SHOWERS OF ADVICE.—Not only does acceptance of advice tend to develop into submission to direction, but the practice permitted in any one department is very apt to spread into others. That is what has happened in Canada. She is being deluged with advice (as we shall see), and resistance has almost disappeared. Advice, moreover, has passed, in some respects, into guidance, and in some departments is already verging on control.

British introduction into Egypt commenced with a "financial adviser." Afterwards Lord Dufferin "provided European advisers in every branch of the administration." Afterwards came British control. Canada's case is different. She commenced with military advisers.

III. LONDON INFLUENCE.

INDIA.—The effect of London atmosphere upon Sir Robert Borden's attitude towards the extremely important question of Indian immigration into Canada, is both noteworthy and regrettable. I do not now debate the necessity for Indian exclusion, nor shall I discuss whether in the past we have done right. That, for present purposes, is irrelevant. What I wish to point out is, that, before going to London, Sir Robert had, and had acted upon, a certain policy; that, succumbing to London atmosphere, he has changed that policy; and that, in doing so, he has committed his government and his party, and, as far as he can, Canada to a different policy. He has agreed that the following bits of advice should be sent to us from the London Conference:

"First—As regards Indians already permanently settled in the Dominions, they should be allowed to bring in their wives (subject to the rule of monogamy) and minor children, and in other respects should not be less privileged than Japanese settled immigrants.

Second—Future admission of Indians for labor or settlement should, if possible, be regulated on lines similar to, and not less favourable than, those governing the admission of any other Asiatic races.

Third—If this be impossible, there might be reciprocal treatment in India and in each dominion of immigration for purposes of labor or permanent settlement. If a dominion is determined to exclude these two classes of immigration from India, India should be free to do the same as regards that dominion. It would be clearly recognized that exclusion in either case was not due to motives of race prejudice.

Fourth—Along with such exclusion, reciprocal arrangements should be made for granting full facilities for admission of tourists, students and the like, and for business visits entailing temporary residence, so long as this residence was not for labor purposes or for permanent settlement" (a).

That Sir Robert should have consented to formulation of the policy contained in these recommendations, and particularly that he should have joined in sending to us a perfectly empty threat of retaliation, must be attributed solely to the influence of his London environment. He had been induced to move the admission of India to the Imperial Conferences on a footing of equality with Canada, and he had, perhaps diplomatically, but nevertheless foolishly, joined in

"generous expressions of appreciation on all sides of assistance given by India in the prosecution of the war" (b).

Given that situation, and he would almost necessarily succumb to the influences depicted by the King in reply to an address read to him by Sir Robert at Windsor Castle on 4 May, 1917:

"It has afforded me the utmost satisfaction that representatives of India have been members of your Conference with equal rights to take part in the deliberations. *This meeting round a common board and the consequent personal intercourse will result in the increasing growth of a spirit of larger sympathy* and of mutual understanding between India and the Overseas Dominions" (c).

The operation of the Milner method could not be better stated than in the King's speech, or be more notably illustrated than by the recommendation of lines of conduct which, it is said, we ought to adopt. By "the larger sympathy" the King meant less regard for that which we have heretofore deemed to be essential to our social welfare, and more attention to "the interests of the Empire as a whole." For the anxiety of British statesmen about Indian migration does not in the least arise from a desire to see Canadian doors open to Indians. On the contrary, even Mr. Chamberlain recognized that

"An immigration of that kind must . . . in the interests of the colonies be prevented at all hazards" (d).

(a) Cabled from London, 24 May 1917.

(b) The Times, 4 May 1917.

(c) The Times, 5 May 1917.

(d) Imperial Conference, 1897.

What troubles British statesmen is that among Indian grievances is exclusion from parts of the British dominions, and that the British government gets the blame. Would it not be better that we should get the Indians?

A PERMANENT IMPERIAL WAR CABINET.

A WAR-PEACE.—The disorganizing influence of the superheated war atmosphere in London upon normal rationality is very notably exemplified in the conception of the future of "the Empire" as an Empire permanently organized upon a war basis. Although we are authoritatively assured that the present war will not end until security against its recurrence has been obtained, we are nevertheless also told that, for the future, our principal purpose in life is to be ready for resumption of the fight. And not merely are Canada's military and naval forces to be maintained at fighting strength, but the economics of her peaceful life are to be rearranged with a view to the anticipated supervention of war.

Indeed, the proposals are even wider than that, for they include such economic sacrifices on our part as will contribute to the war-strength of all the other parts of the King's dominions. In some very real sense, the resources of the parts are to become the resources of the whole, and are to be administered for the benefit of "the Empire as a whole."

Still wider has this delirium extended. What? Yes, Canada's economics are to be tied to those of all the allies except the United States, with which, in consequence, we are almost certainly to be at variance. We are pledged to "a common economic policy" as one of several "permanent measures of mutual assistance and collaboration among the allies."

DURABLE PEACE.—Are these men deceiving themselves, or are they only attempting to deceive us? When Germany's peace proposals (or rather suggestions) were made, we refused to negotiate, because the peace would be merely a truce; because "we would have to do it all over again"; because we were determined to put "an end to militarism" and to "the nightmare of crushing war preparation." Were the "Imperial War Cabinet" to be polled, every member would declare that that is still our purpose and our determination. The psychology of the war presents no more extraordinary phenomenon than the

mentality which, from a basis of permanent peace, argues the necessity of a permanent "Imperial War Cabinet."

PEACE AND PREPARATION.—On various occasions, Mr. Asquith has said:

"We shall never sheathe the sword which we have not lightly drawn until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than that she has sacrificed, until France is *adequately secured against the menace of aggression*, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until *the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed*" (a).

That all being accomplished, the sword was to be replaced in its scabbard, and normal life was to be restored.

Addressing the Foreign Press Association (23 October, 1916) Viscount Grey said:

"I take it on the word of the Prime Minister that we shall fight until we have established the supremacy and right of free development under equal conditions, each in accordance with its genius, of all States, great and small, as *a family of civilized mankind* when we are asked how long the struggle is to continue, we can only reply that it must continue until these things are secured" (b).

In replying to President Wilson's note of 18 December, 1916, the allies said that

"a discussion of future arrangements for *assuring a durable peace* presupposes a satisfactory settlement of the present conflict."

They insisted upon the necessity for "*a stable settlement*"; the right of all nations to "the enjoyment of full security and free economic development"; and the insurance of "*peace upon the principles of liberty and justice*." The reply was accompanied by a note to the President from Mr. Balfour, in which he said that the British people

"do not believe *peace can be durable* if it be not based upon the success of the allied cause"—"on the success of the allies depend *the prospects of peaceful civilization*."

It is war for the end of war,
Fighting, that fighting may cease.
Why do the cannons roar?
For the thousand years of peace.

We are to fight in order that we may secure a durable peace; but it is a peace, evidently, which we are to have no opportunity to enjoy, for, in their address to the King, the members of the recent Imperial Conference said:

"We further considered steps that may be required to insure that victory may not be lost by *unpreparedness in times of peace*, and so to

(a) Quoted in the Round Table of December 1916.

(b) Cosmos: *The Basis of Durable Peace*, p. 7.

develop the resources of the Empire that it may not be possible hereafter for an unscrupulous enemy to repeat his outrages on liberty and civilization" (a).

PERMANENT WAR CABINET.—The attendance of some colonial statesmen at meetings of the British cabinet has already been referred to, as has also the absurd designation given to such meetings. They are to be held annually. Even after the establishment of peace, the Imperial War Cabinet is to hold its sessions. Indeed, the avowed design is that it is to become a part of some constitution. Read Sir Robert Borden's letter (30 April, 1917) to Mr. Lloyd George—

"The step which you have taken in summoning the Imperial War Cabinet is a notable advance in the development of constitutional relations, and I am confident that the usage thus initiated will gradually but surely develop into a *recognized convention*" (b).

Mr. Lloyd George replied (2 May):

"I believe that this new experiment will prove, as you suggest, a *permanent convention of our constitution*" (c).

Sir Robert has declared that an Imperial parliament is "neither feasible nor wise"; nevertheless he favors an Imperial Cabinet. He knows that a cabinet cannot exist without a parliament. Is he, in Milner-method style, endeavoring to reconcile us to its establishment? Sir Robert is honest, but his imperialism is strong.

WAR CABINET RESOLUTIONS.—Among the resolutions of the "Imperial War Cabinet" and the Imperial War Conference were the following (The marginal headings are now supplied):

NAVY SCHEME.—"That the Admiralty be requested to work out immediately after the conclusion of the war what they consider the most effective *scheme of naval defence for the Empire* for the consideration of the several Governments summoned to this Conference, with such recommendations as the Admiralty consider necessary in that respect for the Empire's future security.

MILITARY SUPPLIES.—"That this Conference, in view of the experience of the present war, calls attention to the importance of developing an adequate capacity of production of naval and military material, munitions, and supplies in all important parts of the Empire (including the countries bordering on the **Pacific and Indian Oceans**).

(a) *The Times* (Eng.), 4 May, 1917.

(b) Hansard (Canada), 1917, p. 1601

(c) *Ibid.*

where such facilities do not presently exist, and affirms the importance of *close co-operation* between India, the Dominions, and the United Kingdom with this object in view.

STANDARDIZATION.—“That this Conference recognizing the importance of assimilating as far as possible the military stores and equipment of the Imperial Forces throughout the Empire, recommends that an expert Committee, representative of the military authorities of the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India, be appointed as early as possible to consider the various patterns in use with a view to selecting standard patterns for general adoption, as far as the special circumstances of each country admit.

SIMILAR TRAINING.—“This Conference is of opinion that it is desirable that the ordnance *personnel* of the military organizations of the Empire should, as far as possible, be trained on the same methods and according to the same principles, and that to secure this end selected officers of the ordnance service from all parts of the Empire should be attached for adequate periods to the Imperial Ordnance Department.

IMPERIAL RESOURCES.—“The time has arrived when all possible encouragement should be given to the development of Imperial resources, and especially to making the Empire independent of other countries in respect of food supplies, raw materials, and essential industries. With these objects in view, this Conference expresses itself in favour of:

PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT.—“(1) The principle that each part of the Empire, having due regard to the interests of our Allies, shall give specially favourable treatment and facilities to the produce and manufactures of other parts of the Empire.

EMIGRANTS.—“(2) Arrangements by which intending emigrants from the United Kingdom may be induced to settle in countries under the British Flag.

CONCERTED ACTION.—“Having regard to the experience obtained in the present war, this Conference records its opinion that the safety of the Empire and the necessary development of its component parts require prompt and attentive consideration, as well as concerted action, with regard to the following matters:

FOOD SUPPLY.—“(1) The production of an adequate food supply and arrangements for its transportation when and where required, under any conditions that may reasonably be anticipated.

CONTROL OF RESOURCES.—“(2) *The control of natural resources* available within the Empire, especially those that are of an essential character for necessary national purposes, whether in peace or in war.

MANUFACTURE IN EMPIRE.—“(3) The economic utilization of such natural resources through processes of manufacture carried on within the Empire. The Conference commends to the consideration of the Governments summoned thereto the enactment of such legislation as may assist this purpose.

IMPERIAL MINERAL BUREAU.—“That it is desirable to establish in London an Imperial Mineral Resources Bureau upon which should be represented Great Britain, the Dominions, India, and other parts of the Empire.”

POLITICAL READJUSTMENT.—“The Imperial War Conference is of opinion that the readjustment of the constitutional relations of the component parts of the Empire is too important and intricate a subject to be dealt with during the war, and that it should form the subject of a special Imperial Conference to be summoned as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities.

It deems it its duty, however, to place on record its view that any such readjustment, while thoroughly preserving all existing powers of self-government and complete control of *domestic affairs*, should be based upon a full recognition of the Dominions as *autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth*, and of India as an important portion of the same, should recognize the right of the Dominions and India to an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign relations, and should provide effective arrangements for continuous consultation in all important matters of common Imperial concern, and for such necessary concerted action, founded on consultation, as the several Governments may determine” (a).

NOTABLE POINTS.—Among the more notable points in these resolutions are the following:

1. Notwithstanding the coming of “the thousand years of peace,” our activities are to be primarily directed to preparation for war, and in this respect “the Empire” is to be a unit.

2. The purpose of preferential trade arrangements is to make

“the Empire independent of other countries in respect of food supplies, raw materials and essential industries.”

3. Canada’s resources are included in the phrase “Imperial resources,” and are to be withdrawn from her autonomous control.

4. Control is to be a matter for concerted action.

5. The “economic utilization” of these resources, “through processes of manufacture carried on within the Empire,” is to be a matter for concerted action.

6. There is to be an Imperial Mineral Resources Bureau—to look after (as we shall see), among other things, Canadian nickel and asbestos; for these are now regarded as “Imperial assets.”

7. There is and can be no such thing as “autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth”; for autonomy means self-government (not merely self-government in domestic affairs) and an “Imperial Commonwealth” means a body politic of which its members are parts. In other words, if Canada

(a) The Times (London), 4 May 1917.

is to be an autonomous or self-governing nation, she cannot be subject to control by any government other than her own. The Conference ought to have been more honest. Its intention was to declare for perpetuation of the present despicable subordination, and it desired to give the appearance of concession to Canadian autonomy. By "an adequate voice in foreign policy," moreover, the Conference did not mean adequate to Canada's effective dissent from policy which she might regard as wrong and ruinous. It meant merely that Canada should be at liberty to suggest and to advise, and should be bound to do as ordered. That is the antithesis of autonomy.

THE OLD COLONIAL SYSTEM.—According to conception of many years ago, colonies were places of profit to their owners, their functions being to produce raw material for the metropolitan; to consume her manufactures; and to afford habitation for surplus population. That conception is the foundation of the above resolution, for, observe that in them are embodied the following:

1. Imperial resources (meaning the resources of the Dominions) are to be developed, so that the Empire (meaning the United Kingdom) shall be independent of other countries in respect of food supplies and raw materials.

2. Specially favorable treatment is to be given by the Dominions to the manufactures of the United Kingdom.

3. British emigrants are to be guided to the Dominions; but they are rather to be women of whom the United Kingdom has a surplus than able-bodied men who may be needed at home. Poor-law children, Industrial-school children and Reformatory-school children are also to be encouraged to migrate (*a*).

4. The British over-riding authority of past times having lapsed, "concerted action" is to regulate "the production of an adequate food supply," and "the control of natural resources."

I am not considering whether the old colonial system was, or whether the new system will be, good or bad. I am merely calling attention to the fact that the old is making substantial re-appearance in the new.

LONDON POLICY.—In one of his recent speeches, Sir Robert Borden referred to what was taking place in England as constituting

"revolutionary changes in the government of the Empire" (*b*).

(*a*) Final Report, paras. 465-508.

(*b*) Ante, p. 268.

He was right. Before he went to London, Canada could boast her advances toward autonomy, for, although Sir George Foster had agreed to surrender a good deal of it, the assent of Canada, as represented by her Prime Minister, had not been obtained. Now it has; and perhaps the most "revolutionary" part of the whole proceeding is that, upon some of the most important subjects, the policy of Canada's Prime Minister has been formed in London, in consultation with men who not only do not reside in Canada, but who represent interests very different from ours. To give "specially favorable treatment" to South Africa and Australia, as against the produce of the United States; and to introduce "concerted action" into the management and regulation of our food production and natural resources, appear to me to be matters of such tremendous import that they ought to be discussed and settled, not in London, but in Ottawa; not amidst the imperialistic and aristocratic influences of England, but in the free air of Canada; not in a committee in which Canadians are a small minority, but in a parliament in which none but Canadians sit.

THE DOMINIONS ROYAL COMMISSION.

The inquiries and reports of the Dominions Royal Commission furnish an excellent example of the Milner method of attack upon Canada's autonomy, principally by the "advice-and-its-price" process. In considering it, let us recall the inquiry and report of 1763 (the stock-taking of the then newly acquired colonial resources) and compare it with the stock-taking of 1912-7; let us ascertain why the commission was issued; observe its diversion into an investigation of what are called "Imperial resources" but are really resources of the Dominions; and note particularly its recommendation of co-operation in the development of the "Imperial resources." Advice has reached the "joint-inquiry" stage. It is already being advanced into "co-operation" and "guidance," between which and "control" the interval is short.

1763 INQUIRY.—Shortly after the cession of Canada and other places by France to the United Kingdom, Lord Egremont, the Secretary of State in charge of colonial affairs, re-

quested the Lords of Trade (5 May, 1763) to consider and report:

"By what Regulations, the most extensive Commercial Advantages may be derived from these Cessions, and

How those Advantages may be rendered most permanent and secure to His Majesty's Trading Subjects" (a).

In reply, the Lords recounted the advantages, and made recommendation of exploitation methods:—

"The most obvious Advantages arising from the Cessions made by the Definitive Treaty are The exclusive Fishery of the River St. Lawrence on all the Coasts in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and all the Islands in that Gulf."

"The next obvious Benefit acquired by the Cessions made to your Majesty is the Fur and Skin Trade of all the Indians in North America."

"Another obvious Advantage of the Cession, will be the supplying of all the Indian Tribes upon the Continent of North America with European Commodities immediately through the Hands of English Traders."

"Another Advantage attending the late Treaty is the secure settling of the whole Coast of North America."

"We have already mentioned the great Scope and Room which there is for beneficial Settlements in the Article of Fishery in Nova Scotia, another great Advantage, however, of the late Treaty, *producing Strength to Your Kingdom and Riches to Your Subjects*, is the future Supply which the new Acquisitions will afford of Naval Stores, more particularly that of masting for the Royal Navy, and of that Species of Timber and Wood commonly called Lumber."

"A capital Advantage highly deserving Your Majesty's Attention is the Increase of the Trade of Sugar, Coffee, Cotton and other Indian Products by the speedy Settlement and Culture of the new acquired Islands."

"The last advantageous Consequence arising from the Cessions which we shall now lay before Your Majesty is that of securing the whole Gum Trade on the Coast of Africa from a Monopoly in the Hands of the French by means of the River Senegal as well as the Acquisition of a considerable Share of the Slave Trade formerly in their hands, with a Variety of other Articles which there is great reason to believe may be obtained by the prosecution of further Discoveries on that River" (b).

The western boundary of Canada (then Quebec) was fixed at a line drawn from "Lake Nipissin" to the St. Lawrence. Why?

"The Advantage resulting from the restriction of the Colony of Canada will be that of preventing by proper and natural Boundaries, as well the Ancient French Inhabitants as others from removing and settling in remote Places, *where they neither could be so conveniently made amenable to the Jurisdiction of any Colony nor made sub-*

(a) Shortt and Doughty: *Canada, Constitutional Documents*, Vo. 1, p. 94.

(b) *Ibid*, pp. 98-101.

servient to the Interest of the Trade and Commerce of this Kingdom by an easy Communication with and Vicinity to the great River St. Lawrence" (a).

STOCK-TAKING OF 1912-7.—Canada had, of course, no representation on the inquiry of 1763. She was a mere asset—one of a large number of colonies which continental countries were quarrelling about. According to the ideas of the time, her new owners were taking stock of what they had got, and speculating as to the best methods by which

"those Advantages may be rendered most permanent and secure to His Majesty's Trading Subjects."

But by 1912, Canada had ceased to be an asset. For very many years she had boasted her autonomy. Her resources were her own. No government other than hers had title to, or interest in them. Repetition of the 1763 inquiry would have been impossible—not merely an anachronism, but resented by Canada as a menace and an insult. No British government would have attempted it. So, one might have thought.

THE COMMISSION.—The Dominions Royal Commission proves the contrary. It was composed of five men from the United Kingdom, one from New Zealand, one from South Africa, one from Newfoundland, and one from Canada (b). It made a much more thorough investigation of Canadian resources than did the inquirers of 1763. It made many recommendations as to the use and development of Canadian resources. It referred to these resources as "Empire resources." It urged, "Empire development and organization." It deprecated the colonial habit of taking "a private and particular view" of the local interests. It advocated "a more statesman-like survey of the whole position." It proposed the creation of an "Imperial Development Board" with a view to "co-ordinating Empire effort for the development of these resources," namely, "Empire resources,"

and with a view also to assumption of

"the duty of advising and guiding on these matters."

There is the Milner method in fullest operation, and Canada is making no defence.

(a) Ibid, p. 103.

(b) The Australian resigned in May, 1915, before Canada was inspected.

CONCEPTION OF COMMISSION.—At the Imperial Conferences, Sir Wilfrid had to contend not only against the heavy direct attacks of Mr. Chamberlain, but against the mistaken concessions and proposals of some of the other colonial representatives. The history of the Dominions Royal Commission commences with one of those proposals, and with Sir Wilfrid's adoption of the time-honored method of avoiding uncomfortable situations, namely, by reference of them to a Royal Commission. In 1911, Mr. Fisher of Australia moved the adoption of the following resolutions:

"That this Conference, recognizing the importance of promoting fuller development of commercial intercourse within the Empire, strongly urges that every effort should be made to bring about co-operation in commercial relations and matters of mutual interest.

That it is advisable, in the interests both of the United Kingdom and of the British Dominions beyond the seas, that efforts in favour of British manufactured goods and British shipping should be supported as far as practicable" (a).

Under close surveillance of the Canadian Manufacturers Association, Sir Wilfrid could not subscribe to the second of these resolutions; under obligations of courtsey, he could not very well oppose it; and with parliamentary tact, he moved the substitution of the following:

"That His Majesty should be approached with a view to the appointment of a Royal Commission representing the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Newfoundland, with a view of investigating and reporting upon the natural resources of each part of the Empire represented at this Conference, the development attained and attainable, and the facilities for the production, manufacture, and distribution; the trade of each part with the others and with the outside world, the food and raw material requirement of each, and the sources thereof available. To what extent, if any, the trade between each of the different parts has been affected by existing legislation in each, either beneficially or otherwise" (b).

LAURIER'S REASONS.—Sir Wilfrid gave two reasons for his motion:

(1) The United Kingdom had not responded to the preferences given by Canada to British manufacturers.

"We have been trying to get *mutual preferential treatment*, but we have not been able to do so, and I strongly hope that such a Commission as I have indicated would find it possible to come to the end which we have not been able to reach up to the present time.

(a) Minutes of Proceedings (Cd. 5745), p. 339.

(b) Ibid, p. 340.

(2) "On the other hand, in Canada we have to complain, and have complained bitterly, of some legislation of the United Kingdom which peculiarly affects a very important Canadian trade—the cattle trade. *Our cattle have been subjected for many years past—for over 20 years, if my memory fails me not—to an embargo which was based upon the statement then made that there was disease in the cattle of Canada, which we denied at the time without being able to make an impression. We have protested again and again that our cattle were not diseased. We have asked that that embargo should be removed, but we have failed every time. Our protests are as old as the legislation itself, but though presented year after year, they have not met with any response. We believe that if the true condition of things were known, and if it were found out that the basis upon which the prohibitive legislation was adopted was false, the result would be different from what it is, and we should have some good reason to hope that this impediment to a very important trade would be removed*" (a).

The Colonial Secretary agreed to the motion but, with Sir Wilfrid's assent, deleted the first of the reasons for it by the addition of the words:

"and by what methods *consistent with the existing fiscal policy of each part*, the trade of each part with the others may be improved and extended."

Sir Wilfrid's second reason was deleted by the neglect of the Commissioners. Sir Wilfrid, probably, did not expect anything else.

1912-7 RESEMBLES 1763.—The purposes of the 1763 inquiry were, as we have seen, (1) to take stock of colonial resources, and (2) to ascertain

"How those Advantages may be rendered most permanent and secure to His Majesty's Trading Subjects" (b).

Sir Wilfrid's reasons for moving for an inquiry, in 1911, having been to obtain advantages for Canadians, (1) by the establishment in the United Kingdom of preferential duties in their favor, and (2) by repeal of the British embargo on Canadian cattle, we might have expected that the modern report would bear little resemblance to that of 1763. But we should have been mistaken. For in the later report (or rather reports) there is not a word about these Canadian advantages, while, on the other hand, our splendid resources are catalogued in elaborate detail, and the methods by which those resources may be secured to "the Empire as a whole"—(meaning the United Kingdom) are formulated, and recommended for action. It is the same old imperialistic story, with one unfortunate

(a) Ibid.

(b) Ante, p. 321.

(from the British point of view) difference: In 1911, the title to Canadian resources had become vested in Canada, and her assent to the exploitation must, therefore, in some way be obtained. That, as we shall see, is being accomplished.

MR. MILLS' ESTIMATE.—The proceedings of the Commission are very long; not many people will read them; my testimony will (by some, perhaps) be regarded with suspicion; so, for an estimate of the character of the reports—their conception and their tendency—let me offer a few extracts from a competent imperialist—Mr. J. Saxon Mills (a).

"It will be noticed that the Empire is treated throughout this survey as a *unit*."

"One of the great results of the labours of the Commissioners will be a more precise estimate of *Imperial assets* and, as a result, a *policy* of economic conservation and development."

"Here, then, is a method of promoting *Empire solidarity* which provokes no retaliation like a war tariff, nor excites controversy or suspicion like the proposals for a *more organic constitutional union*. This closer *rapprochement* among the States of the Empire, if not the direct object, *would certainly be an incidental effect of all the Commissioner's proposals*."

"The proposed Board would also serve as a *liaison* between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Dominions, and thus obviate those interminable negotiations which precede and delay any joint action. The Board would be purely advisory *to begin with*, though administrative duties might in time be entrusted to it by the Imperial Conference or the joint Governments."

The Empire a unit. Imperial assets. Closer *rapprochement*. Indirect advance to organic constitutional union. Meanwhile, no controversy. No suspicion. Advisory "to begin with." Power afterwards. That is the very perfection of the Milner method. Let us see whether Mr. Mills' estimate of the work of the Commission is correct.

FREEDOM VS. CONTROL.—To the Commissioners, as to Disraeli, the individualism of the Dominions is a terrible mistake. Its continuation would be an inexcusable blunder. The freedom of self-government must be brought under direction. Advice must be furnished; advice only—in the initial stages. Gradually order, and uniformity, and conformity will be evolved.

If the Commissioners have any knowledge of the political history of Canada, they have no sympathy with it. We believe

(a) The Fortnightly Review, May 1917, pp. 878-886.

that our political, industrial, and economic progress has been possible only because, at as early stages as possible, we took into our own hands the control of our own destinies. The Commissioners, on the other hand, tell us that they have been

"strongly impressed by . . . the disconnected character of its [the Empire's] governing and directing machinery.

The British Empire has grown in obedience to no matured plan of development. Each section outside the United Kingdom which has received the grant of self-government has shaped its own course, pursued its own ends and has directed its activities *chiefly from the standpoint of its local interests* (a).

LABORIOUS INSPIRATIONS.—To the Commissioners, all that is very deplorable, but, being the result of temporary conditions, it is, they think, not incurable. Indeed, they can see that it is already in process of amelioration.

"Yet, as growth has proceeded and as the strength and power of the Empire have increased, as means of communication and intercourse have multiplied, there has developed a deepening sense of common aims and ideals and recognition of common interests and purpose. The instinct, not only of nationhood, but of *Imperial unity* has gradually asserted itself The scattered stones of early colonial days have been built into noble national structures. Already the stately outlines of the Empire of the future can be discerned against the far horizon" (b).

From this excursion into the empyrean, the Commissioners return to tell us why we are so very individualistic:

"In the self-governing parts of the Empire the burden of legislators and administrators is heavy and exacting. Local interests are pressing, and, when these are served, there is little time or energy left for considering broader and wider interests. Whilst now and then *an inspiration to common action is laboriously realized*, most ideas languish under the lack of needed mechanism, and are ultimately buried amongst the neglected opportunities of the world" (c).

Those Commissioners were evidently unaware that, while there is one parliament for the government of forty-five million people in the British Isles and for the oversight of hundreds of millions elsewhere, there are in Canada nine parliaments for seven and a half millions. Of the one hundred and fifty possible reasons for our narrow provincialism, the Commissioners, through the purest bad luck, hit upon the least probable.

(a) Final Report, para. 714.

(b) Ibid.

(c) Ibid.

PRIVATE AND PARTICULAR VIEWS.—As further evidence of the absence of even “laboriously realized” inspirations in our cramped colonialism, the Commissioners declare that:

“Even where local Governments enter into negotiations with one another or with some other country, they naturally incline to take a *private and particular view and seek to obtain the best terms for the interests they represent, without regard to a broader and more statesmanlike survey of the whole position*” (a).

To that charge, especially in dealing with the United States, I am afraid that Canadians must plead guilty; but guilty in common with the United Kingdom—*save only* when she is dealing with the United States about Canadian interests. She is generous enough then.

“EMPIRE AS A WHOLE.”—From all these pinched bigotries we are to be relieved by ceasing to think of our own interests, and by acquiring the habit of considering the interests of the United Kingdom, which, as a sufficient veil to *that* “private and particular view,” are always to be spoken of as “the interests of the Empire as a whole.” The Commissioners think that that aspect has, hitherto, been rather neglected:

“No official attempt, however, has yet been made, except partially by the Dominions Royal Commission, to consider questions affecting Imperial trade and development, from the point of view of the interests of *the whole Empire*” (b).

Not one of the Commissioners really believes that there is such a point of view. You may consider questions from the point of view of Canada, or of any other place. Or you may consider them from the points of view of all the places. But there is no one point of view from which you can regard effects upon widely separated and widely interest-differentiated places. And the easy explanation of the language is that the phrase “interests of the Empire as a whole” must almost always be understood as “the interests of the United Kingdom.”

EMPIRE ORGANIZATION.—Travelling far outside the scope of their instructions, and eager to assist in filling in “the stately outlines of the Empire of the future,” the Commissioners devoted their principal chapter to the subject,

(a) Ibid., para. 717.

(b) Ibid., para. 715.

“EMPIRE DEVELOPMENT AND ORGANIZATION,”

which means development of Dominion resources; under the organizing care of an Imperial Development Board (the creation of which is recommended); for the benefit of the United Kingdom. And so, instead of telling us what would be best for each of the six countries, the interests of all of them are pooled and confused in “the Empire as a whole.” We get references to “Empire production and Empire requirements” (a), and investigations along these lines; but the effect upon relations to other countries of applying Empire products wholly, or even primarily, to Empire requirements, is forgotten in enthusiasm for “the Empire as whole.”

APOTHEOSIS OF IMPERIALISM.—Indeed the Commissioners soar not only beyond recognition of anything but “the Empire as a whole,” but beyond the commonplace counsels (to use their language)

“of advocates of some particular fiscal or other theory, which they have pressed, in season and out of season, as a universal remedy. In our judgment these counsels, however important they may be, cover only a part of the problem. *An Imperial policy, in the broadest sense, must include much that is not fiscal*” (b).

Who could have imagined that Sir Wilfrid’s desire for (1) reciprocal preferences, and (2) the removal of the cattle embargo would end with the apotheosis of Imperialism—“an Imperial policy?”

DOMINIONS ROYAL COMMISSION’S ADVICE.

BITS OF ADVICE.—Subjection of Canada by the advice-and-its-price process has been very appreciably advanced by the reports of the Dominions Royal Commission. The Fifth Interim Report makes the following recommendations:

1. Some of our methods of obtaining immigration need mending—

“We think that the Dominion and Provincial Governments might be well advised to consider, in conference, the whole question of the selection of immigrants and their allocation over the Dominion, so that while each part and Province should receive its fair share of the

(a) *Ibid.*, para. 329.

(b) *Ibid.*, para. 78.

newcomers, the work might be carried out in the most economical manner" (a).

In some respects,

"the present system needs stringent revision and control" (b).

2. ". . . arrangements should be made whereby intending migrants to Canada may, before breaking up their homes, secure themselves, by means of prior medical inspection in the United Kingdom, against rejection on their arrival in the Dominion" (c).

3. "The truth is, we think, that in the past too much attention has been devoted to attracting immigrants and too little to the task of fitting and equipping them for a new life" (d).

4. Canada hitherto has offered free lands to immigrants, and endeavored to induce farmers from other lands to settle on them. The Commission recommends that we should supply not only "adequate training facilities" for both husbands and wives, free of cost, but also

"financial aid, to establish themselves successfully on the land" (e).

5. Canada's shortage in "female domestic help" can be modified by

"giving greater facilities in Canada for training in domestic science, and in particular, by starting training establishments in the Dominion for immigrant girls and women other than those who have been domestic servants in the Mother Country" (f).

and the Commission urges us strongly to adopt these courses.

6. The policy of emigration societies to "bring out to Canada far more boys than girls" (g) is wrong, and ought to be changed.

7. Canadian governments ought not to

"assist private emigration societies in recovering advances for passages, etc., made by them to emigrants from the United Kingdom" (h).

8. ". . . it is clearly urgent that plans for a permanent increase of the depth of the St. Lawrence ship channel should be framed and carried out as speedily as possible" (i).

9. ". . . further efforts should be made to impress upon the underwriters the conditions which justify lower rates for cargoes and hulls to and from Canadian Eastern ports"

(a) Pp. 11, 12.

(b) P. 10.

(c) Pp. 10, 11.

(d) P. 12.

(e) Pp. 17, 18.

(f) P. 18.

(g) P. 19.

(h) P. 19.

(i) P. 23.

"If, however, these efforts fail we think that the Dominion Government would be well advised seriously to consider the question of itself undertaking liability for the extra insurance charges now imposed" (a).

10. ". . . the evidence which we received satisfied us that the development of the export trade from the western coast is of even greater importance than the stimulation of the import trade" (b).

11. "Better distribution of the traffic" would probably be secured by shipping grain to Europe from the western rather than from the eastern coast (c).

12. ". . . it might be of great advantage to the social and productive interests of Canada if, during the coming years, in the absence of new construction work north of the 54th parallel, closer settlement and added cultivation could be secured for the areas now well provided with railway facilities" (d).

13. ". . . we are somewhat surprised to find that no definite policy as yet seems to have been laid down by the Canadian Government as to the conditions on which cables may be landed on Canadian territory."

The Commission recommends that a licensing

"system should be introduced at the earliest possible date" (e).

14. After criticizing

"the system by which Press news both from within and from outside Canada is disseminated throughout the Dominion" (f).

the Commission advises

"that representatives of all the principal newspapers of Canada, of the Dominion Government, and of the Telegraph Companies now operating should meet to discuss the position,"

with a view to securing

"a leased wire for 24 hours per diem between Ottawa and Winnipeg, and probably one from end to end of the Dominion" (g).

15. The Commission favors

"a much more active policy of development of the live stock industries. In particular, we have found both in the Prairie Provinces and in Quebec complaints that live stock for breeding, and particularly heifers, were allowed without restriction to be exported to the United States.

"We call the attention of the Dominion Government to the matter, since, while the Department of Agriculture at Ottawa is preparing a comprehensive programme for the extension of co-operation and the

(a) P. 23.

(b) P. 24.

(c) P. 25.

(d) P. 34.

(e) P. 38.

(f) P. 38.

(g) P. 40.

grant of Government assistance in livestock matters, we are not satisfied that sufficiently effective steps have yet been taken to deal with the diminution of breeding stock through exportation" (a).

16. Referring to iron-mining in British Columbia, the Commission says:

"we suggest it would be of advantage for the Provincial Government to send its best technical officers to Norway to inquire as to the cost of treatment, etc., of the similar ores found in that country" (b).

17. With reference to leases of crown-lands for the purpose of wood-pulp production, the Commission advises that it would not be unreasonable

"that, in future, clauses to restrict foreign control should be inserted when leases of Crown land for wood pulp purposes are granted; also that companies granted leases should be required to instal plant [sic.] capable of producing dry pulp such as is required in the United Kingdom" (c).

18. "It seems advisable that expert investigation should be made by means of a survey schooner or otherwise, in order to ascertain whether the fisheries are being depleted or whether the halibut themselves are still in abundance, but have a tendency to migrate to banks as yet unknown" (d).

19. The Commission advises

"a co-ordination between the functions of the Commission of Conservation and other existing Departments which would promote both economy and efficiency, and tend to more methodical application of energy" (e).

20. "In Canada the tendency has hitherto been to produce too many statistics, not too few as in some other Dominions. The statistics of emigration, of unemployment, and of the livestock industries are, however, deficient. Greater co-ordination between the various Departments engaged in statistical work is needed" (f).

21. The bits of advice given to the fur-farmers of Prince Edward Island are:

"(1) The prevention of undue and speculative company promotion. This point needs no further emphasis.

(2) The placing of the industry on a pelt-selling, not merely on a breeding basis" (g).

The advice-bestowments in the Commission's Final Report are so numerous and elaborate that a selection of extracts from

(a) P. 43.

(b) P. 57.

(c) P. 57.

(d) P. 51.

(e) P. 51.

(f) P. 57.

(g) P. 44.

the Commission's own summary of the recommendations must suffice:

22. "Certain conclusions are put forward on the question of land settlement for ex-soldiers and their families after the war. In particular we emphasize the need for the provision of adequate capital, training, and assistance for the intending soldier settler" (a).

23. "We urge that, in future, as a matter of Imperial policy, far greater attention should be devoted to the emigration of women from the United Kingdom, and make various practical suggestions for increasing such emigration.

So far as the Dominions are concerned the fact is emphasised that one of their main problems lies in finding means to secure proper distribution of women throughout the country districts, and in preventing their concentration in the larger towns and cities" (b).

24. "In order to secure uniform progress in the future, we recommend:—

(a) That all schemes of improvement for certain scheduled ports and dry docks on the great trade routes of the Empire should be submitted to the proposed new Imperial Development Board, so that whilst not interfering in any way with details of construction, etc., it may advise on these schemes from the standpoint of Imperial requirements."

"Your Majesty's Government and the Dominion Governments could arrange in concert to deepen selected ports on the great Imperial trade routes to accommodate vessels of the length and draught required to secure high speed at reasonable cost" (c).

The Commission strongly recommended that this last measure should be taken.

25. "Our recommendations for securing control are as follows:—

(a) That contractors for the new mail services recommended above and all other subsidised services should be required to submit for approval to the Governments concerned a schedule of freight rates on the chief articles of import and export, supervision of which is important in the national interest.

(b) That Boards should be set up by Your Majesty's Governments for the purpose of making inquiry in cases where a *prima facie* case is established that the interests of shippers are being adversely affected by the action of steamship owners or steamship conferences.

(c) That the functions of these Boards should be in the main directed to investigation and conciliation, but that they should be empowered, at their discretion, to order abolition of differential freight rates found to be inimical to Imperial trade" (d).

26. "It is urgent that steps should be taken to improve statistical methods and complications now existing in the various parts of the Empire, particularly as regards movement of population, imports and exports, prices, wages, and cost of living, and movement of capital.

(a) P. 165.

(b) P. 165.

(c) P. 166.

(d) P. 167.

The best method of bringing about such improvement is to call a conference of the statisticians of the Empire. We suggest agenda for such a conference, and outline the preliminary work needed if it is to have the best effect.

In future the collection, collation, and publication of Imperial statistics should be entrusted to a central statistical office, working under the new Imperial Development Board recommended below" (a).

27. "Existing organizations are inadequate to deal with the *scientific development of the resources of the Empire*, with the deepening of its harbours on a co-ordinated plan, with the improvement of its mail and cable services, the preparation and publication of its statistics, and other matters of joint interest to the Empire as a whole.

To remedy these deficiencies we recommend the establishment of an *Imperial Development Board*. This Board, for really effective work, must represent not only the United Kingdom and the self-governing Dominions, but also India, the Crown Colonies, and the Protectorates; in other words it must be concerned with the interests of the whole Empire.

Detailed suggestions are made for the construction and work of such a Board. *In its initial stage it should be advisory*" (b).

COMMENT.—Some of these bits of advice are silly; some are banal; some are trivial; none is of any use; some are prejudicial; all are insufferable insolent. They furnish one more instance of the accuracy of Mr. Asquith's characterization of the customary attitude of his countrymen toward peoples outside the islands as one of "comfortable consciousness of effortless superiority."

DOMINIONS ROYAL COMMISSION AND THE IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT BOARD.

EMPIRE ORGANIZATION.—The most interesting in its imperialistic assumptions and the most sinister chapter of the final report of the Dominions Royal Commission is that entitled

"Chapter XIV—Empire Development and Organization."

Every clause of it is based upon "the Empire as a whole" notion, and the absurd assertion of its first paragraph—that

"India, the Crown Colonies and the Protectorates . . . are vitally linked with the self-governing Dominions; the destinies of all are interwoven" (c)—

(a) P. 168.

(b) P. 169.

(c) Para. 714.

is but one illustration of the extent to which the commissioners had lost themselves in the clouds of the wildest imperialism.

THE BOARD.—Declaring themselves to be

“strongly impressed by the almost infinite variety of the *Empire domain*” (a)

(as they refer to the resources of the Dominions), and feeling that consideration of

“the better utilisation of *the resources of the Empire*”

is a part of their mission, the Commissioners submit

“the conclusions which we have formed as to *the development of the Empire’s resources* and the furtherance of its trade by *the concerted action* of all component parts of your Majesty’s Possessions” (b).

“There is, in brief, both scope and need for a *new Imperial Development Board* which, without displacing any existing body, would devote its energies and experiences to a continuous survey and consideration of *Empire resources* and opportunities, and to study of the best means of *co-ordinating Empire effort for the development of these resources* for the extension of Imperial trade, and for the strengthening of Imperial lines of communication” (c).

ADVISING AND GUIDING.—The Commissioners enumerate nine subjects for the attention of the new Board, and say that it ought to

“collect information, and *advise the different Governments as to the requirements of the Empire* in respect of all raw materials and commodities essential to its trade, and shall watch carefully any tendencies towards change” (d)

“To the duty of *advising and guiding* on these matters would, of course, be added that of collecting the necessary particulars bearing upon them” (e).

“The proposed Board should further undertake the elaboration and the critical examination of joint Imperial schemes of development” (f).

NO ENCROACHMENTS IN “INITIAL STAGES.”—And then follows a particularly fine example of the Milner method:

“The primary condition of this new Imperial Development Board must be that it should not encroach upon the political or administrative machinery of any of the self-governing parts of the Empire” (g).

Of course not. That would involve our signature to a document reducing our powers of self-government. No such signa-

(a) Ibid.

(b) Ibid.

(c) Para. 719.

(d) Para. 716.

(e) Para. 720.

(f) Para. 721.

(g) Para. 722.

ture can at present be obtained. But what of the future? When we get used to doing as we are advised, why might not advice slip slowly into direction? Confident that the Dominions will eventually emerge from the niggardliness of "private and particular views," and will learn, with less labor, to visualize "the stately outlines," the Commissioners declare that the functions of the new Board

"should be *purely advisory in its initial stage*. We are not prepared to suggest that at its inception any specific administrative function should be assigned to it, but equally we hesitate to restrict the future activities of a new and to some extent experimental organization. If at some future time *the Government of the Empire* should, either through the Imperial Conference or otherwise, desire to delegate any administrative duties to it we see no inherent difficulty in giving effect to such a wish" (a).

That is the scheme. It can be carried through only if Canadians choose to be duped, by the operations of the Milner method, into letting go gradually that which at first they would refuse to concede.

CONSTITUTION OF BOARD.—In order to place beyond all possibility of error the meaning to be assigned to "the interests of the Empire as a whole," the new Board is to be composed of the following representatives:

"United Kingdom, India, Crown Colonies, and Protectorates	7
Canada	1
Australia	1
New Zealand	1
Union of South Africa.....	1
Newfoundland	1

12" (b).

The full significance of this arrangement can be grasped only when you remember that the whole scheme may be summed up in the phrase "Empire resources and Empire requirements"; that by "Empire resources" is meant the resources of Canada and other places outside the United Kingdom; and that by "Empire requirements" is meant principally the requirements of the British Isles.

(a) Para. 722.

(b) Para. 730.

MAKE RESOURCES AVAILABLE.—In its purpose, then, the scheme is precisely the same as those of Mr. Curtis and Mr. Lash, namely, that the resources of the Dominions shall be placed at the disposal of the United Kingdom. The only difference is that the two amateurs would ask us to put our signatures to our surrender, and that the Milner-method people would wheedle us into it.

IMPERIAL MINERAL RESOURCES BUREAU.

RESOURCES OF THE EMPIRE.—The recent Imperial Conference recommended the establishment in London of an Imperial Mineral Resources Bureau,

“upon which should be represented Great Britain, the Dominions, India, and other parts of the Empire.”

“The Bureau should be charged with the duties of collection of information from the appropriate departments of the Governments concerned and other sources regarding *the mineral resources and the metal requirements of the Empire, and of advising from time to time what action, if any, may appear desirable to enable such resources to be developed and made available to meet the total requirements of the Empire*” (a).

Here we get the “unity of the Empire” notion in its fullest and most dangerous development. “The Empire” is regarded as an entity, possessed of “resources” and with certain “requirements”; and the Bureau is to advise how the resources are to be “developed and made available” for the Empire. It was the possession of gold mines that caused the loss to the Transvaal of its independence. Let Canada beware how she permits British interference with her nickel and her asbestos. Their value has excited cupidity. In the Fifth Interim Report of the Dominions Royal Commission may be found the following:

“The nickel ore produced in Canada is of exceptional interest, not only in respect of its magnitude in relation to other sources of supply, but because of the invaluable improvements which its use has effected in the preparation of war material. As is well known, it increases both the strength and the ductility of steel, and it has, consequently, been freely specified by the naval and military authorities for use in warships, guns and other war material. It is, therefore, a matter for sincere congratulation that *80 per cent. of the world's output should be found within the British Empire*; practically the whole of this is in

(a) The Times (London), 5 April, 1917.

Canada and in the Sudbury district of Ontario, with a relatively small proportion from the Cobalt district and the Alexo mine near Porcupine" (a).

"The Canadian deposits of asbestos are of particular interest and importance, supplying, it is calculated, about 80 to 85 per cent. of the world's consumption" (b).

"Canada has two assets of vital importance to the Empire as a whole in its possession of so large a proportion of the world's supplies of nickel and asbestos" (c).

SCHEMES FOR CONTROL.—Three plans are suggested whereby the "Empire resources" are to be appropriated to the benefit of "the Empire as a whole";

First: Decrying all narrow views of

"of local interests"; rising to "a broader and more statesmanlike survey of the whole position" (d);

and accepting the notion of "the unity of the Empire," we must agree to the establishment of The Imperial Development Board, whose duty it shall be continuously to survey

"*Empire resources* and opportunities, and to study of the best means of co-ordinating *Empire effort* for the development of these resources" (e), with "the duty of *advising and guiding* on these matters" (f).

—advising only in the "initial stages," but ready to take on administrative functions if *the Government of the Empire* should so direct (g).

Second: The second method by which the "Empire resources" (Canada's nickel and asbestos) can be appropriated to the Empire is by the creation of The Imperial Mineral Resources Bureau above referred to.

Third: The third suggested method of appropriation is that the British government should use them in bargaining for trade treaties on behalf of the British Empire.

"Carefully! Carefully! Mr. Ewart. Surely it is not possible that imperialism has gone wild enough for a suggestion of that sort to get into a report of a Royal Commission?"

"Why wild?" I reply. "If the Empire is a unit, why ought not Canadian minerals to be applied to the bargaining benefit of 'the Empire as a whole?'"

(a) P. 45.

(b) P. 46.

(c) P. 57.

(d) Ante, p. 327.

(e) Dominions Royal Commission Final Reports, para. 719.

(f) Ibid, para. 720.

(g) Ibid, para. 722.

Leaving readers to supply the answer, I quote from the Final Report of the Commission:

"It is not difficult, however, to imagine conditions even in times of peace, in which it might become desirable to use the possession of these assets as an instrument of commercial negotiation. The practical monopoly of potash which Germany possesses has enabled her to exert pressure on other countries in the past, and the controversy between Germany and the United States in 1911 may be mentioned as an example of the influence which the possession of a raw material monopoly gives in commercial negotiations between two Powers. The possession of assets such as the Canadian asbestos and nickel supplies could be *used by the British Empire* as a powerful means of economic defence" (a).

Canada's Minister of Trade and Commerce put his signature to that report, and agreed to all its paragraphs.

The Imperial Mineral Resources Bureau has been organized, and Sir George Perley—another Canadian Minister—has become a member of it.

The advice method gave the British government control over Egypt.

IMPERIAL TRADE.

FORMERLY.—In the early days, the United Kingdom enjoyed a monopoly of Canadian trade, and no ships but British were permitted to enter Canadian ports. Free trade ideas threw trade and ports open to the world. Afterwards, as has been noted, the freedom was regretted. And later, Mr. Chamberlain commenced his attempt to recover control. First, he required, as condition precedent to closer relations, that we should return to free trade with the United Kingdom. In a speech in London before the Canadian Club (25 March, 1896), he said:

"But the principle which I claim must be accepted if we are to make any, even the slightest progress, is that, within the different parts of the Empire, *protection must disappear*, and that the duties must be revenue duties and not protective duties in the sense of protecting the products of one part of the Empire against those of another part" (b).

Finding that the interests of the parts (the Dominions) could not thus suddenly be rendered subordinate to "the Empire as a whole" (the United Kingdom), Mr. Chamberlain proposed intervention in our manufacturing development. At Birmingham (15 May, 1903), he suggested a compromise:

(a) Ibid, para. 335.

(b) The Times (London), 26 March.

" . . . suppose that we intervene in any stage of the process and say to them, 'There are many things which you do not make, many things for which we have a great capacity of production—leave them to us, as you have left them hitherto.' If we do not do this, Canada will fall to the level of the United States, Australia will fall to the level of Canada, South Africa will fall to the level of Australia" (a).

PRESENT PROPOSAL.—That, of course, was not acceptable. For the moment, all attempts upon our development and liberty ceased. But now, under pretext of what is best for "the Empire as a whole," our purposes are to be examined by the Imperial Development Board; we are to be belabored with advice as to what we are to do; and we are expected to do as we are advised.

LORD BALFOUR'S COMMITTEE.—A strong committee, including some free traders, presided over by Lord Balfour of Burleigh, and known as the "Committee on Commercial and Industrial Policy," purposely anticipated the deliberations of the recent Imperial Conference by adopting the following resolutions, and sending them, with a covering letter, to Mr. Lloyd George (2 February, 1917).

"1. In the light of experience gained during the War, we consider that special steps must be taken to stimulate the production of food-stuffs, raw materials and manufactured articles within the Empire wherever the expansion of production is possible and economically desirable for the safety and welfare of the Empire as a whole.

2. We, therefore, recommend that H. M. Government should now declare *adherence to the principle that preference should be accorded to the products and manufactures of the British Overseas Dominions in respect of any Customs Duties now or hereafter to be imposed on imports into the United Kingdom* (b).

3. Further, it will in our opinion be necessary to take into early consideration as one of the methods of achieving the above objects, the desirability of establishing *a wider range of Customs Duties* which would be remitted or reduced on the products and manufactures of the Empire, and which would form the basis of commercial treaties with Allied and Neutral powers" (c).

In the covering letter to Mr. Lloyd George, the Committee said:

"It will be recalled that at the Colonial Conference of 1902, the Prime Ministers of the Self-Governing Colonies unanimously *urged the expediency of granting in the United Kingdom preferential treatment*

(a) Ewart: *The Kingdom of Canada*, pp. 138, 139.

(b) The Imp. War Confce. adopted a resolution to the same effect.

(c) Cd. 8482.

to the products and manufactures of the Colonies either by exemption from or reduction of duties then existing or thereafter to be imposed, and that a Resolution in the same terms was passed at the Conference of 1907" (a).

WHY ABANDON FREE 'TRADE?—Rather dishonestly, the Committee proceeded to justify departure from previous free-trade principles, upon the ground that the sacrifices and services of the Dominion had made necessary, for the sake of the unity of the Empire, an attempt to meet the declared wishes of the Dominions.

"We have arrived at the conclusions indicated chiefly on the ground that although to some of us any measures which may act in restraint of trade are in the abstract distasteful, we think it necessary for the sake of the unity of the Empire a serious attempt should now be made *to meet the declared wishes of the Dominions* and Colonies for the development of their economic relations with the United Kingdom, and that any abstract opinions we may hold should not, under the circumstances in which we are placed and with the experience gained during the war, stand in the way of any measures which are seen to be important, having regard to the general interests of the Empire."

"Whatever controversies may have arisen in the past, we think that, regard being had in particular *to the sacrifices made and the services rendered* by our fellow subjects overseas for a common purpose during the present war, the time has now arrived at which this request should be granted to the fullest extent which is now or may hereafter become practicable" (b).

THE FABRICATED PLEA.—In the Committee's own letter may be found contradiction of this foolishly fabricated plea:

"We do not overlook the practical difficulties involved, but we desire to emphasise the fact that *for the purpose of recovering trade lost during the war, of securing new markets, and of consolidating the resources of the British Empire*, the development throughout the Empire of a system of mutual tariff preferences is a subject which cannot, in our opinion, any longer be neglected" (c).

Not because of the sacrifices and services of the Dominions are preferences to be granted to them, but in order to recover lost British trade, to secure new markets for British manufactures, and to obtain British control over "the resources of the British Empire."

(a) Ibid.

(b) Cd. 1482.

(c) Ibid.

THE PLEA DISPLACED.—The Committee displaced its plea by the paragraph of its letter which suggested that subsidies should be given to the Dominions instead of preferences:

"The Dominions have not asked, and we do not understand them to ask, that duties should be imposed by the United Kingdom for the sake of granting a preference to their products. But we feel that, in the words of the Resolutions we are forwarding to you, it will be necessary to take into early consideration, as one of the methods of achieving the objects indicated, the desirability of establishing a wider range of Customs duties than exists at present. This subject we propose to consider later, and to submit a further report thereon at an early opportunity, as well as on the question how *far the interests of the Dominions could be met by the granting of subsidies in lieu of tariff preferences*" (a).

In other words the three purposes of the Committee, (1) recovery of trade, (2) new markets, and (3) control of Dominion resources, are to be accomplished by means, not of preferences at all, but by cash payments to the Dominions. And that is what the Committee chooses to call "a system of mutual tariff preferences."

SUBSIDIES.—It is hardly conceivable that any British statesman will ever be bold enough to propose to spend British money in subsidizing Canadian production, or that Canada would accept eleemosynary aids.—I am wrong. I had forgotten the new "unity-of-the-Empire" phraseology. "Why," Imperialists may say to me, "ought not a British statesman to provide subsidies for *Empire* production in Canada as well as in Yorkshire?" "Possibly," I reply, "because a British statesman might imagine that to spend British money in Canada would be to invert the purpose for which "the unity-of-the-Empire" idea was concocted.

THE TRUTH.—Nobody believes that the free-traders of the Balfour committee agreed to recommend the adoption by the British government of a trade policy which they thought would be injurious to British interests, either because of "the declared wishes of the Dominions," or because of their war-sacrifices and services. The truth is that economic dread of Germany and the United States, and not any new-found fondness for the colonies, is the explanation of their conversion to "a wider range of customs duties." Current literature is full of anxiety

(a) Ibid.

upon that score, and various are the strategic plans for the anticipated trade struggle. "A common economic policy" with all the allied nations, is one method. "Imperial trade unity" is another. Creation of the British Trade Corporation is a third. To Canada, they are all prejudicial and dangerous.

WHY NECESSARY?—And they appear to be necessary in the interests of British trade only because British manufacturers are less enterprising and adaptive than their German and American competitors. I should not make that statement (especially at the present time) had I not at hand the report of a British Board of Trade Committee (*a*), which gave as reasons for the failure of British trade in the Dominions (although aided there by preferential duties): (1) lack of scientific research; (2) lack of industrial training; (3) timid bank support; (4) poor consular service; (5) insufficient canal service; (6) unregulated railway rates, etc. To these defects, the Dominions Royal Commission has added (7) the practice of the British manufacturer to quote prices in his own currency; (8) the unattractive appearance of his goods; (9) bad methods of packing; (10) lack of selling-energy—for example, a single trade commissioner for Newfoundland and the whole of Canada (*b*). Other "weak points in our industrial armour" are pointed out in *The Round Table*.

"In the first place it is generally agreed that the equipment and plant of our industry is in many respects inferior and sometimes markedly inferior to that of America, and probably in a good many cases to that of Germany. We were before the war, and still are, in many respects inferior to the United States in the application of machinery and automatic mechanical appliances; we are greatly behindhand in the use of power, particularly electric power, by the efficient utilisation of which our industrial life might be largely transformed.

"The causes of our mechanical inferiority are various. One is the lack of research, to which reference is made later, and which results in the case of antiquated processes. Another is that we started earlier than our competitors. We build our railways and factories and docks on too small a scale; our tunnels too narrow, our platforms too small, our terminals too cramped; our workshops in crowded towns, where there is no room for expansion. Different industries grew up separately—e.g., blast furnaces, and steel works, which today should probably in certain cases be combined. Everywhere we are handicapped in the re-equipment and organization of our industry by our having started on

(a) The report is dated 28 January, 1916, and may be seen in the Canadian government publication: *Proclamations, Orders in Council, and Documents relating to the European War*, 3d Supp. App., p. 681.

(b) Fifth Interim Report, paras. 196, 203-5.

a scale too small for today, to say nothing of the further handicaps caused by the reluctance of the British workingman to take kindly to new labour-saving devices, and of the British industrialist to accept new ideas.

"These difficulties have been increased by the ruinous tendency of most industrial business to divide profits up to the hilt, a tendency encouraged by our taxing laws. Reserves for depreciation and betterment are usually inadequate and accordingly large expenditure on re-equipment becomes impossible.

"A very large proportion of the coal used in the country is still used in plants involving a coal consumption from five to fifteen times greater than the best that can be done to-day. Everyone knows that our railways have been great sinners in the past in not conserving their resources. Does anyone suppose that, if some of our southern lines were in the United States, they would not be reorganized within a year? No doubt there are in this country much greater difficulties owing to the far smaller scope for development. But what is the position? They go on decade after decade crying for more reconstruction, starved by the sins of their former directors, and yet incapable of reorganization owing to the provisions of our laws relating to statutory companies, originally designed though they were to protect the public."

"Another defect in our industry is generally thought to be our inferior organization, both in manufacturing and in selling, and particularly our organization for competing in foreign markets."

"A third defect is the lack of co-ordination between industry and research. The work of research, much neglected in this country, can no longer be carried out in a haphazard and unmethodical way . . . If we are to live in competition with other nations, we must keep ourselves abreast of them, not only in actual knowledge but in its practical application to industry."

"This question of research leads naturally to the allied one of the adaptation to practice of new ideas, new inventions and new schemes. We are believed to be behindhand, if not in our scientific knowledge, at least in our application of it. Very many inventions are the fruit of English brains, but their development and application are done by others."

"These weaknesses in British industry—the failure to apply scientific and technical knowledge to manufacturing, the lack of research, the want of co-operation in manufacturing and in selling, the failure to provide for renewals and depreciation—all of which have as one of their effects the keeping down of wages—are overcome to a great extent in America and Germany by large organizations, cartels and trusts. Their monopolistic tendency is objectionable to the English mind, and possibly other drawbacks may have the effect of deadening individual initiative."

"A contributory cause is undoubtedly the roundabout, slow and costly methods of negotiating financial business through company promoters, trust companies, and so forth, in London compared with the immediate and thorough consideration given to them elsewhere by powerful and combined financial and industrial interests" (a).

(a) December, 1916: *Industry and Finance*, pp. 33-40, 64.

THE REMEDY.—There are two methods by which the British manufacturer can successfully cope in the markets of the Dominions with German and American competition: (1) by changing his methods, or (2) by prevailing upon the Dominions to give him such preferential treatment as will obviate that necessity. In other words—to quote the language of a British protectionist in the *Westminster Gazette*—

“Are we to hustle, like the Germans, for any sort of trade at any sort of price, and make the trade returns the test of our well-being, or make a decent and well-ordered life, with spaces for leisure and pleasure the object of our national effort?” (a).

To which we may reply that they may do as they wish, but if they do not want “to hustle like the Germans,” we do not desire to be exploited like the Poles.

CATTLE EMBARGO.—If anybody believes that any part of the British fiscal system has ever been adopted for any other than strictly self-regarding purposes, I ask him to consider the history of the embargo placed upon Canada’s cattle.

Had the animals been excluded in pursuance of avowed protectionist policy, we could have offered no objection; for the leaf would have been taken from our own book. We protested merely because the embargo was based upon the assertion of danger of infection from diseased herds. At the Conference of 1911 (as has been noted) Sir Wilfrid Laurier, referring to Canada’s constant denial of the assertion, said:

“We have protested again and again that our cattle were not diseased. We have asked that that embargo should be removed, but we have failed every time. Our protests are as old as the legislation itself, but though presented year after year, they have not met with any response” (b).

At the recent London Conference, Sir Robert Borden again protested, and on his return to Canada he said in the House of Commons:

“In the Imperial War Conference we also took up the cattle embargo, which has been the *source of irritation to the people of this country for many years past*. I do not hesitate to say, what I said in the Conference and what has been many times said, that if the United Kingdom desire, for the protection of any industry in the United Kingdom, to keep Canadian cattle out of that country, we have not the slightest objection to their doing so. But we want them to do it directly, and not indirectly. We consider that if the embargo is maintained for any such purposes, as I took the liberty of asserting, *it is*

(a) Quoted in the *Citizen* (Ottawa) 30 August, 1916.

(b) Ante, p. 324.

a great injustice to Canada that it should be maintained, and it ought to be removed. I said to them: If you desire to keep our cattle out pass a law to keep them out; keep your own course with regard to your own fiscal matters, with regard to your industries, with regard to your productions; we do the same with regard to ours; and we are perfectly content that you should do the same with yours; but do not, *on the pretence that our cattle are diseased*, keep them out for any such purpose" (a).

Since then the British Minister of Agriculture has said as follows:

"Strong representations on the subject, but more particularly concerning the stigma which is thus cast on Canadian livestock, were made to me by Canadian ministers during their recent visit. Canada disputes the genuineness of cases on which prohibition was originally founded, and *without doubt has been almost entirely free from foot and mouth disease and pleuro-pneumonia*. The Canadian feeling, therefore, resents the imputation of infection.

"*The prohibition cannot, as I am advised by the chief veterinary officer of the agricultural board, be justified on the ground of health.*

"Cattle bred and reared in Canada and leaving that country for the first time by direct shipment to a British port ought not to be excluded under the Disease of Animals Act of 1896. I cannot say whether, or under what conditions, Canadian cattle of the kind indicated might hereafter be permitted to enter this country except for slaughter at the port.

"When the farmers here are to be asked to reduce their livestock, permission is plainly impossible; but the prohibition rests largely upon the agricultural policy of the United Kingdom than on the risk of disease" (b).

After a quarter of a century of dishonesty we get the truth. We get no relief. But of that we make no complaint. We recognize that British farmers are benefited by our exclusion. We note that they ought not to be asked to suffer for "the benefit of the Empire as a whole." And we get a lesson in phraseology and political vision. We see that "the benefit of the Empire as a whole" means "the benefit of the United Kingdom," and that "the private and particular view of a British class" may sometimes intercept the "broader and more statesmanlike survey of the whole position" (c).

THE UNITED STATES.—Antipathy to our enemies is being pressed upon us as a reason for permitting Canada to play Poland to the United Kingdom. But that too, is rather dis-

(a) *Hansard*, 18 May, 1917, p. 1607.

(b) Cabled from London, 25 May, 1917.

(c) *Ante*, p.

honest for we are expected to exclude American manufacturers, as well as German, to the best of our ability. In the Round Table (a), we read:

"By our enormous war orders we are pouring fabulous sums into the laps of the great American iron, steel, and engineering industries. They will be vastly more wealthy and powerful than our own industries. Even now the great American basic industries are reaching out to acquire all the best deposits of raw materials they can lay their hands on, wherever they may be. Representatives of American industry, backed by great financial corporations, are seeking new business in all likely quarters of the globe, and *in the future we shall have two enterprising and powerful countries and not one to compete with abroad.*"

In recommending "mutual tariff preferences," Lord Balfour's committee contemplated, no doubt, such preferences in Canada as would enable the British manufacturer to compete successfully with the American in the Canadian market. In other words, we are to put such duties on American goods as will raise our prices to a point at which the British manufacturer, handicapped by all his old-fashioned, defective methods, and by higher freight rates, can sell to us at a profit. May we not respectfully ask the committee to address themselves to the reformation of the British manufacturer? May we venture to remind those gentlemen that for the year ending 31 March, 1914 (the year before the war) Canada imported

From the United States.....\$426,000,000

From the United Kingdom..... 133,000,000 (b) ;

and that we really cannot afford to quarrel with the Americans merely in order that the British manufacturer may enjoy

"a decent and well-ordered life, with spaces for leisure and pleasure."

THE BRITISH TRADE CORPORATION.—Creation of the British Trade Corporation, with a capital of fifty million dollars, to aid British enterprises in foreign countries, would be a matter of indifference to Canada were it not that one clause in the charter appears to have been designed specially as a supplement to the work of The Imperial Development Board and the Imperial Mineral Resources Bureau. These are to advise and to guide, while the corporation is to execute. The clause is as follows:

"In any cases in which, as the result of arrangements between our Government of the United Kingdom and any other Government,

(a) Dec. 1916, pp. 63,4.

(b) Figures taken from the Fifth Interim Report of the Dominions Royal Commission, p. 4.

whether the Government of a British possession or Protectorate or a foreign Government, our Government is desirous that British capital shall participate in financial operations not falling within the terms of any agreements with other parties which may be existing at the date of this our charter, and requires an agent for the representation of British interests so far as relates to trade or finance, we do hereby, but without in any way limiting or modifying the powers and rights by this our charter elsewhere conferred, grant and confer on the Corporation the right in such cases of being such agent of our Government" (a).

One step further—a lease of our mineral properties to The British Trade Corporation for ninety-nine years—and Canada may as well sign her abdication. By similar method Wei-hai-wei was taken from China.

THE EMPIRE RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE.

LAND GRABS.—The Empire Resources Committee, under the presidency of Sir Starr Jameson, has proposed the pooling of "the resources of the Empire" with a view to the reduction of the British national debt. Canadian fish, timber, and land are all to be organized and made productive for "the Empire." From a Canadian cable despatch (b), we learn that

"One of the proposals of the newly-formed Empire Resources Committee, which, under the presidency of Sir Starr Jameson, proposes to *develop the resources of the British dominions to assist in paying off the war debt*, is to arrange for taking over 200,000,000 acres of land in the Canadian West.

A memorandum of the committee suggests an Imperial Development Board be formed to arrange with the Dominion of Canada to purchase 200,000,000 acres of arable land in Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and British Columbia for, say, £40,000,000 sterling to be paid by England at the rate of £10,000,000 yearly on the condition that the Dominion Government spends the whole capital in the immediate development of the lands.

It is believed the value of those lands in such an empire farm would speedily reach twenty pounds per acre or altogether *the Empire will receive in cash four thousand millions sterling, which is the value of its debt for war or pre-war.*"

This constitutes an excellent example of the effect of regarding Canadian resources as "Empire resources." The committee would not dream of making such a proposal with

(a) Cd. 8567.

(b) 24 February, 1917.

reference to the lands in the United States. Why? Because those lands belong to the United States. And the reason that the committee feels at liberty to propose its appropriation of 200,000,000 acres of Canadian land is its view that those acres are "Empire resources" and belong to "the Empire as a whole." I say *appropriate*, for, although the committee speaks of purchasing at a price of a dollar an acre, the dollars are to be spent upon the development of the lands which the committee is to own.

THE ROUND TABLE.—Is it a mere coincidence, or is it further evidence of a well-considered design to make of Canada a second Africa, that the *Round Table* for March last contained the statement that

"in many quarters it seems to be taken for granted."

that the Imperial War Conference

"will propound a scheme for the development of *imperial resources*, and take control of all minerals, metals, wool and other raw products of the Empire . . . that it will deal with the various Imperial and Dominion debts and work out a plan for liquidating the cost of the war" (a).

Unfortunately for Canada there appears to be no doubt that action of that sort would be heartily approved of by British imperialists. What the Imperial Conference did was quite in harmony with what was expected and hoped.

AN IMPERIAL MARITIME COUNCIL.

Complaining of the insecurity of the present basis of "Imperial Union," and suggesting the

"advantages which can be derived from the central direction of great common affairs,"

Lord Sydenham recently proposed the creation of an "Imperial Maritime Council," to be supported by a surtax on all imports from foreign countries into "Imperial ports," and having for its purpose (*inter alia*)

"the development of *the immense unutilized resources of the Empire*," and the "continuous scientific study of the inter-working of Imperial trade as a whole" (b).

(a) P. 243.

(b) *Maritime Communications and Imperial Progress: The Nineteenth Century*, May, 1917.

There being no possibility of studying the "trade as a whole," Lord Sydenham did not mean that anybody should try to do it. What he had in mind was the subordination of the interests of the parts to the interests of the whole—the subordination, once more, of the "private and particular" interests of the colonies to the "imperial" interests of the United Kingdom.

Following the true Milner method, Lord Sydenham contents himself with his Maritime Council, as a first step. It may suffice for "the initial stages," but his hope is

"that the establishment for the first time of a standing Imperial Council, with definite and important duties and a large revenue, *would smooth the way to further organized co-operation.*" *The Maritime Council might lead by natural steps to political union in all matters of Imperial concern.*"

THE EARL OF DUNRAVEN.

A recent article by the Earl of Dunraven in *The Nineteenth Century* (a) very well illustrates the subserviency of thought to diction. Proposal to pay the British war debt out of fisheries belonging to Canada would not be made; but why ought not "the fisheries of the Empire" to be applied to that purpose? Merge Canada in "the Empire as a whole"; think of Canadian assets as "Imperial assets," and the "new idea" for the liquidation of the British war debt will appear, namely, "making remunerative, and deriving income from property within the Empire."

The Earl writes as follows:

"Let us take stock. What do *we* possess? Unquestionably *the Empire possesses* assets so valuable that, were they realisable in cash, the debt, gigantic as it is, would be of small importance."

"In considering whether fisheries constitute *an Imperial asset capable of realisation for Imperial purposes* under normal peace conditions, the present circumstances of the home industry will not be ignored, and the immediate necessities of the nation constantly intrude themselves."

"The practically untapped wealth in those waters is incalculable. It is no exaggeration to say that in the seas that wash the coasts of Canada, the principal commercial food fishes are to be found in greater abundance than in any other part of the world. Statistics as to the population engaged in fishing, profits, volume and value of catch could be furnished, but for the purpose of this article they are really useless. *No measure of the wealth at the disposal of an active organized industry can be made.*"

(a) *Diet and Debt*, February, 1917.

"But development lies, and must continue to lie, with the Dominion and the Provincial Governments acting, if the project is to be a success, in consultation and conjunction with a *State Department at home specially created for the purpose—that is essential.*"

"The business must be treated as a whole. It must be viewed as an Imperial not as a local asset; and provided that it is profitable as a whole, the profit on any particular branch of it is comparatively immaterial."

"How is the War debt to be handled? . . . Some new idea must be found, and it lies, as it seems to me, in the direction of *making remunerative and deriving income from property within the Empire at present lying fallow.* This cannot be done by individuals or by corporate bodies of individuals, it can only be accomplished *by the Parent State, the Dominions and other component parts of the Empire acting in unison for a common object.*"

"A board dealing with Imperial assets should be created. So far as fisheries are concerned it should administer the Home fisheries nationalised and linked up from the Atlantic to the Pacific. That at least is my opinion, formed with reluctance, but formed both on the ground of the pressure of the immediate necessity to provide food, and also on the economic ground that it is necessary *if the latent and neglected resources of the Empire are to be developed and utilised to ease the financial pressure of a gigantic war debt.*"

ALLY ENTANGLEMENTS.

PARIS RESOLUTIONS.—Not only, with a view to war-preparation, are Canadian resources to become "Empire resources," but her economic life is to be tied to that of the Allies—a term that does not include the United States. Canada is to share with them all (so it has been agreed)—France, Japan, Serbia, and the rest (not including the United States) "a common economic policy" upon the lines of the resolutions of the Paris Conference, which were as follows (marginal headings now added)—

SOLIDARITY.—"I. The representatives of the Allied governments have met at Paris under the presidency of Mr. Clementel, Minister of Commerce, on June 14, 15, 16, and 17, 1916, for the purpose of fulfilling the mandate given to them by the Paris Conference on March 28, 1916, of giving practical expression to their solidarity of views and interests and of proposing to their respective governments the appropriate measures for realizing this solidarity."

ENEMY DESIGNS.—"II. They declare that, after forcing upon them the military contest, in spite of all their efforts to avoid the conflict, the empires of Central Europe are today preparing, in concert with their allies, for a contest on the economic plane, which will not only

survive the re-establishment of peace but will at that moment attain its full scope and intensity."

ENEMY. OBJECTS.—"III. They cannot, therefore, conceal from themselves that the agreements which are being prepared for this purpose between their enemies have the obvious object of establishing the domination of the latter over the production and the markets of the whole world and of imposing on other countries an intolerable yoke."

COUNTER MEASURES.—"In face of so grave a peril the representatives of the Allied governments consider that it has become their duty, on grounds of necessary and legitimate defence, to adopt and realize from now onward all the measures requisite on the one hand to secure for themselves and for the whole of the markets of neutral countries full economic practice, and on the other hand to facilitate the *organization on a permanent basis of their economic alliance*.

For this purpose the representatives of the Allied governments have decided to submit for the approval of these governments the following resolutions:

(Resolutions embodying "Measures for the war period" follow, but are here omitted.)

"Transitory Measures for the Period of Commercial, Industrial, Agricultural and Maritime Reconstruction of the Allied Countries."

RESTORATION.—"I. The Allies declare their common determination to insure the re-establishment of the countries suffering from acts of destruction, spoliation and unjust requisition, and decide to join in devising means to secure the restoration of those countries, as a prior claim, of their raw materials, industrial and agricultural plant, stock and mercantile fleet, or to assist them to re-equip themselves in these respects."

ENEMY OUTLAWRY.—"II. Whereas the war has put an end to all the treaties of commerce between the Allies and the enemy Powers, and whereas it is of essential importance that, during the period of economic reconstruction which will follow the cessation of hostilities, the liberty of none of the Allies should be hampered by any claim put forward by the enemy Powers to most-favored-nation treatment, the Allies agree that *the benefit of this treatment shall not be granted to those Powers during a number of years to be fixed by mutual agreement*.

"During this number of years the Allies undertake to assure to each other, so far as possible, *compensatory outlets for trade*, in case consequences detrimental to their commerce result from the application of the undertaking referred to in the preceding paragraph."

ALLY RESOURCES FOR ALLIES.—"III. The Allies declare themselves agreed to *conserve for the Allied countries, before all others, their natural resources* during the whole period of commercial, industrial, agricultural and maritime reconstruction, and for this purpose they undertake to establish special arrangements to facilitate the interchange of these resources."

ENEMY DUMPING.—"IV. In order to defend their commerce, their industry, their agriculture and their navigation against economic aggres-

sion resulting from *dumping or any other mode of unfair competition*, the Allies decree to fix by agreement a period of time during which the commerce of the enemy Powers shall be submitted to special treatment and the goods originating in their countries shall be subjected either to prohibitions or to a special regime of an effective character.

"The Allies will determine by agreement through diplomatic channels the special conditions to be imposed during the above mentioned period on the ships of the enemy Powers."

"ENEMY ACTIVITIES.—"V. The Allies will devise the measures to be taken jointly or severally for preventing enemy subjects from exercising, in their territories, certain industries or professions which concern national defence or economic independence."

"Permanent Measures of Mutual Assistance and Collaboration Among the Allies.

ALLY SELF-SUFFICIENCY.—"I. The Allies decide to take the necessary steps without delay to render themselves independent of the enemy countries in so far as regards *the raw materials and manufactured articles essential to the normal development of their economic activities*.

"These measures should be directed to assuring the independence of the Allies, not only so far as concerns their sources of supply, but also as regards *their financial, commercial and maritime organization*.

"The Allies will adopt such measures as may seem to them most suitable for carrying out of this resolution, according to the nature of the commodities and having regard to the principles which govern their economic policy.

"They may, for example, have recourse either to enterprises subsidized, directed or controlled by the governments themselves, or to the grant of financial assistance for the encouragement of scientific and technical research and the development of national industries and resources, to customs duties or prohibitions of a temporary or permanent character or to a combination of these different methods."

"Whatever may be the methods adopted, the object aimed at by the Allies is to increase production within their territories as a whole to a sufficient extent to enable them to maintain and develop their economic position and independence in relation to enemy countries."

ALLY TRADE-FACILITIES.—"II. The Allies undertake to convene a meeting of technical delegates to draw up measures for the assimilation, so far as may be possible, of their laws governing patents, indications of origin, and trade marks.

"In regard to patents, trade marks and literary and artistic copyrights which have come into existence during the war in enemy countries, the Allies will adopt, so far as possible, an identical procedure, to be applied as soon as hostilities cease.

"This procedure will be elaborated by the technical delegates of the Allies."

COMMON ECONOMIC POLICY.—"Whereas for the purposes of their common defence against the enemy the Allied Powers have agreed to adopt *a common economic policy*, on the lines laid down in the resolu-

tions which have been passed, and whereas it is recognized that the effectiveness of their policy depends absolutely upon these resolutions being put into operation forthwith, the representatives of the allied governments undertake to recommend their respective governments to take without delay all the measures, whether temporary or permanent, requisite for giving full and complete effect to this policy forthwith, and to communicate to each other the decisions arrived at to attain that object" (a).

CURIOUS ECONOMY.—Curious notions those allies had. If you have wheat that you do not want and your neighbor needs, and he has a superfluity of something which you require, and if you decline to trade with him who will be hurt? The Paris men point to the neighbor alone. They picture themselves as loaded with all the candy, and they insist that good children only shall have some of it. Listen to Sir George Foster.

"I say that for at least a generation German wares, business and men should be excluded from the pale of the British Empire; give them a good long time to repent, but be sure they do repent, then we will let them come and pray be readmitted into the neighborhood of fellowship and decent civilization" (b).

COMMENT.—Omitting, for the present, all comment upon Sir George Foster's idea, I confine myself to the follownig remarks:

1. Canada's economic policy must be settled at Ottawa, and not either in London or in Paris.

2. The Paris agreement makes intelligible and necessary that part of the London program which contemplates permanent organization for war purposes in order, as the King said, that "Victory may not be lost by unpreparedness in times of peace"—in order (he ought to have said) that the Allies may, with security, prosecute commercial war after the physical is finished. Canada will not agree to that.

3. The Paris programme is absurdly ridiculous. Does anybody imagine that Russia can afford to cease trading with Germany? or that if political enmity is to persist, commercial interchange will be feasible? What advantage will accrue to Serbia from tariff war with Austria? Are Roumania and Bulgaria to eternalize their antipathies?

4. If, as is almost certain, "consequences detrimental to their commerce result" to these or other allies, from their re-

(a) *The New York Times*, 29 July, 1916.

(b) *The Citizen* (Ottawa), 28 July, 1916.

fusal to make arrangements with present enemy powers, Canada will not agree to assist in providing for them some "compensatory outlets" for their trade.

5. Canada declines to ruin herself by adherence to the agreement "to conserve for the allied countries before all others" (including the United States) her natural resources. The effect might be that our neighbors would conserve their coal.

6. Canada will not agree to establish "a common economic policy" with the Allies. That would be ridiculous and suicidal.

7. Canada will not apply herself, her resources, and her trade to the task of re-adjusting the traditional trade interchanges in Europe.

Sir George Foster was present at the Paris Conference, and, as far as he could, pledged Canada to performance of its agreements.

Canada ought to notify her repudiation of his action.

WHAT HARM IN IMPERIAL ADVICE?

WHY OBJECT?—"But, after all, Mr. Ewart, nothing that may be agreed to at the annual meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet, or that may be advised by The Imperial Development Board, or by The Mineral Resources Bureau, or by any other institution, can be carried into effect without the sanction of our own parliament. Why, then, do you object? To put the matter in Sir Robert Borden's own language, the annual meetings of the Imperial War Conference do not

'sacrifice in the slightest degree the autonomy of the powers of self-government which is possessed by each of the dominions.'

The ministers

'go there as the representatives of independent governments, each responsible to independent parliaments. They meet there for the purpose of consultation, co-operation, and united action, but that action can be taken only with the sanction and authority of the representatives of the various nations of the Empire assembled in their own Parliaments. Therefore, there is no sacrifice of any existing power of self-government' (a).

What objection to that can be made?"

In reply, I offer two considerations and one illustration.

(a) *Hansard*, 18 May, 1917, p. 1600.

ALREADY COMPROMISED.—First: A great deal can be done, and has been done, without acts of parliament. Already we stand compromised and embarrassed by the complaisances of our government. Already our ministers have sanctioned the assertion that Canadian resources are "Empire resources," to be applied, under imperial oversight, for the advantage of "the Empire as a whole." Already our autonomy in this respect has been reduced. Already we have agreed that with all the Allies (except the United States) we are to have "a common economic policy." Already has been done what we shall have great difficulty in undoing.

OTTAWA POLICY.—For second reply, I point out that heretofore Canadian economic policy has been settled in Canada. Nobody outside of Canada has been consulted. By the press, on the platform, in parliament, through organizations, by private discussions, we have determined what source we ought to take. And hitherto it has usually been a course disapproved by British statesmen—protection, preference, cheap postage, immigration, almost any subject you like to name.

LONDON POLICY.—For the future, it is proposed that policy is to be discussed in London, by bodies of men in which Canada is to have one representative out of twelve; that, by compromise and concession, agreement is, if possible, to be arrived at; with the understanding that Canada's representative—her Prime Minister—shall use all his influence and power to place that agreement upon the Canadian statute book. Which means that the Prime Minister, in London, shall himself settle what we are to do. For parliament would implement his undertaking, first, because whatever he says, his party does; and second, because his agreement would be regarded as one made by Canada, and one, therefore, to which Canada ought to adhere.

OBJECTIONS.—The objections, then, to the scheme (beyond its Milner-method insidiousness) are that

1. Our policy would be framed in London instead of in Canada.

2. It would be framed by bodies of men in which Canada had very meagre representation.

3. It would be framed in the absence of discussion, public or parliamentary, in Canada.

4. It would be done into law in Canada, not because of its merits, but because (1) the Premier's party would stand by the Premier, and (2) in doing so would argue that Canada ought not to repudiate the action of her representative. The following pages will illustrate what I mean.

SIR JOHN A. MACDONALD.—If anyone should doubt the accuracy of the above forecast, let him recall the unhappy experience of Sir John A. Macdonald at Washington in 1871, and the ensuing action of the Canadian parliament.

Very anxious for the restoration of the cordial relations with the United States (*a*) which had been interrupted by Britain's unfriendly conduct during the civil war, the British government, without Canada's consent, tacked on to the proposal of a conference to settle her outstanding differences with the United States, the settlement also of the Alabama claims, and asked Sir John to act as one of the British commissioners (*b*). Referring afterwards to the request (House of Commons, 13 May, 1872) Sir John said:

"When the proposition was first made to me, I must say that I felt considerable embarrassment and great reluctance to become a member of the Commission. I pointed out to my colleagues that *I was to be one only of five, that I was in a position of being over-ruled continually in our discussions, and that I could not by any possibility bring due weight from my isolated position*" (*c*).

Having yielded to the invitation, Sir John encountered the experience which he had anticipated (*d*). Struggling with purely selfish colleagues, he found himself pressed and voted into fatal concessions.

"I had continually before me, not only the Imperial question, but the interests of the Dominion of Canada, which I was there especially to represent, and the difficulty of my position was that, if I gave undue prominence to the interests of Canada, I might justly be held, in England, to be taking a purely colonial and selfish view, regardless of the interests of the Empire as a whole, and the interests of Canada as a portion of the Empire, and, on the other hand, if I kept my eye

(*a*) Afterwards in the House of Commons (3 May, 1872), Sir John said: "So long as this question remained unsettled between the two nations, there was no possibility of the old friendly relations that had so long existed between them being restored, and England felt that it was of the first importance to her that these amicable relations should be restored."—Macpherson: *Sir John A. Macdonald*, vol. II., p. 120.

(*b*) Had Sir John been advised of the commingling of the subjects, he might have declined the invitation.—Pope: *Sir John Macdonald*, vol. II., pp. 116, 126, 127.

(*c*) Macpherson, op. cit., vol. II., p. 125.

(*d*) The whole story may be seen in Pope, op. cit., vol. II., pp. 85-140.

solely on Imperial considerations, I might be held as neglecting my especial duty towards this my country, Canada. It was a difficult position, as the House will believe, a position that pressed upon me with great weight and severity at the time, and it has not been diminished in any way since I have returned, except by the cordial support of my colleagues, and I believe also of my friends in this House" (a).

In a letter from Washington to Mr. Tupper (29 March), Sir John said:

"My long telegram of the 22nd will have informed you of the state of fishery matters up to that time. You may imagine that my position was exceedingly embarrassing. In our separate caucusses *my colleagues were continually pressing me to yield—in fact, I had no backer, and I was obliged to stand out, and, I am afraid, to make myself extremely disagreeable to them*" (b).

Relating an interview with his colleagues, Sir John told Mr. Tupper of Lord de Grey's threat of breaking up the conference unless he, Sir John, gave way, and he added:

"He was followed by the other Commissioners *seriatim*, who all made speeches *at me*" (c).

"A confidential cable was sent by Lord de Grey, stating the terms, and at the same time stating that I did not concur in the settlement, on the ground that the compensation was inadequate, and that I doubted whether the Canadian Parliament would ratify the arrangement, although the rest thought the settlement reasonable" (d).

In a later letter (1 April), Sir John said:

"I must say that I am greatly disappointed at the course taken by the British Commissioners. *They seem to have only one thing in their minds—that is, to go home to England with a treaty in their pockets, settling everything, no matter at what cost to Canada*" (e).

In a still later letter (6 May), he said:

"In addition to the letter which I shall send to Lord Grenville, and which will be such as can be published, I shall prepare a letter to him marked 'secret,' pointing out the sacrifices which Canada has been called upon to make. I shall do this because, if the manner in which Canada has been treated by England were fully known to the Canadian people, I am afraid it would raise an annexation storm that could not easily be allayed" (f).

Sir John did his best but was overborne. He said to Lord de Grey

"that Canada was called upon against her will to enter into an arrangement, which she considers in the highest degree unsatisfactory to her

(a) Macpherson, op. cit., vol. II., p. 127.

(b) Pope, op. cit., vol. II., p. 94.

(c) Ibid, p. 99.

(d) Ibid, p. 102.

(e) Ibid, p. 105.

(f) Ibid, pp. 137, 138.

people, in order to secure the settlement of other matters in which England is more immediately interested That, as there was an anti-colonial party in England, so there was an annexation party in Canada; and if we were told that England was afraid or unwilling to protect us in the enjoyment of our undoubted rights, not from fear of the American Government or the American people, but from fear of the Gloucester fishermen, that party would gain great strength in Canada and perhaps imperil the connection with the mother country. That in case such connection was severed, the consequence, in my opinion, would be annexation to the United States" (a).

AN OBJECT LESSON.—Canada will never, in a conference of five or six British to one Canadian, have an abler or more patriotic representative than Sir John. He was unsuccessful, not because of any ill-will on the part of his colleagues, but because while he was a Canadian they had in view "the interests of the Empire as a whole"—meaning the separate interests of the United Kingdom. All that they wanted was a treaty, a settlement, a renewal of friendship with the United States, "no matter at what cost to Canada."

SIR JOHN IN CANADA.—So objectionable was the treaty that only with the greatest difficulty could Sir John induce his own colleagues to support it. Writing to Sir John Rose (17 April, 1872), he said:

"Thanks for your several letters about the treaty. Your telegram of Saturday was satisfactory. I have little doubt now that there will be a pacific solution of the difficulty. Meanwhile, *after many months of labour and anxiety, I have screwed my colleagues to the sticking-point.* We have finally agreed to go to Parliament this session, for an act to bring the fisheries articles into force" (b).

And in a later letter (18 June), he said:

"Thanks for your various letters about this important treaty. Never was there such a bungled matter from beginning to end. You may tell Lord Granville from me, confidentially, that if he wants his business done at Washington correctly at any time he must send me alone. But seriously, the whole thing was badly managed, first at Washington, and still worse in England. I suppose that the treaty will come to something in the end, but instead of removing heart-burnings, it has laid the foundation of new suspicions, and all without the slightest necessity" (c).

(a) Ibid, pp. 116, 117.

(b) Ibid, p. 149.

(c) Ibid.

PARLIAMENT.—“But, Mr. Ewart, if in a conference which has no legally binding effect, five do vote down one, what harm is done—action will follow only if parliament so desires, and our parliament is free?” Free, in one sense, yes; but, nevertheless, compromised and fettered. Listen to Sir John pleading in parliament for ratification of what he struggled against in conference—surrender of the St. Lawrence, the canals, the fisheries, the Fenian claims—

“This was the line taken by Her Majesty’s Government, and which they had a right to take; and when some one writes my biography—if I am ever thought worthy of having such an interesting document prepared—and when, as a matter of history, the questions connected with this treaty are upheld, it will be found that upon this, as well as upon every other point, *I did all I could to protect the rights and claims of the Dominion*” (a).

“I believe the second sober thought of this country accords with the sober second thought of the Government and we come down here and ask the people of Canada, through their representatives, to accept this treaty, *to accept it with all its imperfections, to accept it for the sake of peace, and for the sake of the great Empire of which we form a part*” (b).¹

What did parliament do? It voted for Sir John A. Macdonald by a party vote of 121 to 55. His supporters repeated his phrase “for the sake of the great Empire of which we form a part,” but not a man of them would have voted as he did had Sir John declined to support the treaty which he had been induced to sign. Parliament was free, and so was Sir John, but the action of the Canadian legislature had in reality been foreordained in Washington.

THE NEW IMPERIAL INSTITUTIONS.—The new imperial bodies—the Cabinet, the Board, and the Bureau will sit in London. Canada will have one representative out of twelve. Policies are to be discussed—war policies, trade policies, financial contributions, immigration, development and disposition of local resources, etc., etc. Nobody is to take “a private and particular view” (c) of anything: everybody is to consider the “broader and wider interests” (d); all proposals are to be based upon “imperial unity” (e); all suggestions are to be

(a) Macpherson, op. cit., vol. II., pp. 150, 151.

(b) Ibid, p. 175.

(c) Ante, p. 327.

(d) Ante, p. 327.

(e) Ante, p. 326.

regarded "from the point of view of the interests of the whole" (a); all resolutions must have for their purpose "the increase of the power of the Empire as a whole" (b).

In an atmosphere of that kind, and in such environment, what would become of the lone Canadian representative? Sir John Macdonald would make valiant struggle. Even he would be beaten. Lesser men would merely collapse—and receive "additional evidence of His Majesty's favor." The London policy would go out to Canada, and would be duly registered there "for the sake of the great Empire of which we form a part."

WHO OWNS CANADA?

"EMPIRE RESOURCES."—The larger part of Canada is public domain—is owned by the people. But what people? The people of Canada? or the people of the British Empire? Are our undisposed-of lands Canadian resources, or "Empire resources?" Are our mineral properties Canadian assets, or "Imperial assets." Until a few months ago, a confident answer could have been returned. To-day we stand compromised. Our ownership, and, with it, our autonomy in that respect, are in jeopardy. We are on the way back to early colonial conceptions.

GOVERNOR AYLMER.—The legal title to the public lands since 1763 has been vested in the sovereign. In our earlier days, Colonial Secretaries and Governors insisted upon that fact as justification for their applying the moneys derived from the lands to such purposes as they saw fit. Governor Aylmer (1831-5), for example, declared that such resources "are enjoyed by the Crown, by virtue of the Royal Prerogative, and are neither more nor less than the proceeds of landed property, which legally and constitutionally belongs to the Sovereign on the throne" (c).

LORD DURHAM.—Taking the same view, Lord Durham, in his report (1839), said:

"Unbounded materials of agricultural, commercial and manufacturing industry are there: it depends upon the present decision of the Imperial

(a) Ante, p. 327.

(b) Final Report, p. 83.

(c) In message of February, 1831, to Quebec House of Assembly: quoted in Lord Durham's Report (edited by Sir C. P. Lucas), vol. I., p. 185.

Legislature to determine for whose benefit they are to be rendered available. The country which has founded and maintained these Colonies at a vast expense of blood and treasure, may justly expect its compensation in turning their unappropriated resources to the account of its own redundant population; *they are the rightful patrimony of the English people*, the ample appanage which God and Nature have set aside in the New World for those whose lot has assigned them but insufficient proportions in the Old" (a).

"The waste lands of the colonies are the property, *not merely of the colony, but of the Empire, and ought to be administered for imperial, not merely colonial purposes* . . ."

Combatting the idea that

"the subject is one which appertains of right to the colonies" (b).

Durham declared (c) that

"There can surely be nothing in the fact, that the Crown has granted to one person, or to any number of persons, a certain portion of land in any colony which can give to those persons any right to dispose of the land which has not been granted to them: but rather the first grantees, having had their share of the land, are less entitled to any voice in the disposal of the remainder than the other citizens of the empire. The only rights which they can possess are of precisely the same character and extent as those possessed by any other subjects of the Crown: a right to demand that these lands shall be administered in such a manner as to promote the prosperity of the colony, and *to advance the interests of the empire*. These objects, properly regarded, are identical, though experience has amply shown that the one may be pursued at the expense of the other. It is for the Imperial Parliament to reconcile these different interests, and by providing for the greatest development of the resources of the colonies, to enable them to offer a market for the manufactures, and a home for the surplus population of the United Kingdom" (d).

In default of imperial action,

"the North American Provinces must be nearly valueless to the empire" (e).

In accordance with these views, Durham recommended the creation of "a central commission," with its chief offices in London, to which should be "entrusted the whole execution of the plan" (f).

ORIGIN OF THESE VIEWS.—Such views were a part of the general conception which underlay "the colonial system,"

(a) Ibid, vol. II., p. 13.

(b) Ibid, p. 37.

(c) In the appendix to the report written by Charles Buller.

(d) Ibid, p. 38.

(e) Ibid, p. 39.

(f) Ibid, p. 128.

namely, that the colonies were sources of wealth for the metropolitan—(1) to produce the needed raw material; (2) to consume manufactures; and (3) to provide homes for surplus, and usually undesirable, population, who would add to the production and increase the consumption. And so Lord Durham argued that

"The experiment of keeping colonies and governing them well, ought at least to have a trial, ere we abandon for ever the vast dominion, which *might supply the wants of our surplus population, and raise up millions of fresh consumers of our manufactures, and producers of a supply for our wants*" (a).

RELAXATION.—Adoption, by the British, of free trade principles brought relief from the pressure of claims of that sort, and for many years no suggestion of British title to Canadian resources was heard. Now, however, Canada seems to be on the point of admitting that her resources are "Imperial assets," to be administered for the benefit of "the Empire as a whole," under the advice of, and in conjunction with, representatives of the British government. Lord Durham's proposed "central commission" is commencing as an "Imperial Development Board," and an "Imperial Mining Resources Bureau."

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN.—While the British official attitude towards Canada changed with the adoption of free trade, the Englishman's private view of his ownership of the colonies has never disappeared. Writing in 1767 (b), Franklin said that "Every man in England seems to consider himself as a piece of a sovereign over America; seems to jostle himself into the throne with the King, and talks of *our subjects in the colonies*." (c).

PRESIDENT FALCONER.—Lapse of one hundred years effected no change, for, as President Falconer said in the University of Toronto (1 March, 1907),

"To the Briton we continued long after confederation to be colonists in whom he thought he had vague proprietary rights" (c).

JOHN S. EWART.—When I was in England in 1901, an English judge, on being told that I lived in Manitoba, said to me:

"Ah, how interesting! Manitoba! Let me see. We are colonizing that place now, are we not?"

(a) Ibid, vol. I., p. 180.

(b) 11 April, to Lord Kames: *Works*, vol. 7, pp. 528, 529.

(c) *The Federation of Canada*, p. 109.

Of course, I said "Yes."

"And how long is it, Mr. Ewart, since you went out?"

MR. BARKER.—Those "vague proprietary rights" are rapidly assuming concrete and very definite form, both in the writings of the publicists and in the language of statesmen and royal commissioners. Take, for example, the following from the pen of Mr. J. Ellis Barker, one of the ablest of British magazine writers—

"Wealth is power. The British Empire should endeavour to be the leading Anglo-Saxon nation, not only in territory but in white population and wealth as well. Hitherto the development of the Empire has been restricted by a small-minded parochial policy of the component parts, by lack of imperial organization and co-operation. The great imperial domain can be *adequately protected and exploited only by the Empire as a whole, by a truly Imperial Government, by Empire-wide co-operation*. Immigration and emigration, transportation by land and water, the planful opening and settlement of the vast empty spaces of the Empire, and the question of inter-Imperial trade must be *settled imperially, not parochically*. If that is done there is every reason to believe that in a few decades the British Empire will be far ahead of the United States both in white population and in wealth."

"An Imperial Government in the full sense of the term should investigate and *take stock of the Imperial resources*, for they are unknown. It is nobody's business to study and describe the resources of the Empire. No official survey has ever been made of England's coal beds. The resources of the Empire are exploited, or wasted, at will by private individuals . . . An Imperial stock-taking is necessary. *The Empire belongs to the race, not to a few capitalists.*"

"The War has been waged not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It seems therefore only fair that part of the cost should be borne by future generations. *It might be thrown in part on the latent and undeveloped resources of the Empire which might be pooled for the purpose of repaying the war debt*" (a).

MR. HURD.—Mr. Archibald Hurd (a still more prolific writer), with the same view of British ownership of the colonies, writing in the Fortnightly Review for May, 1917, complained of

"the haphazard manner in which the past *British governments* have failed to cultivate and develop the wonderful resources of the oversea Dominions, Crown Colonies, and Dependencies";

and roundly asserted that

"the inhabitants of the British Isles . . . enjoy the advantage of having a *preferential claim on the immense resources of the oversea portions of the British Empire*" (b).

(a) *Britain's Coming Industrial Supremacy*; The Nineteenth Century, October, 1916, pp. 697-9.

(b) *The Shadow of Famine on the Continent*, p. 776.

In other current publications may frequently be seen such sentences from British pens as:

"The area of *our* Empire woodlands is almost incalculable" (a).

"We are not yet able to form an idea of the vast possibilities of *our* Imperial inheritance" (b).

British statesmen use the expression "*our* Dominions."

THE ROUND TABLE.—If I am told that I am unduly anxious, and that none of these men could have really meant what they said, I point to the December number of *The Round Table*, that very ably conducted organ of imperialism, and ask, "What do you think of that?"

"There is a steadily strengthening realization that there must be a change in the status and powers and responsibilities of the nations of the Empire, and that there must be a more conscious development of *the resources of the Empire for the benefit of all who dwell within it*" (c).

What I think of that is that it is in perfect harmony with imperialistic principles and practices.

OFFICIALLY.—It is the hardening of this belief in British proprietary rights that constitutes our danger. Were it confined to private individuals, it might be disregarded. But it has invaded the official mind. It is to be met with (as we have seen) in the reports of officially appointed British commissions. And (almost incredible) it is being assented to by members of the Canadian government—Sir Robert Borden and Sir George Foster.

SIR EDWARD CARSON.—The First Lord of the Admiralty recently said:

"But there is one result from the war that nothing but our own actions and our own energies can keep from us, and nothing but our own inaction and our own carelessness can deprive us of, and that is *the utilization and the organization of the vast resources of the Empire in the manner most advantageous to the interests of every part of the great Empire to which we belong*. The war has demonstrated three or four fundamental material facts. It has taught us in the first place *what our resources are*, as I do not believe we ever knew them in the slightest degree until war broke out" (d).

(a) The Fortnightly Review, May, 1917: J. Saxon Mills, in article already quoted.

(b) The Nineteenth Century, May, 1917: Lord Sydenham, in article already quoted.

(c) P. 14.

(d) Speech before the British Empire Producers' Organization: The Times (England), 25 May, 1917.

CANADIAN ASSENT.—Proof of Canadian complaisance has sufficiently appeared in what has already been said, namely, that Sir Robert Borden agreed to the resolutions of the recent London conferences, and that Sir George Foster signed the reports of the Dominions Royal Commission. To these, I add that Sir Robert Borden, speaking at Manchester (21 April, 1917), after reference to the "powerful state organization" of German resources by the German government, said:

"The natural resources of the British Empire will enable us to meet the situation, provided our efforts are characterised by thoroughness, skill, system and a strong, united purpose, manifested in effective co-operation between the mother country and the Dominions. I must submit that our natural resources ought to be conserved for the general national benefit, and controlled within the Empire, for essential national purposes, and that their utilization through manufacture should be carried on to the greatest possible extent within the Empire, and not abroad" (a).

WHO OWNS?—Although, therefore, a few years ago, no one would have doubted the absolute ownership by Canada of her public lands, British claim to them has now to be reckoned with. Not, indeed, that as yet any British statesman intends to propose the passing of over-riding appropriation legislation. Not, indeed, that anybody will deny that Canada, by her crown-grants, can give valid title to these lands. But the conception of Canada as a trustee of them, for the benefit of the United Kingdom, has been very clearly asserted and quite complacently agreed to.

IMPERIAL PHRASEOLOGY.—Our danger is due, almost exclusively, to the currency of imperial phraseology. Use the word *Empire*, in its application to Canada, as a mouth-filling, chest-swelling, self-adulatory expression, instead of as a reminder of our degraded colonialism; employ the phrase "unity of the Empire," as expressive of singleness and indivisibility in political association; discard such language as "Canadian resources" and "Canadian assets," in favor of "Imperial resources" and "Imperial assets," and you will soon find yourself possessed of the conceptions which are implicit in your language; for, as Bacon has truly said:

"Words still manifestly force the understanding, throw everything into confusion, and lead mankind into vain and innumerable controversies and fallacies."

(a) The Globe (Toronto), 23 April, 1917.

IMPERIAL ASSOCIATION.—Erroneous imperial phraseology has already induced compromising imperial association in connection with our resources. Already we have agreed to the establishment of “The Imperial Development Board,” and “The Imperial Mineral Resources Bureau”—both based upon the correctness of the conception of “Empire resources.” If we are content to discharge our alleged imperial trusteeship of those resources in such ways as shall be imperially required of us, we may continue indefinitely, although foolishly, to boast our ownership of them. If we refuse—as some day is almost certain—we shall find, as the Egyptians found, that “the British government will be displeased, and that they will probably find some adequate means for making their displeasure felt” (a).

SIR JOHN AND SIR ROBERT.

TWO PREMIERS.—In February, 1867, delegations from Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick under the chairmanship of Sir John A. Macdonald (b) were engaged in London (England) upon the construction of our present constitution. Fifty years afterwards (February, 1917) a Canadian delegation under Sir Robert Borden’s leadership went to London to attend a meeting of the Imperial Conference. Sir John was an intense Canadian (c). Sir Robert is a conscientious Imperialist. Sir John made a splendid struggle for Canadian autonomy. Sir Robert worked well for imperialism. Had Sir John achieved all that he anxiously desired, or if his successors had had his abilities, ambitions and advantages (d), Canada would long ago have been completely autonomous. Unless the policy

(a) Ante, p. 307.

(b) At the federation period, Sir John was Mr. Macdonald. His better known designation is here employed.

(c) Sir John Thompson, in his eulogy of his former chief said: “Sir John’s love of Canada and his desire to serve her must be put far in front of all his characteristics. His daily thought might be expressed in Webster’s words: ‘Let our object be our country, our whole country, and nothing but our country.’ ‘Nothing but our country’ in the sense that Canada was to be first of all in every consideration of public policy or personal action. His true and deep Canadianism was the ‘pillar of cloud by day, and the pillar of fire by night,’ to the hundreds of thousands whom he led as no man could have led by a mere party banner”: Pope, *op. cit.*, p. 344. Sir Joseph Pope applied the metaphor to the expression of a very different idea: “Sir John Macdonald, the guiding principle of whose long and eventful life was British connection, and for whom the visible symbol of that intimate union stood as a pillar of cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night.”

(d) Sir Wilfrid Laurier’s fine Canadianism is handicapped by his French birth.

adopted by Sir Robert is repudiated, Canada will descend to the status of a British sphere of influence (a).

SIR JOHN'S PURPOSE.—Sir John saw in the proposal for the federation of Canada an opportunity, as his biographer tells us (b), for "founding a Kingdom." To him, it was clear that Canadians would not always be colonials. He believed that the union of the provinces would produce a strength and importance sufficient to elevate them to higher rank. And the nature of the status which he had in view is very clear to anyone who will carefully read the speeches and documents relating to the federation proceedings. It may be thus defined—

1. The title of the federation was to be "The Kingdom of Canada."

2. Its rank was to be that of Kingdom.

3. The reign of the Colonial Secretary was to cease.

4. The head of the Executive was to be the King in person or his representative.

5. The over-riding but nominal authority of the Imperial parliament was to remain. Canada would be a self-governing nation, with an executive of her own, but under British suzerainty.

6. And to that extent Canada was to remain "in connection with the British Empire"—a phrase which must be sharply differentiated from "a part of the British Empire" (c).

SIR JOHN'S DIPLOMACY.—Well aware of the danger of arousing imperialistic opposition to his purpose, and proceeding with masterly astuteness, Sir John, throughout all the discussions in Canada, deprecated debate upon the two principal items of the contemplated reconstruction, namely, the rank to be assigned to the new organization, and its title. He knew perfectly well that all the little loyalisms would burst into wildest clamor were anyone to propose that Canada should be a kingdom, and that her parliament should have the same relations with the king as had the British parliament. "That would be independence," they would have shouted, and the proposal would have appeared to be sufficiently condemned by the word. As it was, some people protested and wanted clearer specification. For example, Mr. Dunkin in parliament said:

(a) "Today as used in China and elsewhere, the term applies rather to a region pre-empted for further exploitation, and possibly for political control" (*Ency. Brit.*).

(b) Pope, *op. cit.*, vol. I., p. 312.

(c) A mere king-union would satisfy the former phrase.

"As to the state that is to be created, its style and rank are left in most delightful ambiguity. We may be honored with the dignity of a kingdom, or of a vice-royalty, or of we know not what. All we are assured of is, that it is to be a something better, higher and more grand than we now have" (a).

NO REVERBERATION.—Advising that decision as to the rank and title should be left to the discretion of the Queen, Sir John prevented submission of any resolution upon those points in Canada. But at the same time, by his example and enthusiasm, he gave to the debates such an elevation in character and tone as would have justified the decision which he intended to get. For Sir John had not the least idea in the world of leaving those two very important matters to the Queen. He knew that Her Majesty would do as she was advised, and that his work would be with the British government. So far as Canada was concerned, his plan was as is indicated in a letter written just before leaving for England (8 October, 1866):

"Again, it appears to us to be important that the Bill should not be finally settled until just before the meeting of the British parliament. The measure must be carried *per saltum*, and no echo of it must reverberate through the British provinces until it becomes law. If the delegation had been complete in England, and they had prepared the measure in August last, it would have been impossible to keep its provisions secret until next January. There will be few important clauses in the measure that will not offend some interest or individual, and its publication would excite a new and fierce agitation on this side of the Atlantic. Even Canada, which has hitherto been nearly a unit on the subject of Confederation, would be stirred to its depths if any material alterations were made. The Act once passed and beyond remedy, the people would soon learn to be reconciled to it" (b).

SIR JOHN'S CONFIDANTS.—I have no doubt that Mr. George E. Cartier shared Sir John's views from the first (His speeches reveal that), but I am not sure who else received his confidence. The great majority of the members of the Canadian parliament had little conception of the splendid idea of the great statesman. Their speeches were devoted, at first, to the merits of the different features of the proposal, and, afterwards (to some extent), to the demerits of one another.

PUBLIC OPINION.—Remembering that the first federating conference was held at Charlottetown, P.E.I. (September,

(a) Confederation Debates, p. 488.

(b) Pope, *op. cit.*, vol. I., p. 308.

1864); that the second was held at Quebec (October, 1864); that between the conferences and after them, some of the delegates visited various cities and made speeches there; that lengthened debate took place in the Canadian parliament (3 February—13 March, 1865); and that afterwards delegates from the three provinces (Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick) met in London to complete their work, let us follow the proceedings; watch the play of Sir John's thought; and see what support for his ideas can be found in the speeches and debates of the period.

BANQUET SPEECHES.—Records of the speeches made in the various cities have been given us by the Honorable Mr. Whelan, one of the Prince Edward Island delegates in "The Union of the Provinces," and by the Honorable J. H. Gray, a Nova Scotia delegate, in "The Confederation of Canada." From these volumes the following extracts are taken:

Sir John said—

"He had, however, every reason to believe that the result of the Convention which held its sittings in Charlottetown for the past week, would lead to the formation and establishment of such a Federation of all the British North American Provinces as would tend very materially to enhance their individual and collective prosperity, politically, commercially, and socially; and also give them, in their united manhood, *that national prowess and strength which would make them at least the fourth nation on the face of the globe*" (Whelan, p. 8).

"If we can only obtain that object—a vigorous general government—we shall not be New Brunswickers, nor Nova Scotians, nor Canadians, but *British Americans, under the sway of the British Sovereign*" (Whelan, p. 44).

"In the conference we have had, we have been united as one man—there was no difference of feeling—no sectional prejudices or selfishness exhibited by any one;—we all approached the subject feeling its importance; feeling that in our hands were the *destinies of a nation*; and great would be our sin and shame if any different motives had intervened to prevent us carrying out *the noble object of founding a great British Monarchy, in connection with the British Empire, and under the British Queen*" (Whelan, pp. 44, 5. Gray at p. 45 reports the same language).

"We will become a great nation, and God forbid that it should be one separate from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland" (Whelan, p. 46).

"I shall feel that I have not served in public life without reward if, before I enter into private life, *I am a subject of a great British American nation, under the government of Her Majesty, and in connection with the Empire of Great Britain and Ireland*" (Gray, p. 46. Whelan at p. 47 reports substantially the same language).

The Hon. George E. Cartier said—

"They (the delegates) met to enquire whether it were possible for the Provinces, from their present fragmentary and isolated materials, to form a *Nation or Kingdom*; Canada, of herself, though she was a large country, with a vast and extensive interior, could not make a nation; neither could the Maritime Provinces of themselves become a kingdom. It was, therefore, essentially necessary that those national fragments and resources of all the Provinces should be concentrated and combined, in order that they, in their trade, intelligence, and national power and prosperity, might be rated as at least *the fourth nation of the world*" (Whelan pp. 9, 10).

"When we consider that Canada has a population of 3,000,000, Nova Scotia 350,000, New Brunswick nearly 300,000, Prince Edward Island very nearly 100,000, or a total population of over three million and a half, we see there is a sufficient personal element in these Provinces to make a *nation*. When we come to the territory occupied by these Provinces, we see again another great element requisite for *the foundation of a great State*" (Whelan, p. 24).

"Knowing as we do in Canada, that we possess so large a personal element—that we have cleared so much of our territory as would *secure to us as respectable a position as many of the European powers, we want to be something greater yet*; but that cannot be unless you unite with us" (Whelan, p. 25).

"We know very well that, as soon as confederation is obtained, the Confederacy will have to be *erected into a Vice-Royalty, and we may expect that a member of the Royal Family will be sent here as the head*" (Whelan, pp. 26-7).

"He said it had been urged against Confederation that such a change in our constitution would make us republican, and gradually lead to a final separation from the mother country. But he believed it would have the contrary effect—that it would bind us more closely to that country, and probably secure to us *the vice-royalty of a prince of the reigning family*" (Whelan, p. 51).

The Hon. Adams G. Archibald (N.S.) said—

"They want, as the Hon. Mr. Cartier very properly observed, to bind the Colonies together, and *make of them one nation*" (Whelan, p. 11).

"It would be the proudest day in the history of British America, when they would unite hand in hand, and *form a nation*, which, in all the elements that constitute real greatness, might be ranked as *the third or fourth on the face of the globe*" (Whelan, pp. 11, 12).

"A united nation, we shall become a great country and the time is not far distant when a *colossal power*, growing up on the continent, shall stand with one foot on the Pacific and the other on the Atlantic, and shall present to the world, even on this side of the Atlantic, the proof that monarchical institutions are not inconsistent with civil and religious liberty, and the fullest measure of material advancement" (Whelan, p. 97).

The Hon. T. H. Haviland (P.E.I.) said—

"He believed, from all that he could learn, that the Provinces would, ere long, be *one great country or nation*, from the Pacific to the Atlantic" (Whelan, p. 16).

"But the peculiarity of this meeting was that it was held in a time of peace, with the approbation, and he believed, with the sanction of Her Majesty, that *the colonies might throw aside their swaddling clothes, to put on themselves the garb of manhood*, and hand down to posterity the glorious privileges for which their ancestors contended from age to age in the old country, and which had been brought into these new countries under the protecting shadow of the flag that had braved a thousand years the battle and the breeze" (Whelan, pp. 114, 5).

The Hon. F. B. T. Carter (Newfoundland) said—

"He had occasion to visit Quebec several years ago, on matters of public business, which brought forcibly before his mind the benefits which would be derived from a union of the Provinces; he had then expressed the wish that we might one day be all united in *one common country under a scion of the Royal family*; and it was his belief now that the wished-for union was not far distant" (Whelan, p. 74).

The Hon. J. H. Gray (N.B.) said—

"But apart from this question of a commercial union, would they permit him to express the opinion that they wanted something more—they wanted *a National Union, one that would enable them to take an honorable place among the nations of the earth*" (Whelan, p. 102).

The Hon. Charles Fisher (N.B.) said—

"When this Confederation became a fact, if they examined the statistics published from time to time, they would find that in point of maritime influence and importance it would be *the fourth power in the world*. (Cheers). *In these respects England, France, and the United States would alone be superior to it*" (Whelan, p. 173).

The Hon. A. T. Galt (Canada) said—

"He was glad we had a policy, glad that we were *growing out of the littleness of colonial politics*, and that we were preparing for the responsibilities which would fall upon us, whether welcome or not—the *responsibilities of a national existence*" (Whelan, p. 205).

COMMENT.—Sir John's language was accurately appropriate to his idea. He wanted to *found* a monarchy; not to continue Canada as a colony of an existing monarchy. It was to be "in connection with the British Empire," and, therefore, not a part of it. He saw nothing inconsistent between the desire that he should continue to be "a subject of a great British American nation," and his statement, of many years afterwards, that he was born a British subject and would die a British subject; for he never dreamed of ending his allegiance

to the British sovereign. His wish was that Canada should be a kingdom; and that she should have, as King, the sovereign who occupied the throne of the United Kingdom.

THE QUEBEC CONFERENCE.—Of the proceedings of this conference we have short records made by the Secretary, Col. Bernard, extending from the 10th to the 25th October; but those of the subsequent days are incomplete. We have also Col. Bernard's short minutes of the debates between the 11th and the 25th October. And Mr. Gray has left us extracts from some of the speeches. Among others, he reports Sir John as having said that the new constitution—

“was intended to be, as far as circumstances would permit, similar to that of the Imperial government, and *recognizing the Sovereign of Great Britain as its sole and only head*” (p. 55).

For the purpose in hand, the following are the more important of the proceedings of the Conference.

NO COLONIALISM.—The following resolution was moved—

“That the constitution of the General and Local Governments shall be framed upon the British model *so far as is consistent with our colonial condition*, and with a view to the perpetuation of our connection with the Mother Country” (a).

In amendment the following was moved—

“That while it is the avowed desire of this Conference to perpetuate the connection with the parent state by every means in our power, it is not judicious to fetter our actions by the passage of a resolution of a simple declaratory character, and which may embarrass our action in the selection of the best means of providing for the general and local government of the country” (b).

In further amendment the following was moved. (It became No. 3 of the series of resolutions agreed to by the Conference)—

No. 3. “That in framing a Constitution for the General Government, the Conference, with a view to the perpetuation of our connection with the Mother Country, and to the promotion of the best interests of the people of these Provinces, desire *to follow the model of the British Constitution, so far as our circumstances will permit*” (c).

This last amendment was carried, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island dissenting, but on the ground, only, that they

(a) Pope: Confed. Docts., p. 9.

(b) Ibid, p. 9.

(c) Pope: Confed. Docts., p. 9.

favored the first amendment (a). On reflection, nobody liked the words "consistent with our colonial condition."

THE EXECUTIVE.—Sir John moved—

"That the Executive authority or Government shall be vested in the Sovereign of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and be *administered according to the well understood principles of the British Constitution by the Sovereign personally or by representative duly authorized.*

"Mr. Tupper. Is it meant to leave it to the Queen or to make any suggestion as to the appointment of a Viceroy?

"Mr. John A. Macdonald. *I think it advisable not to make any suggestion.* At least it should not be a constitutional suggestion. *Hereafter the Parliament of the Federation may represent a desire for one of the Royal Family as Viceroy.*

"Mr. Macdonald's motion carried."

This resolution became No. 4 of the series adopted by the Conference. From it alone could anyone suspect Sir John's design, and its significance appears to have escaped the observation of those who would have been opposed to its necessary implication. Formerly the Executive of Canada had been a Governor-General acting under the instructions of the Colonial Secretary, and that fact stamped her status as a colony. The resolution declared for personal government by the Queen

"according to the well-understood principles of the British constitution."

and necessarily involved the elimination of the Colonial Secretary. Formerly the Canadian government had no access to the king—the Governor-General wrote to the Colonial Secretary, and the Colonial Secretary told the Governor what to do. Humiliation of that sort was to cease. But if, besides making that explanation, Sir John had proposed the rank of kingdom, and as title "The Kingdom of Canada," he would at once have heard the reverberations "through the British provinces" which he dreaded.

ENGLISH SOVEREIGNTY.—A resolution (afterwards No. 29 of the series) containing a schedule of subjects of legislation assigned to the federal parliament (something like our present sec. 91) commenced as follows:

"That it shall be competent for the General Legislature to make laws for the peace, welfare and good government of the Federated Provinces (*saving the sovereignty of England*), and especially . . ."
 . ." (b).

(a) Ibid, p. 74. And see p. 21.

(b) Pope: *Confederation Documents*, p. 24.

The words in parenthesis were unnecessary, and were omitted from the constitution as passed. Sir John did not contemplate termination of the existing sovereignty. It was little more than nominal, and its appearance of reality would have been reduced by the adoption of his design.

RANK AND NAME.—The only other resolution material for present purposes was the following (It became No. 71 of the series):

“That Her Majesty the Queen be solicited to determine the rank and name of the Federated Provinces” (a).

COMMENT.—The foregoing speeches and resolutions proved very conclusively:

1. That federation meant to the delegates something more than a mere union of colonies.

2. That it meant elevation from colonial rank.

3. That connection with the British Empire was to be maintained.

4. That that connection was not to include the continuation of the interposition of the Colonial Secretary between Canada and her sovereign.

5. That, on the contrary, the executive authority was to be administered “by the sovereign personally or by the representative of the sovereign duly authorized.”

6. That the over-riding authority of the Imperial parliament was to continue. In this connection note that the constitution was to be a British statute and, therefore, necessarily under the control, as to amendment or otherwise, of that parliament. Alteration of provincial constitutions was to be committed to the local legislatures (b).

IN PARLIAMENT.—In the Legislative Assembly of the Parliament of Canada, Sir John moved (6 February, 1865) an address to Her Majesty praying the submission to the Imperial parliament of a federation bill, based upon the resolutions of the conference, and in doing so, said—

“And it seems to me, as to them, and I think it will so appear to the people of this country, that, if we wish to be a great people; if we wish to form—using the expression which was sneered at the other evening—a *great nationality, commanding the respect of the world,*

(a) Ibid, p. 52.

(b) Ibid, p. 105.

able to hold our own against all opponents, and to defend those institutions we prize . . . this can only be obtained by a union of some kind between the scattered and weak boundaries composing the British American Provinces" (a).

"In the first place, by a resolution which meets with the universal approval of the people of this country, we have provided that for all time to come, so far as we can legislate for the future, *we shall have as the head of the executive power the Sovereign of Great Britain*. (Hear, hear). No one can look into futurity and say what will be the destiny of this country. Changes come over nations and peoples in the course of ages. But, so far as we can legislate, we provide that, for all time to come, *the Sovereign of Great Britain shall be the Sovereign of British North America*" (b).

"We have given the General Legislature all the great subjects of legislation. We have conferred on them, not only specifically and in detail, *all the powers which are incident to sovereignty*, but we have expressly declared that all subjects of general interest not distinctly and exclusively conferred upon the local governments and local legislatures, shall be conferred upon the General Government and Legislature" (c).

"If, therefore, at the Conference, we had arrived at the conclusion, that it was for the interest of these provinces that a severance should take place, I am sure that Her Majesty and the Imperial Parliament would have sanctioned that severance. We accordingly felt that there was a propriety in giving a distinct declaration of opinion on that point, and that, in framing the Constitution, its first sentences should declare, that 'The Executive authority or government shall be vested in the Sovereign of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and be administered according to the well understood principles of the British Constitution, by the Sovereign personally, or by the Representative of the Sovereign duly authorized.' That resolution met with the unanimous assent of the Conference. The desire to remain connected with Great Britain and to retain our allegiance to Her Majesty was unanimous" (d).

"We provide that 'the Executive authority shall be administered by the Sovereign personally, or by the Representative of the Sovereign duly authorized' (e). *It is too much to expect that the Queen should vouchsafe us her personal governance or presence*, except to pay us, as the heir apparent of the Throne, our future Sovereign, has already paid us, the graceful compliment of a visit. The Executive authority must therefore be administered by Her Majesty's Representative. We place no restriction on Her Majesty's prerogative in the selection of her representative. As it is now, so it will be if this Constitution is adopted. The Sovereign has unrestricted freedom of choice. Whether in making her selection she may send us one of her own family, a Royal Prince, *as a Viceroy* to rule over us, or one of the great statesmen of

(a) Debates, pp. 27-8.

(b) Ibid, pp. 32-3.

(c) Debates, p. 33.

(d) Ibid, p. 34.

(e) When on a visit the Queen would have exercised her constitutional functions on the advice of her Canadian Ministers, not of the Colonial Secretary.

England to represent her, we know not. We leave that to Her Majesty in all confidence" (a).

"The last resolution of any importance is one which although not affecting the substance of the Constitution, is of interest to us all. It is that 'Her Majesty the Queen be solicited to determine the rank and name of the federated provinces.' I do not know whether there will be any expression of opinion in this House on this subject—*whether we are to be a vice-royalty, or whether we are still to retain our name and rank as a province. But I have no doubt Her Majesty will give the matter Her gracious consideration, that She will give us a name satisfactory to us all, and that the rank She will confer upon us will be a rank worthy of our position, of our resources, and of our future*" (b).

"One argument, but not a strong one, has been used against this Confederation, that it is *an advance towards independence*. Some are apprehensive that the very fact of our forming this union will hasten the time when we shall be severed from the mother country. I have no apprehension of that kind. I believe it will have the contrary effect. I believe that, as we grow stronger, that, as it is felt in England we have become a people, able from our union, our strength, our population, and the development of our resources, to take our position among the nations of the world, she will be less willing to part with us than she would be now, when we are broken up into a number of insignificant colonies subject to attack piece-meal without any concerted action or common organization of defence. I am strongly of opinion that year by year, as we grow in population and strength, England will more see *the advantages of maintaining the alliance between British North America and herself*. Does any one imagine that, when our population instead of three and a half, will be seven millions, as it will be ere many years pass, we would be one whit more willing than now to sever the connection with England? Would not those seven millions be just as anxious to maintain their allegiance to the Queen and their connection with the Mother Country, as we are now?" (c).

"When this union takes place, we will be at the outset no inconsiderable people. We find ourselves with a population approaching four millions of souls. Such a population in Europe would make a second, or at least, a third rate power" (d).

"And when, by means of this rapid increase, we become a nation of eight or nine millions of inhabitants, *our alliance will be worthy of being sought by the great nations of the earth*. (Hear, hear.) I am proud to believe that our desire for a permanent alliance will be reciprocated in England. I know that there is a party in England—but it is inconsiderable in numbers, though strong in intellect and power—which speaks of the desirability of getting rid of the colonies: but I believe such is not the feeling of the statesmen and the people of England. I believe it will never be the deliberately expressed determination of the Government of Great Britain. (Hear, hear.) The

(a) Ibid, p. 34.

(b) Ibid, p. 43.

(c) Debates, p. 43.

(d) Ibid, p. 43.

colonies are now in a transition state. Gradually a different colonial system is being developed—and it will become, year by year, less a case of dependence on our part, and of overruling protection on the part of the Mother Country, and more *a case of a healthy and cordial alliance. Instead of looking upon us as a merely dependent colony, England will have in us a friendly nation—a subordinate but still a powerful people—to stand by her in North America in peace or in war*" (a).

"If we do not take advantage of the time, if we show ourselves unequal to the occasion, it may never return, and we shall hereafter bitterly and unavailingly regret having failed to embrace the happy opportunity now offered of *founding a great nation under the fostering care of Great Britain, and our Sovereign Lady, Queen Victoria*" (b).

Mr. George E. Cartier said—

"Whether we were made *a kingdom or a vice-royalty*—whatever name or grade was assigned to us—we would undoubtedly have additional prestige" (c).

Mr. McGee made use of a sentence not altogether pertinent here, but which I should like to reproduce—

"When I can hear our young men say as proudly, 'our Federation,' or 'our Country,' or 'our Kingdom' as the young men of other countries do, speaking of their own, then I shall have less apprehension for the result of whatever trials the future may have in store for us" (d).

Hon. Mr. Langevin said—

"Besides, we shall have acquired a standing which we have not hitherto attained in our relations with other countries with which we have dealings. It is of no small importance for the inhabitants of a country to have *a standing in foreign countries*, and not to be treated as men of inferior position. When Canadians go to London or elsewhere out of their own country, they have no recognized position, *because we are only a simple colony*. But under the Confederation we shall be protected by England, and besides *we shall have a position in foreign lands*, the position which every man enjoys who belongs to a great nation" (e).

Hon. Mr. Rose said—

"Now I do not deny that the effect of the present movement may be to *change the character of the actual relations which subsist between this province and the Mother Country*.

HON. MR. HOLTON. Hear! hear!

HON. MR. ROSE. I do not deny that the result may be to change the character of these relations. But I maintain, and I hope I shall be able to satisfy the House of the soundness of the position I take, that the change will be of that character, that, instead of loosening or

(a) Ibid, pp. 43-4.

(b) Ibid, p. 45.

(c) Debates, p. 62.

(d) Ibid, p. 145.

(e) Ibid, p. 369.

weakening or diminishing the connection with the Mother Country, it will tend to put it on a footing which will make it stronger and more enduring. (Hear, hear.) Though I believe these relations will be somewhat changed, and we may have to consider what new aspect they will present, I believe this measure is forced upon us by the necessities of our position. The irresistible force of passing events will not allow us to stand still. But, whether by this inevitable change the country shall gradually lose its dependent or protected character and assume more of the Federal relation, constituting this a territorial division of the Empire, I believe it will result in placing those relations on a surer and more steadfast footing, and that we will still acknowledge the same Sovereign, owe the same fealty, and maintain the same veneration for the English Constitution and name" (a).

"We must, from the necessities of our geographical position—so long as the United States continue to be as powerful as they are; and even if they are divided into two or three portions—we must always find in them a source of danger which must force upon us a dependence on England. We find, I repeat, in our position towards the United States, and in the great preponderating power they possess, a guarantee that *we need not apprehend that there will be anything like practical independence of England asserted by the colonies of North America*; because, from the very necessities of our position, we shall always have to look up to her for protection and aid" (b).

"But, sir, though I have said I was disposed to look upon this question—the danger of Federation rendering us independent of England, quite apart from the considerations that spring out of sentiments of loyalty, yet I believe that those attachments will be increased tenfold by this proposed union. *We will have a sentiment of nationality among ourselves*; and I consider it to be one of the first duties of a statesman to inculcate that national feeling that gives the people a strong interest in their country's welfare" (c).

Mr. Dunkin said—

"The Governor General or other head of this magnificent future vice-royalty, or what not, will hold his court and parliament at Ottawa; but a handsome sop is thrown to Quebec and Toronto, also. They, too, are each to have a provincial court and legislature and governmental departments. Everything for everybody! *As to the state that is to be created, its style and rank are left in most delightful ambiguity. We may be honored with the dignity of a kingdom, or of a vice-royalty, or of we know not what.* All we are assured of is, that it is to be a something better, higher and more grand than we now have" (d).

"Great Britain has not yet, in any true sense of the term, federated herself with any of her colonies. She just retains a nominal supremacy over them.

MR. SCOBLE. It is a real supremacy.

(a) Debates, p. 395.

(b) Ibid, p. 396.

(c) Ibid, p. 396.

(d) Ibid, p. 488.

MR. DUNKIN. No; it is only nominal as regards its exercise. It is not real in the sense of amounting to a substantial, practical exercise of power over the colonies. For these nearly five and twenty years past, I call to mind no legislative act of ours disallowed by the Home Government.

AN HON. MEMBER. Yes, there was one—Mr. Hincks' Currency Act.

MR. DUNKIN. Well, I believe that was. But in that case we got our own way in effect directly afterwards" (a).

"As I said just now, the Federal Government of the United States was to take place in the great family of the nations of the earth; but what place in that family are we to occupy? Simply none. The Imperial Government will be the head of the Empire as much as ever, and will alone have to attend to all foreign relations and national matters; while we shall be nothing more than we are now. *Half-a-dozen colonies federated are but a federated colony after all*" (b).

"Sir, I was saying that in this scheme there is no such conservative tendency as this—nothing indicative of a set purpose to develop, strengthen and perpetuate our connection with the Empire. That end we might indeed better gain without than with this extra machinery of local federation; for disguise it how you may, *the idea that underlies this plan is this, and nothing else—that we are to create here a something—kingdom, vice-royalty, or principality—something that will soon stand in the same position towards the British Crown that Scotland and Ireland stood in before they were legislatively united with England; a something having no other tie to the Empire than the one tie of fealty to the British Crown—a tie which in the cases, first, of Scotland, and then of Ireland, was found, when the pinch came, to be no tie at all; which did not restrain either Scotland or Ireland from courses so inconsistent with that of England as to have made it necessary that their relations should be radically changed, and a legislative union formed in place of a merely nominal union*" (c).

Mr. Cartwright said—

"And yet, sir, in less than thirty years I have lived to see Canada expand into a state equal in numbers, in resources and power of self-government to many an independent European kingdom—lacking only the will to *step at once from the position of a dependency to that of an ally—a favored ally of the great country to which we belong, and to take that rank among the commonwealth of nations which is granted to those people, and to those only, who have proved that they possess the power as well as the wish to defend their liberties. This, sir, is what I think Canada can do; this is what I think Canada ought to do; and if, as I believe, this project of Confederation would contribute most powerfully to enable us to do so, there are few sacrifices which I would refuse to make for such an object—much more, forgive my honorable friends yonder for having in time past spoken somewhat over harshly and hastily of each other*" (d).

(a) Ibid, p. 503.

(b) Debates, p. 525.

(c) Ibid, pp. 527-8.

(d) Ibid, p. 825.

Mr. Scoble said that he had written to the Duke of Newcastle, in 1859, with reference to Canada's future as follows—

"Consolidated ultimately under one government, after the model of the Mother Country, with such modifications as the circumstances of the case might require, *an empire might be formed over which, hereafter, some one branch of the Royal Family might reign a constitutional monarch, over a free and united people*" (a).

Mr. Scoble added that he had not changed his views. Mr. Rankin said—

"Sir, the time must come, sooner or later, when this country *must cease to be a colony dependent on Great Britain*; and whatever we do, whatever arrangements for the future we may make, we ought always to keep the fact plainly before our eyes, that passing events are calling upon us, *either to commence the establishment of a nationality for ourselves, or make up our minds to be absorbed in the republic lying along our southern borders*" (b).

The Hon. J. H. Cameron said—

"And if we obtain, as I hope, through the resolutions that have been passed, when the proper time comes, we will obtain—*if we get the name and status of a nation, we should not be afraid also to take the responsibilities of a nation*" (c).

"And when that united government is formed, when that union does take place, we shall then stand in a position which, according to the facts and figures that have been used from time to time in this debate, will establish us as *a power on this continent*, and enable us to assist in working out the three problems presented by the three governments—the despot government of Mexico, the republican government of the United States, and the constitutional government of these colonies" (d).

"*Our opponents say we are hardly ripe, hardly of age fit to enter upon a new nationality*. Why, sir, there are none of the lesser powers of Europe, except Belgium and Bavaria, that have a population of four millions. If we cannot establish a nation when we have four millions of people, what shall we say of Greece with its population of only one million? If we are ever to form ourselves into a nationality—and few will deny that it is our destiny to be united at some time—what better time will ever be likely to present itself for handing down to posterity the boon of a united and free nation—the greatest boon that government and people can transmit—than the opportunity which the present favorable state of affairs presents to us?" (e).

"We have, in my own humble opinion, but two future states of existence to choose for ourselves. We have, on the one side, the opportunity to make ourselves a nation, able and willing to protect ourselves, with the aid of the Mother Country, and to grow wealthy and

(a) Debates, p. 910.

(b) Ibid, p. 916.

(c) Ibid, p. 964.

(d) Ibid, p. 965.

(e) Ibid, p. 968.

prosperous under that form of existence. On the other hand, we have the certain prospect of absorption, at no distant period, into the United States. There is no alternative. (Hear, hear, ironically)" (a).

THE COLONIAL STATUS.—Throughout the debates appear indications of the opposition which would have been evoked by frank proposal of a kingdom free from the control of the Colonial Secretary. For example, one member (Mr. Walsh) said:

"I believe there is nothing more ardently to be desired—no greater glory attainable than for these colonies remaining for all time to come, as we are now, dependencies of Great Britain" (b).

The most noteworthy reference of that kind occurred in the course of the speech of the Hon. Mr. Moore, when, after he had said,

"I believe honorable gentlemen will agree with me, that after this scheme is fully carried into operation, we shall still be colonies,"

Sir E. P. Taché interjected the words, "Of course" (c).

Taché was then Prime Minister. Whether the form of relationship outlined by the Quebec resolutions could fairly be called "colonial," is one upon which opinions might differ. Although Sir Étienne was Prime Minister in name, Macdonald and Cartier were the dominating personalities in the cabinet. Sir Étienne died on the 30th of July of the same year.

DELEGATES IN LONDON.—The next scene opened in London, where delegates from the three Provinces assembled "for the purpose of arranging the terms of union" (d). After discussions lasting from the 4th to the 24th December, 1866, the delegates agreed upon a series of sixty-nine resolutions. Three of these are the same as the three above quoted from the resolutions of the Quebec Conference (e).

DELEGATES' FIRST DRAFT.—The Conference then proceeded to draft a bill. Its noticeable features (for present purposes)

(a) Debates, p. 969.

(b) Ibid, p. 810.

(c) Ibid, p. 228.

(d) Pope Documents, p. 305.

(e) Ibid, pp. 98-110. The five resolutions are now numbered 3, 4, 28, 29, and 71. In the resolutions of the Quebec Conference the phrases "federal union," "federation," and "federated Provinces" were used. Mr. Charles Tupper seems to have been partly responsible for the introduction of the inappropriate term "confederation" (Ibid, pp. 114, 115). It was carried into the first draft on the constitutional (Ibid, pp. 123, 124), but, fortunately, was objected to by somebody and eliminated.

are those of the clauses above quoted. No. 3 (as to following "the model of the British constitution") was omitted; No. 4 was repeated; the words "saving the sovereignty of England" were omitted in No. 29; and No. 71 (as to rank and name) was provided for by leaving blanks to be filled in afterwards (a).

LAW OFFICERS' DRAFT.—Meanwhile the Imperial law officers were also engaged in drafting a bill. Its language will give some idea of what Sir John and the other delegates had to struggle with. It recited:

"WHEREAS the Union of the British North American Colonies for Purposes of Government and Legislation would be attended with great Benefits to the Colonies and be conducive to the Interests of the United Kingdom" (b).

and it proceeded to declare that

"the said Three Colonies shall thenceforth *form and be One Colony.*"
"The United Colony shall be composed," etc.

"There shall be one Governor-General for *the United Colony,*" etc.

"For each Province there shall be an Officer, styled *the Superintendent,*" etc.

DELEGATES' SECOND DRAFT.—The delegates produced a second draft (c). It is dated 2 February, 1867. The law officers' draft had provided that

"the said Three Colonies shall thenceforth form and be *One Colony.*"

Instead of that, the delegates' draft provided that

"the said Provinces . . . shall form and be one united dominion *under the name of the Kingdom of Canada, and thenceforth the said Provinces shall constitute and be One Kingdom under the name aforesaid . . .*" (d).

That was the suggestion of the delegates as to Canada's "rank and name"; and we may assume that all the delegates had agreed to it. Further, the draft of the law officers had provided that

"There shall be for *the United Colony* Two Houses of Parliament styled the Legislative Council and the House of Commons" (e).

whereas the delegates' draft provided that

"From and after the Union, there shall be within and for the *Kingdom of Canada,* one General Parliament, which shall be composed

(a) Pope: *Confederation Documents*, pp. 123-140.

(b) *Ibid.*, p. 141.

(c) I refer only to the drafts of which Sir Joseph Pope has furnished us with copies.

(d) *Ibid.*, p. 159.

(e) *Ibid.*, p. 142.

of the Queen, an Upper Chamber, to be called the Senate, and a House of Commons" (a).

The law officers had provided for the constitution of an Executive Council. The draft of the delegates added the words:

"which shall be called the Privy Council of Canada" (b).

DELEGATES' THIRD DRAFT.—Between the 2nd and 9th February, the delegates prepared their third draft bill. In it they made further use of the phrase "Kingdom of Canada." For example:

"The word 'Parliament' shall mean the Legislature or Parliament of the *Kingdom of Canada*" (c).

The following clauses were new:

"The word 'Kingdom' shall mean and comprehend the United Provinces of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick.

The words 'Privy Council' shall mean such persons as may from time to time be appointed by the Governor-General, and sworn to aid and advise in the Government of the Kingdom.

The word 'Canada' (when not applied to the Province of Canada) shall mean the Kingdom of Canada hereby constituted" (d).

JOINT DRAFT.—The next draft (9th February) is the joint product of the delegates and the English law officers (e). Prior to its preparation, Sir John had made his last fight for elevation of his country out of colonialism, and had fallen back beaten. The words

"shall form and be one united dominion under the name of the Kingdom of Canada, and thenceforth the said Provinces shall constitute and be one Kingdom under the name aforesaid"

were supplanted by the language which now appears in the constitution:

"shall form and be *One Dominion* under the name of Canada; and on and after that Day those three Provinces shall form and be *One Dominion* under that Name accordingly" (f).

Corresponding substitution was made throughout the draft. The recital was made to declare that which was untrue—

(a) Ibid, p. 160.

(b) Ibid, pp. 142, 160.

(c) Ibid, p. 177.

(d) Ibid, p. 178. And see also secs. 12, 15, 48, 49.

(e) Pope, *Sir John Macdonald*, vol. I., p. 311, note.

(f) Pope: *Confed. Docts.*, p. 213.

"WHEREAS the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick have expressed their Desire to be federally united into *One Dominion* under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom" (a).

SIR JOHN'S BIOGRAPHER.—Sir Joseph Pope has said—

"At Westminster, as elsewhere, the guiding hand throughout the whole of these negotiations was that of Sir John Macdonald, who, amid much discouragement, devoted all the energies of his mind to the work of building up a new nationality on this continent. When I speak of discouragements, I do not refer to the difficulties inseparable from the task of reconciling the different and sometimes conflicting interests of the several provinces, but rather to the want of appreciation shown by the Imperial authorities of the great work in hand. They were, as I have said, interested in the negotiations, and freely lent their assistance to the carrying out of the scheme, but *their idea of what was to be attained fell far short of the lofty conception of Mr. Macdonald. He was intent upon founding a kingdom, they upon effecting an arrangement which would result in the simpler administration of the Colonial Office.* With his mind full of the Imperial idea, he seized upon the occasion as affording an opportunity for consolidating and strengthening British rule upon this continent, while they do not seem to have been animated by any higher notion than that it would be a good deal more convenient to deal with one colony than with half a dozen. Sir John himself has illustrated very clearly what I have attempted to say."

"The title 'Kingdom of Canada' appears for the first time in the interpretation clause of the sixth draft of the Bill (b). It was substituted for the words 'United Provinces,' which appear in the preceding draft. Mr. Macdonald, impressed with the importance of the monarchical term, made every effort to retain it; but, for the reason which he relates, the Imperial authorities would not consent to its use" (c).

SIR JOHN'S TESTIMONY.—Twenty-two years after the passing of our constitutional Act, Sir John was still resentful at the failure of Colonial Office sympathy with the great project of founding a Kingdom, and writing to Lord Knutsford (18 July, 1889) (d) he said—

"A great opportunity was lost in 1867, when the Dominion was formed out of the several provinces. This remarkable event in the

(a) Ibid, p. 212.

(b) This is a mistake. The title appeared in what the author would call the fifth draft bill; for although the term "United Provinces" is used in the interpretation clause of that draft, the title "Kingdom of Canada" appears in several other clauses (secs. 4, 9, 10, 11, etc.).

(c) Ibid, pp. 311-313.

(d) Pope, *Sir John Macdonald*, vol. I., p. 311-13; and Sir Joseph's letters to the *Ottawa Citizen* of 26 July, 1917.

history of the British Empire passed almost without notice. The new Confederation had, at the time of the union, about the same population as the thirteen colonies when they rebelled and formed a nation imbued with the bitterest feelings of hostility towards England—feelings which, by the way, exist in as offensive a form now as they did on the day of the 'declaration of independence.'

"The declaration of all the B.N.A. provinces, that they desired as one Dominion to remain a portion of the Empire, showed what wise government and generous treatment would do, and *should have been marked as an epoch in the history of England.* This would probably have been the case had Lord Carnarvon, who as Colonial Minister had 'sat at the cradle' of the new Dominion, remained in office. His ill-omened resignation was followed by the appointment of the late Duke of Buckingham, who had as his adviser the then Governor-General, Lord Monck—both good men, certainly, but quite unable, from the constitution of their minds, to rise to the occasion. The Union was treated by them as if the B.N.A. Act were a private Bill uniting two or three English parishes. Had a different course been pursued—for instance, *had united Canada been declared to be an auxiliary Kingdom, as it was in the Canadian draft of the Bill—I feel sure (almost) that the Australian Colonies would, ere this, have been applying to be placed in the same rank as 'The Kingdom of Canada.'*

"Pray pardon this long discursive letter, which I have been tempted to bore you with by the pleasant and cool breezes of the Lower St. Lawrence, where I am spending some weeks of escape from the heat of Ottawa, and by the hope that, by the time this reaches you, you will have been able to get away for a time from official cares.

"Should I be able to visit England this year, I shall not refrain from pressing my views on Her Majesty's Government at even greater length than I now venture to trouble your lordship with.

"Meanwhile believe me, dear Lord Knutsford,

"Faithfully yours,

"John A. Macdonald."

"P.S.—On reading the above over, I see that it will convey the impression that the change of title from Kingdom to Dominion was caused by the Duke of Buckingham. This is not so. It was made at the instance of Lord Derby, then Foreign Minister, who feared the first name would wound the sensibilities of the Yankees. I mentioned this to Lord Beaconsfield at Hughenden in 1878, who replied: 'I was not aware of the circumstance, but it is so like Derby, a very good fellow but one who lives in a region of perpetual funk.'—J.A.M.D."

SIR JOHN AND SIR ROBERT.—If the purpose of this narration had been to present an account of the genesis of federation, it would be fairly open to the criticism that it says little of the work of Brown, Tupper, Tilley and the other "fathers of federation." But as the intention was to depict the attitude of one of these men only, that of the others is largely irrelevant. And if it be said that the narrative leaves the impression

of an original conception held by Sir John alone; confided gradually to a few; concealed from the unthinking crowds; and finally, and only when absolutely necessary, revealed to his colleague-delegates in London, my reply is that I make no pretence to certainty on these points. I present them hypothetically. Whether true or not is immaterial for present purposes; for all that is desired is to place in contrast Sir John's Canadianism and Sir Robert's imperialism.

Sir John was the great leader. He struggled splendidly for Canada. Sir Frederick Rogers, the Permanent Under Secretary of the Colonies, has given us a view of his ability:

"Lord Carnarvon was in the chair, and I was rather disappointed in his power of presidency. Macdonald was the ruling genius and spokesman, and I was very greatly struck by his power of management and adroitness. The French delegates were keenly on the watch for anything which weakened their securities; on the contrary, the Nova Scotia and New Brunswick delegates were very jealous of concession to the *arriere* province; while one main stipulation in favor of the French was open to constitutional objections on the part of the Home government . . . He stated and argued the case with cool, ready fluency, while at the same time you saw that every word was measured, and that while he was making for a point ahead, he was never for a moment unconscious of any of the rocks among which he had to steer" (a).

Sir John passed. Sir Wilfrid was handicapped. And now we have Sir Robert and imperialism. With Sir John, vanished also (as we now see) all hope of THE KINGDOM OF CANADA. My feeble efforts to revive the "lofty conception" of our eminent statesman were gratefully received (I am thankful to know) by not a few of my fellow-countrymen, and may have supplied information concerning our political history which may yet be of service in the coming struggle with imperialism. But Canada will never occupy the position designed for her by Sir John Macdonald. Imperialism will either reduce her powers of self-government or provoke their climax.

THE REPUBLIC OF CANADA.

KINGDOM OF CANADA.—Discontented with the political subordination of Canada; anxious that she should cease to be "an adjunct even of the British Empire" (b); longing for her ele-

(a) *Lord Blatchford's Letters*, pp. 301, 302.

(b) Sir Robert Borden's phrase.

vation to respectability, I have for some years, through the *Kingdom Papers*, urged our assumption of the status of an internationally recognized state, but with the retention of the present King of Canada. England and Scotland in the reigns of the Stuarts had the same king, and so also had Great Britain and Hanover during the Hanoverian regime. The king of the United Kingdom is now the King of Canada. Why might not that which we objected to (subordination to the British peoples) be terminated, and that to which we have never objected (nominal subordination to the British King) be continued?

AUTONOMY DIMINISHING.—But for the war, the violent access of imperialism which it has precipitated, and the synchronization of an imperialistic Canadian Government, I still think that Sir John A. Macdonald's desire for a "Kingdom of Canada" as "a great nationality commanding the respect of the world" could have been realized. Now it cannot. We have sunk back into colonialism. We are being treated as children, and we are submitting to the treatment.

THE REASON.—The situation owes its existence to our allegiance to the British King. As long as king-union continues, we shall be regarded as part of the British Empire, from which will be deduced that, as the Empire is a unit, so its resources must belong to the Empire and be applicable, under Imperial direction, to the needs of the Empire as a whole.

Conception and language of that sort are fatal to Canada. I had not imagined that any possible concatenation of circumstances could not only make them current, but could apply them successfully to the political downfall of Canada. The unexpected has happened, and we are now driven to assert that if the foundation of allegiance to the same king is the base which alone supports the scaffold upon which we are to be sacrificed, then, regret it as we may, the foundation must be destroyed.

DECLENSION.—We have been at the climax of our political ascent. As a colony we scaled to a higher plane than could have been thought possible—to the control of our tariff, even to the shaping of other of our foreign relations. But just prior to reaching the loftiest pinnacle, our strength failed us;

we suffered the first declension in our history; we agreed to accept British military advice and British military advisers. The fatal precedent is being rapidly followed and expanded. Advice in various departments has advanced through recommendation and persuasion, into joint inquiry, co-operation and guidance. Control will come, partly by purchase of properties and partly by the usual developments through expostulation, and threat. The road to engulfment is being rapidly traversed. It is all down-hill. And we have no brakes.

COMPROMISED.—As a colony, we are compromised and embarrassed beyond recovery. Our Minister of Trade and Commerce has signed a document which contains the admission that our nickel and asbestos are “of vital importance to the Empire as a whole”; which treats our minerals as “Imperial assets”; and which regards them as “Empire resources” available for “Empire requirements.” Our Prime Minister has supplemented these statements by joining in recommending the creation of “The Imperial Mineral Resources Bureau,” for the very purpose of advising how our minerals can best be applied to the “Empire requirements”; and the Bureau is at work. What was Canada’s has become the Empire’s; and the functions of our parliament are, in very appreciable measure, to be discharged by British Boards and Bureaus.

WRECKED.—As a self-governing colony, we are wrecked beyond repair. Imperialistic Canadians will rejoice. To them, the Empire is everything, and Canada a mere source of supply. They glory in Canada’s being a part of the Empire, and are indifferent to her role. They would willingly surrender a large measure of her legislative power to a federation or a council in which she would have negligible influence. And, from complete cession of autonomy down to the taking of advice, they would agree to anything which would curb Canada and place her—her men, money, and resources, for any and every purpose, at the disposal of the British government.

CANADIAN IMPERIALISM.—That is the true spirit of imperialism. And if you ask whether Canadian imperialists can covet their own effacement, I answer that they regard themselves not as Canadians, but as British, and that, as British

imperialists, they desire British control over Canada. They have always desired it. From the earliest page in our history down to the present day, they have struggled against Canadian autonomy. They hate the word. They hate our song. They hate our flag. Sir George Foster opposed our negotiation of trade treaties on the ground that it was the prerogative of "an absolute and independent power" (a). Mr. Cockshutt, M.P., said:

"This country is sick and tired of the word 'autonomy'; it has been worked to death" (b).

Mr. Ames, M.P., said:

"Autonomy, which was the slogan of the last century, has done its work, accomplished its purpose, and belongs to the last century. It does not belong to the Canada of to-day" (c).

THE QUESTION.—If not quite right in 1913, Mr. Ames is right now. And the question for those of us who are not imperial-Canadians, who hate subordination to anybody, and who detest subjection to any authority but their own, is whether Canada is to return to the bondage of colonialism, or is safely to emerge from her present entanglements as a self-governing and self-respecting nation.

PAST HOPES.—While the scope of her self-control was expanding, Canada tolerated her colonialism. In each victory over her imperialists, she saw hope of final triumph. Her nationhood might be deferred, but it appeared to be secure. Federationists she easily defeated. Chamberlain went down before Laurier. The dawn of the new era was lighting the eastern hills. Complete self-government; equal status with the other sister-states; union through the same King, seemed to be most certainly assured.

A REPUBLIC.—The prospect has passed. Not along that line may Canada rise to nationhood. And if her colonialism must cease; if all schemes of political union upon any other basis are impracticable and impossible; and if even a crown-union would be a constant source of peril, there remains but one course open to us, and that is to proclaim THE REPUBLIC OF CANADA.

(a) *Hansard* (Canada), 1892, p.

(b) *Ibid* (17 Dec., 1913), p. 1625.

(c) *Ibid* (17 Dec., 1913), p. 1298.

PRESENT DISCUSSION.—It is tragically unfortunate that while Canadians are fighting Prussian imperialism in Europe, they should be called upon to repel the attacks of British imperialism in Canada. Utterly unable, during peace, to make any advance with their federation and other projects, imperialists are now taking advantage of war necessities and engagements in order that, at the end of the war, they may carry into the conference for the readjustment of political relations a partially accomplished fact.

They can find no justification in the pendency of the war for "the advances" in imperialism which they have made and of which they boast. The allies are working together strongly and harmoniously, and, in their co-operations, no trace of the sinister working of ulterior political motives can be detected. The one purpose is, as it ought to be, to win the war.

Professing concurrence in the necessity, under present circumstances, for unity, imperialists have not hesitated to precipitate a most skillfully planned attack upon Canada's powers of self-government—an attack which they well knew would arouse resentment in Canada. They have done it; and now, while we are fighting for the liberation of Belgium, Serbia, and Rumania, we find that there has been forced upon us a struggle for the freedom of our own land. Canada's voice must be heard before the re-adjusting conference meets, and, unfortunately, that means during the war.

By cessation of the *Kingdom Papers*, I did what little I could to postpone constitutional discussion until after the war. Unofficial imperialists made my persistence in silence difficult. The proceedings of our ministers in London have made it impossible. Sir Robert Borden has been engaged, as he says, in "revolutionary proceedings . . . in the government of the Empire," which have "brought about an important advance in constitutional relations," leading to "a new and greater Imperial Commonwealth"; and he and Sir George Foster have been taking the necessary preliminary steps toward the transfer to the intended Commonwealth of the resources of Canada.

Further silence would, for me, be a crime against Canada. I recognize that thus far the schemes of the imperialists have been successful; that they have made abundantly clear that our status as a Sister-Kingdom has become an impracticability; and that now our only alternative is between deeper subordination and complete separation. Under such circumstances, we cannot hesitate to reply that we elect for self-respecting national life as THE REPUBLIC OF CANADA.

FIFTY YEARS AGO AND NOW.

MISS MACHAR.—Fifty years ago, Canada's assumed emergence from colonialism was hailed by a lady who lived in Sir John's city:

"Through the young giant's mighty limbs, that stretch from sea to sea,

There runs a throb of conscious life—of waking energy.
From Nova Scotia's misty coast to far Columbia's shore,
She wakes—a land of scattered homes, and colonies no more,
But a young nation, with her life full beating in her breast,
A noble future in her eyes—the Britain of the West."

Miss Machar (*a*) was mistaken. Sir John and those closely associated with him felt the "throb of conscious life." To Mr. W. A. Foster of Toronto and a few others, there came a desire for something more respectable than colonialism. But Canada was unmoved. For nationalism she cared nothing. The "lofty conception" of Sir John fell in Canada on ground as stoney as it met in England.

AUSTRALIA.—And now our leaders are plunging us backwards. Thoughtful Australians (even without knowledge of the schemes and practices above referred to) are becoming alarmed. They are realizing that their country is "less mistress of its own fortunes than it had supposed" (*b*).

"Now, with constitutional government by Parliament in the main superseded by executive government under the War Precautions Act, as one restriction after another is imposed 'at the request of the Imperial Government,' or 'in consequence of information received' from the War Office or the Admiralty, Australians in general are beginning to feel that their self-government is somehow less than it was. This feeling inevitably leads to a consideration of future political relations. The simpler reaction is found in murmurs of 'too much Imperial Parliament'; a recrudescence of the old sensitiveness as to 'Downing Street'; and suspicions of further attacks on our autonomy by schemes threatening 'Imperial Federation' or 'organic union'" (*c*).

"Deep, even passionate, resentment is excited or expressed at the suggestion that Australia demands or will demand any share in Imperial government, and it is even insisted that the Federal Government should intervene to set Britain right in regard to the 'misrepresentations' which suggest the possibility of such a demand" (*d*).

(*a*) Miss Machar used the pseudonym *Fidelis*.

(*b*) *The Round Table*, June 1917, p. 611.

(*c*) *Ibid*, pp. 611, 612.

(*d*) *Ibid*, p. 612.

"The Convention of the powerful Australian Workers' Union has carried a resolution, 'That in view of the possibility of Australia being dragged into a scheme of Imperial Federation which would abrogate our rights and privileges under responsible government, and seriously undermine the palladium of our liberties—the Commonwealth Constitution—this Convention of the Australian Workers' Union places on record its stoutest opposition to this Dominion of the Empire being governed by the plutocrats of England, which the proposed scheme would involve.' There has been a lively discussion in the *Sydney Worker*; and other Labour organs have, with varying degree of vehemence, expressed views similar to those of the Australian Workers' Union" (a).

MR. HARRIS.—Even from England do we hear strong protest against the proposed imperialistic exploitations. In *The Contemporary Review* for July (arrived after all the above was in type) may be seen the following references to 'The Empire Resources Development Committee' (b).

"British Colonial policy from its inception has been based upon *service* to, and not *exploitation* of, the Dependencies. A powerful Committee, including several Ministers of the Crown, and backed by large financial interests, has come into existence with the avowed object of reversing that policy, and, by so doing, to *exploit* the Dependencies in order that they and their people may render to the Mother Country the *service* of paying for us our war-debt charges. This Committee is operating under the title of the Empire Resources Development Committee. The Chairman is Sir Starr Jameson, the President of the Chartered Company, while the Honorary Secretary, together with certain other members of the Committee, are either Directors or otherwise closely connected with the Company, the driving force and the declared policy are also of the Chartered group. Though it is true that the main interests connected with the Committee, its policy, and its driving force are, in all essentials, those of the Rhodesian Chartered Company, there has been added to the membership a group of representative men whose names are well known in quite different connections—men who have little knowledge of Rhodesia, and those who have in no sense grasped the paths along which Sir Starr Jameson and Mr. Wilson Fox propose leading them."

The writer adds that

"it is the duty of every right thinking Britisher to take up the challenge and defeat an attempt which, if it succeeds, may lead to the disruption of the British Empire. The struggle will be short, but furious, and, God helping Britain, it shall be won" (c).

CANADA.—All the help that Canada needs is that she may be wakened and made to understand. For the moment we have

(a) *Ibid.*, p. 610.

(b) See *Ante*, p.

(c) *Empire Resources Development and Britain's War Debt*, pp. 65, 66.

lost the road to nationalism. Probably we have lost nothing but the wrong road. If so, we must be content to grope and struggle a little before the true course becomes clear to our people.

This, at all events,—the first of our lessons—is certain. Imperialism is the enemy—the enemy in Europe and the enemy in Canada. Imperialism was the cause of the present war. Imperialism was the cause of the American revolution. Imperialism was the cause of the Canadian rebellions. Imperialism is the curse and the scourge of the world.

And this I say to the imperialists who are pressing their crown of thorns upon the brow of the Canadian people. Crush it down. Restrict our political liberty. Restrain our legislative freedom. Take possession of our property and resources. Apply our assets to the payment of the British war debt. Add us to your fighting strength. Reduce us to a source of supply—men, materials, and money. Throw us into your international bargain scales. Count us as Egyptian fellaheen and Indian ryots.

Crush it down, I say, until it enters the bone. Repeat for us the tragedy of your Transvaal imperialism. Lord Milner is once more a dominating figure. He is the same masterful aristocrat now that he was then. He drove the Boers into a war for freedom. He is reducing Canada to shameful subjugation. He has dissipated all hope of THE KINGDOM OF CANADA. He will find, I tell him, that he has but turned us to a better, for a more secure and enduring, destiny. He, principally, is the founder of THE REPUBLIC OF CANADA.

Ottawa, August, 1917.

JOHN S. EWART.

